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THE NEW CITIZENSHIP

By the Same Author

THE
ORGANIZATION OF LIFE

A revaluation of evidence relative to the primary factors in the activity and evolution of living organisms, including a factorial analysis of human behavior and experience

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THE NEW CITIZENSHIP

A Study of American Politics

BY

SEBA ELDRIDGE

University of Kansas

Author of Political Action, etc.

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PREFACE

Much has been written about the citizen's failure to practice the self-determination conferred on him by eulogistic theories of political democracy. Many prescriptions for his shortcomings have been tried, but to all appearances the patient's condition grows steadily worse. This arouses a suspicion of faulty diagnosis and even of incurable malady.

This book presents a fresh diagnosis and a new prescription, based on a systematic examination of the influences conditioning the citizen's development. The prescription calls for a radical re-orientation of popular interests, which alone can make responsible citizenship possible; and for the construction of citizenship institutions designed to foster the intellectual and practical activity that alone can make popular government a reality.

The outcome of the program offered, if it should be tried, is far from certain. Grounds are set forth for the hypothesis, however, that it has a fighting chance of success. Plans are elaborated for testing this hypothesis experimentally. Only such a test can decide whether the rather heroic remedies proposed shall meet the fate of all the others that have been tried hitherto. The issues, no less scientific than practical, are such momentous ones that a conclusive test,

whether favorable or adverse, would surely be fraught with far-reaching consequences.

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Lawrence, Kansas

January, 1929

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THE NEW CITIZENSHIP

CHAPTER I

THE FAILURE OF POPULAR GOVERNMENT

THE American citizen appears to be in a somewhat parlous condition. Evidences multiply that he has failed grievously to practice the self-determination imputed to him by the accepted theory of democracy; and grave doubts are raised that he can ever approximate, in practice, the attainment of that ideal.

Illustration of these statements will perhaps be a work of supererogation, for all competent students of politics concede their correctness. Yet an exposition of the citizen's failure will serve to reveal its nature, and to that extent illuminate the problem it creates.

The most obvious indication of this failure, perhaps, is the growth of non-voting. In forty years the proportion of the actual to the eligible vote has declined from eighty to fifty per cent, varying, of course, from state to state and from one election to another. Investigation shows that many fail to vote because of absence from home, sickness in the family, recent change of residence or other sufficient reasons. Yet we may assume, in the absence of

statistical evidence, that something like the same proportion were prevented by similar causes from voting forty years ago, and that the decline in actual voting since that time signifies a corresponding decline of political interest. The most thorough study of non-voting yet undertaken, that of Merriam and Gosnell in Chicago, illustrates this fact. Approximately thirty per cent of the non-voters interviewed in that city gave valid reasons for their failure to participate in the elections, while the remainder could not adduce such reasons, unless confessed indifference, disbelief in woman suffrage, inconvenient location of the polls, preoccupation in work, and the like be so regarded. One significant evidence of the citizen's failure, then, is abstention from voting because, for one reason or another, it is not considered sufficiently important to justify the effort involved.¹

The condition of party politics in the United States is eloquent evidence of the same failure. As all students of the subject know, partisan activity is dominated by a relatively small number of professional and semi-professional politicians, the great majority of whom are interested primarily in their own pocketbooks and perhaps in the "game for its own sake," but only secondarily in "the public welfare." It is known, too, that the politicians' interests are best subserved, as a rule, through their alliance with the wealthier economic interests,

¹ The increased proportion of eligible voters participating in the 1928 election may necessitate some qualifications of this conclusion.

namely, those of the business men, particularly the practitioners of big business. We are not less ignorant of the fact that the rank and file of voters exert very little influence on the party machine and the uses made of its power. The voters must of course be "educated," "brought into line," and there are real contests between the two major parties in this game; but the party machines accomplish this task without making any very extensive concessions to the real interests of the voters. Perhaps a growing realization of this fact accounts, in part, for the increase of non-voting and of the indifference to politics it signifies.

One very pertinent question must be raised here. Actual politics is not a function solely of the interests of professional politicians and of the business or other economic groups that influence political activity. Theoretically, the citizen might have dominated the development of party politics in the United States, or at least have furnished a counterpoise to the power of politicians and allied economic interests that would have directed party government, in some substantial measure, to the expression of his interests. Why has not the citizen done this in reality? Reserving this question for later consideration, we merely note here that prevailing political conditions are a result of the citizen's influence as well as of the control exercised by professional politicians and their allies.

The failure of the citizen is so important, so cen-

tral a fact in our politics, that it may well be illustrated by concrete examples. Let us take some cases of it from Riordon's *Plunkitt of Tammany Hall* (1905), which presents in George Washington Plunkitt's own words his disclosures regarding party politics as practiced by the celebrated Democratic machine of New York City. It may be explained, for the benefit of readers unacquainted with the book cited, that Mr. Plunkitt was a Tammany district leader high up in the counsels of that organization. While his revelations are exceptional and even unique in character, the practices he describes are fairly typical of machine politics elsewhere.

In one of the conversations reported by Mr. Riordon, Plunkitt tells how he secured a political following. He first got a *cousin* who was not interested in politics to "follow" him politically and vote as he directed, irrespective of the issues. His next two recruits were *school friends* who, like his cousin Tommy, agreed to stand by him, regardless of the issues involved. He then proceeded to work the flat-house he lived in, "the next house and so on down the block and around the corner," until finally he had sixty men back of him. Plunkitt doesn't tell what inducements he held out to all these voters, other than his cousin and his school friends, but quite likely they agreed to "stand by him" because he was their *neighbor* or perhaps a "good mixer" and because, like Tommy, they "didn't take any particular interest in politics." There is never a hint that any of the fol-

lowers thus recruited realized their welfare was involved in the educational, the sanitary, the industrial and all the other problems over which politics of the Tammany type gave the control, and that not only in the local community but in state and nation as well.

These illustrations are taken from Plunkitt's talk on "How to Become a Statesman." Further illustrations are furnished by the talk entitled "To Hold Your District—Study Human Nature and Act Accordin'." The young fellow who is proud of his voice accepts an invitation to join "our Glee Club"; a baseball player is brought into "our baseball club"; and likewise "the feller that likes rowin' on the river, the young feller that makes a name as a waltzer on his block, the young feller that's handy with his dukes" are all enlisted "by givin' them opportunities to show themselves off." The older folks are enrolled under the Plunkitt banner by helping them "in the different ways they need help." When a family in the district is burned out, quarters are provided, clothes furnished and other help given until "they get things runnin' again." Families in want for other reasons are also aided, jobs found for men out of work and candy given to the little ones, all with the same end in view.

Plunkitt's revelations illuminate so well the motives back of the voter's action in politics, when he *does* act, that a further sample of them may be presented. This details the "political work" done by

Plunkitt during a single day, the record in this case being presented in the words of Mr. Riordon, Plunkitt's editor.

A Day's Work By Plunkitt.—2 A. M.: Aroused from sleep by the ringing of his door bell; went to the door and found a bartender who asked him to go to the police station and bail out a saloon-keeper who had been arrested for violating the excise law. Furnished bail and returned to bed at three o'clock.

6 A. M.: Awakened by fire engines passing his house. Hastened to the scene of the fire, according to the custom of the Tammany district leaders, to give assistance to the fire sufferers, if needed. Met several of his election district captains who are always under orders to look out for fires, which are considered great vote-getters. Found several tenants who had been burned out, took them to a hotel, supplied them with clothes, fed them, and arranged temporary quarters for them until they could rent and furnish new apartments.

8:30 A. M.: Went to the police court to look after his constituents. Found six "drunks." Secured the discharge of four by a timely word with the judge, and paid the fines of two.

9 A. M.: Appeared in the Municipal District Court. Directed one of his district captains to act as counsel for a widow against whom dispossess proceedings had been instituted and obtained an extension of time. Paid the rent of a poor family about to be dispossessed and gave them a dollar for food.

11 A. M.: At home again. Found four men waiting for him. One had been discharged by the Metropolitan Railway Company for neglect of duty, and wanted the district leader to fix things. Another wanted a job on the road. The third sought a place on the Subway, and the fourth, a plumber, was looking for work with the Consolidated Gas Company.

The district leader spent nearly three hours fixing things for the four men, and succeeded in each case.

3 P. M.: Attended the funeral of an Italian as far as the ferry. Hurried back to make his appearance at the funeral of a Hebrew constituent. Went conspicuously to the front both in the Catholic church and the synagogue, and later attended the Hebrew confirmation ceremonies in the synagogue.

7 P. M.: Went to district headquarters and presided over a meeting of election district captains. Each captain submitted a list of all the voters in his district, reported on their attitude toward Tammany, suggested who might be won over and how they could be won, told who were in need, and who were in trouble of any kind and the best way to reach them. District leader took notes and gave orders.

8 P. M.: Went to a church fair. Took chances on everything, bought ice-cream for the young girls and the children, kissed the little ones, flattered their mothers and took their fathers out for something down at the corner.

9 P. M.: At the club-house again. Spent \$10 on tickets for a church excursion and promised a subscription for a new church-bell. Bought tickets for a base-ball game to be played by two nines from his district. Listened to the complaints of a dozen push-cart peddlers who said they were persecuted by the police and assured them he would go to Police Headquarters in the morning and see about it.

10:30 P. M.: Attended a Hebrew wedding reception and dance. Had previously sent a handsome wedding present to the bride.

12 P. M.: In bed.

That is the actual record of one day in the life of Plunkitt. He does some of the same things every day, but his life is not so monotonous as to be wearisome. [From *Plunkitt of Tammany Hall* by W. L. Riordan, Copyright 1905 by Doubleday, Page and Company.]

All these instances illustrate the methods used by

Plunkitt in capturing political power. Elsewhere in the same volume he shows how this power is exploited in enriching himself. He is careful to draw a distinction, now become famous, between "honest graft" and "dishonest graft." The latter includes (or did at that time) "blackmailin' gamblers, saloon keepers, disorderly people, etc." He avers that he and his fellow politicians do not practice this sort of graft, because, as he puts it, "why should the Tammany leaders go into such dirty business, when there is so much honest graft lyin' around when they are in power?" He proceeds to show, by examples, how he got rich through this species of graft. His party is in power, and about to undertake a lot of public improvements. He is "tipped off" that a park will be laid out at a certain place, buys up all the land he can in that neighborhood, and sells at a "good price" after announcement of the project has enhanced the value of the property. Likewise, he buys up land needed for approaches to a new bridge, part of a watershed to be utilized for a city water supply, and the like. But he does not confine himself to transactions in land, for, as he says, "anything that pays is in my line."

He tells in another place of reciprocity in patronage between Tammany and private business interests, and also between Tammany and the Republican organization. Once, after Tammany was defeated at the elections, he got several hundred jobs for his followers on the surface and elevated railways, and "placed a lot more on public works done by con-

tractors," so that, as he boasted, "no Tammany man goes hungry in my district." "Plunkitt's O. K. on an application for a job is never turned down," he says, "for they all know that Plunkitt and Tammany don't stay out long." Reciprocity between Tammany and the Republican politicians is quite as cordial. "When Tammany's on top I do good turns for the Republicans. When they're on top, they don't forget me. Speaking of the cooperation between himself and the Republican leader in his district, he says "we differ on tariffs and currencies and all them things, but we agree on the main proposition that when a man works in politics he should get something out of it."

These instances sufficiently illustrate for present purposes the use made by politicians of the power acquired through the practices previously cited. Needless to say, the picture would require considerable "touching up" to fit machine politics elsewhere, particularly state and national politics. It is safe to say, however, that methods of the same general type are applied the country over in building up the power of professional politicians, and that uses made of the power thus secured are also of the sort illustrated.

A more recent picture of machine politics is presented in Frank R. Kent's *The Great Game of Politics* (1924). In one of his chapters Kent describes the methods whereby the precinct executive of a party gets his power. This personage has charge of the smallest unit of the political machine, the election precinct organization, and it is his business to get

enough votes at the primary to assure continued control of the machine in his precinct. On the average, each party in an election precinct will poll only about 125 votes at primary elections, owing to the fact that only a small percentage of voters take part in primaries, although these are far more important than final elections. Sixty-five votes will therefore be sufficient, ordinarily, to maintain the control of the given party in the average precinct. Kent proceeds to show how the requisite votes are secured. (We must remember that Kent is giving a generalized account of this process.)

The precinct executive controls a *family* vote of five, his own and those of his wife, parents, children or other relatives. The precinct executives of the two major parties select the election judges and clerks of the precinct, though these are formally appointed by a public official or board. Each of the two executives will, on the average, name *three* of these officials. The latter are paid for their services by the state, but are indebted to the precinct executive for their appointment. These three officials are selected with a view to enhancing the power of the precinct executive at the primaries. They are good, on the average, for five votes each, those of the given election official and members of his family.

Added to the twenty votes thus recruited are five controlled by the proprietor of the polling place. Rent for this is likewise paid by the state, but the place is picked by the precinct executive (of the party

in power). Then there are two "runners" or "messengers" employed by the precinct executive "to get out the vote," and paid for their services, this time out of party funds handled by the precinct executive. These deliver to the latter a family vote of five each. Finally, there are jobholders, such as street cleaners, policemen, firemen and department clerks, who secured their jobs on the recommendation of the precinct executive. There will be, on the average, at least seven of these jobholders who may be counted on to back the organization with a family vote of five each. All these votes put together make up the sixty-five necessary to the continued power of the precinct executive and his faction of the party in the given precinct.

Kent describes the other parts of the party machine and their operation, but the precinct organization deals most directly with the voter, and is therefore drawn upon here for illustrations of the voter's motives in political action.

A concrete case will emphasize the significance of the generalized account just presented. Incidentally, it serves as a verification, in one instance, of Kent's own account, the correctness of which has been questioned by some students of politics. The case was reported by a student at a mid-western university, and from a rural community of a state alleged to rank pretty high as regards political "purity."

The precinct executive of the Leoti precinct is known throughout that locality as "Accommodating Joe." Like many

of the business men in that new country he is a real estate agent by trade. Joe is very fond of corn whisky which in this precinct is an asset, as over one half of the population is made up of foreigners (mostly Russians), who are decidedly against the Volstead Act.

I have marvelled much at Joe's congenial and accommodating personality. I understand perfectly that a person should treat his neighbor as himself, but Joe is the only person I have ever known who treated his neighbor better than himself. To all appearances he many times accommodates his neighbor to the decided detriment of himself. For example, I have known him to make numerous petty loans to people who he knew would never repay them. He goes out of his way to secure hands for farmers during the busy seasons of the year, and on many occasions pitches in himself and works when other help cannot be obtained. He and his wife will drive for miles in their old rickety Ford to help care for the sick or the dead. As I have said, all of this seemed a great mystery, until two years ago when I discovered that "Accommodating Joe" is the precinct executive of my own precinct. I do not believe that his duty to get votes for the machine causes him to do all these kind and accommodating things, for I believe that to a great extent this is part of his nature. But I do believe that the motive of getting votes drives him to do more helpful things for his neighbors than he would otherwise do. Regardless of the causes for his being so accommodating, this trait is a valuable asset to the precinct executive in securing votes.

Upon inquiry I found that Joe had been our precinct executive for the past seven years, and that during that time he has almost invariably carried the primary for *all* the machine nominees. I have secured the following facts regarding the methods he uses in carrying the primary:

Joe capitalizes his extensive and thorough knowledge of all the people who live in his precinct. He knows the likes and

dislikes, friendships and enmities, of every person. By playing upon these feelings of the people he is able to swing many votes. For example, in electioneering he is able to stress the points of the machine nominee which will meet with the approval of the voter with whom he is talking. Another favorite method of Joe's is to play one rival faction off against another. In this precinct there are several factions. Some of them are quite large and able to cast many votes, while others are very small. Joe in a roundabout way will so manage that a small rival faction will pull for the non-machine man or men and as a result the machine man will get all the votes of the larger faction.

He keeps at his home a frequently revised list of all the voters in his precinct. These lists he obtains from the Supervisors of Elections. He divides the 300 or so voters of his precinct into separate lists of those registered as Republicans, those registered as Democrats and those who are unaffiliated with either party. Being a Republican, Joe pays but little attention to the Democratic and unaffiliated lists, but devotes most of his time and thought to the Republican list. He gives to this Republican list the most minute and careful analysis. He ranks the voters according to their consistency and regularity in voting, and as a result he is able to tell just about how many Republican votes will be cast in the primary. Because elections create more interest in this part of the country than in most sections, 75% of the voters will take part in the primaries. This reduces the number of Republican voters to be reckoned with to, say, 110. What has to be done is to swing a majority of these 110 votes. Sixty votes will do the stunt safely.

The families of both Joe and his wife are well represented in this precinct. From these relatives Joe can absolutely count on a vote of 14. This number plus the votes of Joe and his wife makes a total of 16 votes from this source alone.

He is also careful to recommend for the judges (two) and

the clerk of election not only men who are his political friends and will vote with him but men who can control a family vote of at least four each besides their own. Then there is the local postmaster who owes his position to the recommendation of Joe, and who can swing at least nine votes. This makes a total of forty votes of which he is sure.

The real work is in getting the last twenty votes which will give him a majority in the primary. In this number are four individuals who have sold their votes to Joe for the last six years at \$1.75 each. As a result of his many favors Joe has many staunch friends. From this source he is at the very least sure of twelve votes. This brings the votes which he can count on up to fifty-six. The remaining four votes are easily secured from the aspirants for some public office, or job, and from the small county officers or nominees who depend upon the machine for support.

However, Joe does not stop here. He goes right on and makes a sure thing surer. During election day he hops in his old Ford and brings voters to the polls from all parts of the precinct. In a hotly contested election he will have his relatives or close friends use their cars for the same purpose. Generally he furnishes money for the gas and oil. During the primary two years ago he carried a hired hand around with him for the purpose of relieving the busy farmer. The hired hand would take up the work where the farmer left off while the latter went to the polls with Joe and cast his vote. This method proved to be very successful. At least all of the farmers confronted with the proposition went to the polls.

Probably the greatest vote-getter for Joe was the jug of corn whisky which he kept constantly near him. This mystic juice had a great power of creating good fellowship. If it didn't quite make you love Joe like a brother it deadened your critical faculties to such an extent that it was easy for him

to influence your vote. In this locality they do not pretend to enforce the Volstead Act.

Due caution must be exercised in interpreting such instances. They refer, of course, to *primary* politics. This, however, rather enhances their significance, since the primary is the avenue to political power in this country. It is there that the choices open to the voter at general elections are made. Under present conditions, those choices are made in nearly all cases by party machines using methods of the sort illustrated, however much the specific methods vary from one community to another. The evidence does not of course prove that all primary elections are controlled in this way. Independent candidates genuinely opposed to all the machine stands for often poll a large vote, and in not a few cases are elected. But, in the main, the primaries are controlled by professional politicians *and* voters of the type characterized, together with *non-voters* who make this control easier by abstention from voting. A further caution to be observed in interpreting Kent's account is that it probably does not apply, without qualification, to any particular election precinct. Being general, it is not assumed to do so. When elaborated, however, as Kent himself does elaborate it in other parts of his book, it fits the Leoti Precinct surprisingly well. Finally, the methods of controlling the voter in primary elections have only a limited application to general elections. There, of course, the contest is be-

tween parties for electoral support of their several candidates as chosen at primaries thus controlled.

That considerable voting at general elections has reference to the issues is shown by the large vote sometimes polled for new parties, and also, to some extent, by fluctuations in the votes cast for the two major parties. No less significant, perhaps, is the vote recorded for minor parties which explicitly advocate radical changes in the *status quo*. Moreover, a considerable number of the voters who consistently support one or the other of the two major parties are not altogether unintelligent in so doing. These may have arrived at conclusions of their own which are not incompatible with the major policies of the particular party; or they may be dissatisfied with the policies of the party, but remain in it because they hope, in cooperation with others like themselves, to modify those policies by working from the inside.

How numerous the more or less competent voters of these various categories are, and just how high they would be rated as regards political intelligence, there is no available basis for estimating. There are grounds for the belief, however, that voters who come up to any acceptable standard of political intelligence in the exercise of the suffrage at general elections are greatly overbalanced, numerically, by voters who fall short of such a standard. The influence of parents' politics on children's politics is shown, by various investigations, to account for a large percentage of choices at the polls. The strong

hold of what may be called the Republican-or-Democratic tradition is perhaps even more significant, controlling, as it does, the great majority of voters throughout the country; for when it is considered that these parties, taken together, represent only one or at most two distinct positions on *controversial* questions, and that other probably equally tenable positions on the same questions are espoused by some one or more of the minor parties which the voter might support, it will be seen that the tradition in question is a powerful one. The enormous influence in political campaigns of grossly misleading propaganda, as in the Presidential campaign of 1924, for instance, is further evidence of political unintelligence on the part of a great many voters at general elections. Equally significant, perhaps, is the very large purchasable vote which, according to Kent, holds the balance of power in Presidential elections as well as in state and local elections where one of the two major parties is not overwhelmingly preponderant, numerically, compared with the other.²

These various evidences suffice to show that voters at general elections, like voters at the primaries, largely fail to perform intelligently the functions theoretically imputed to them. The fact that a very large percentage of those eligible to vote at general elections fail to do so, and that a great many of those who vote do so because of the efforts of the party

² Kent, F. R., *Political Behavior*, pp. 196-227.

machines, is unquestionable evidence in support of the same conclusion.

The progress achieved in dealing with public questions, together with the interest, intelligence and activity of the public itself in regard to these questions, furnishes another line of evidence as to the citizen's competency.

Social scientists have often pointed out that, as a rule, a long period of time intervenes between the recognition of a social problem and the adoption of measures designed to solve it. One sociologist has written a book on the subject giving numerous illustrations of this "cultural lag," as he terms it, besides attempting to account for the widespread existence of the phenomenon, and offering tentative suggestions for eliminating it.³ He shows, for instance, that approximately half a century elapsed after the old employers' liability laws ceased to function satisfactorily before workmen's compensation laws were generally adopted. Other illustrations are yielded by a consideration of the general property tax, the maladjustments of the family, the slow growth of trade unions and the unsatisfactory character of international relations.

Similar illustrations could be drawn from every domain of social life. Owing to rapidly changing conditions, due largely to an unprecedented development of the industrial arts, grave problems have arisen in every field of human endeavor; but these

³ Ogburn, W. F., *Social Change*.

rarely stimulate the interest and effort requisite to needed adjustments. Many such problems have been solved in the scientific sense of the term—in the sense, namely, that workable solutions have been demonstrated. But the organized effort essential to the adoption of those solutions lags behind.

One might cite a host of problems in support of this contention. The methods of conserving natural resources have been largely worked out in this and other countries. Progress in applying those methods is very slow. As a result, the virtual exhaustion of our precious petroleum resources is now only a matter of a few years; a timber famine is almost certain to overtake us within the next twenty-five or fifty years; the drain on our coal reserves is far greater than it need be; and the conservation of other resources falls far short of the demonstrated need for it. Similar observations apply to the problems of the wage earner. We know, for instance, how to eliminate unsafe and unsanitary working conditions; how to abolish the blight of child labor; how to provide the special protection needed by women workers; how to do away with the economic insecurity of the wage earner. Progress toward some of these objectives has been made, but very little toward the others. Preventable disease furnishes another illustration. Although the public is as interested in this as in most of its problems, painstaking estimates place the number of preventable deaths in this country at upwards of 500,000 annually; the number of

persons needlessly incapacitated for work at an average of a million or more; and the money waste due to these factors at well over a billion dollars a year. We have in this case a quantitative expression of the consequences resulting from the lag in the application of scientific knowledge.

These are only random illustrations from an indefinite number that might be cited.⁴ The persistence of unsolved problems in all such cases, long after the methods of solving them have been worked out, is due largely to the ignorance, indifference and inactivity of the citizen. Other factors are there, of course, notably the opposition of vested interests to changes that might put them at a disadvantage. But, in the last analysis, the public at large *could*, were it competent as a public, force the adoption of needed measures in all these fields. Only occasionally is it interested and active enough to do so. Of all the grave problems facing us at the present time, the public is actively interested in very few. The marketing of farm surpluses, the prohibition issue, the teaching of evolution, negotiation of the arbitration treaties, and financial support of the public schools would seem to exhaust the list, though various other problems engage the interest of more or less active minorities.

And, generally speaking, public opinion on such problems is ephemeral, superficial, and often mis-

⁴ A more detailed consideration of this topic will be found in the Appendix.

directed. For example, the very existence of the evolution controversy is due to public ignorance and prejudice; the genuine interest of the public in child welfare was readily perverted a few years ago so as to defeat the child labor amendment; the abiding popular interest in education, while assuring development of the schools along conventional lines, is scarcely grounded on an understanding of the deeper educational problems of the time; and public interest in problems of the farmer or the wage earner has always, at least up to this time, been relatively sporadic and ineffective.

The point of this illustrative exposition is not that popular opinion does not, first and last, count for much in decisions on questions of public policy. Compared with many other countries, public opinion is here a powerful influence. In particular, active minorities have often succeeded in vitalizing neglected problems and forcing the adoption of remedial measures. The point is that, judged by the need and possibility of the citizen's interest in public questions, he is to a high degree ignorant, apathetic and incompetent. It may be added that this fact is related both as cause and effect to the condition of party politics previously considered.

We must now try to get some notion of the problems respecting the possible rôle of the citizen in social control, which are raised by a survey of citizenship in the United States, such as has been presented.

It is evident, for one thing, that any such account

must seriously challenge the validity of our traditional conception of citizenship. This conception implies that the masses of men can and will govern themselves in political and other social relationships, given the requisite institutions. It also implies that we *have* and for a long time have had this requisite of self-government in the United States. But the evidence shows that only a relatively small measure of self-government is exercised by the masses of people as a matter of fact. It even strongly suggests that the great majority of people do not care to govern themselves, or care enough seriously to attempt it. Either that, or they have come to conclusion that they cannot govern themselves; or perhaps as another alternative, they still believe that they do govern themselves, illusory though the belief be.

Whichever of these alternatives be the correct one, it is clear that "the people" are rather definitely abdicating their rule, if they ever exercised it, and that the rule they still exercise is very largely rule by passive consent, with all that term implies. Does it not follow that the people of the United States are really repudiating, wittingly or unwittingly, the democratic ideal, and, in doing so, preparing the way for the explicit reinstatement of rule by an oligarchy? Does not the evidence show that democracy is an impossible ideal, that the "iron law of oligarchy" is indeed a law of universal validity? Is it possible, on the contrary, to create democracy, or some approach to it, by means not yet tried, or forces not

yet brought into play? Or, stating the problem in a different form, how much self-government by the masses of men is possible under the most favorable conditions that might be attainable? What are these conditions? And in what ways may they be brought about?

CHAPTER II

THE MAKING OF THE CITIZEN

THE citizen is born and brought up in a family group. This group and its individual members are engaged in promoting their own interests, with little attention given to the interests of other family groups. Family discussion and effort are chiefly concerned with the maintenance or increase of the family income, and with the housing, clothing, health service, recreation, educational opportunities and other objects upon which income shall be spent. The political, economic and social factors that condition these interests are largely *taken for granted*. The problems in which the child becomes interested and which he learns to solve, by his own observation and experience, are in large part the problems centering in the family situation thus characterized. His interests are thus given their bent, which in turn molds the interests of his children in the same direction, when he shall have acquired a family of his own. This very potent factor in the development of the citizen might be termed *familocentrism*. On its intellectual side, it embraces only a limited realization of the implications of family interests for the political and economic order with

which they are bound up. This situation has *its* determining factors, of course, and these we shall consider in their proper place.

The young citizen soon acquires membership in other groups. These are mainly *age-groups*, severally composed of individuals of approximately the same ages. The gang, the play group, the school and, later, the "social" set or circle are the more significant of these groups. Their influence in the development of honesty, truthfulness, cooperativeness, loyalty and other traits of personality is incalculably great, especially when they are deliberately directed, as they may be, toward these objectives. But, like the family, these groups are largely self-centered, and have but little interest in the larger society of which they are part. The fine moral traits developed by their means, and the problems which their members learn to solve through their group experiences, have almost exclusive reference to the amusements, adventures and associations of these groups themselves. This is inevitably so to a large degree, because childhood and youth could not identify themselves with the larger society save in limited measure, and it might not be desirable, even were it possible, that this should be so.

The school is, of course, a partial exception to these rules, since it aims to train its pupils for the various "responsibilities" of adult life. It is perpetually under fire for its failure to do this in specific directions. Without attempting an adequate ap-

praisal of its contributions at this point, we can put down on the credit side of the ledger, literacy, proficiency in elementary mathematical operations, some conception of American history, rather eulogistic in character, a rudimentary knowledge of American government, chiefly of its externals, some notions of contemporary social problems, generally of a superficial and optimistic nature, and the like. On the other side of the ledger must be put down uncritical loyalty to the Constitution, the stimulation of national vanity and self-assertiveness, failure to comprehend our social and political institutions, and want of training in independent study of community problems. Moreover, the efforts of the schools are largely directed toward the equipment of its pupils for the pursuit of just the interests which are emphasized in the home. The preparation of boys for a vocation, of girls for homemaking or gainful employment, and of them both for conformity to conventional moral standards is now given major emphasis in school work. There is, nevertheless, a distinct trend toward more extensive training in the social sciences, with the emphasis on "practical" community problems. This is one of the most hopeful tendencies in elementary and secondary education today, but, as we shall see later, we would best not be *too* hopeful about it.

Practically all normal boys look forward, from their early years, to engagement in a vocation. The vocational interests of most women eventually center

in the home, of course, though many pursue outside vocations for all or part of their lives. Pay, congeniality of work, possibilities of "advancement" and feasibility of the requisite special training as well as parental influences and chance circumstances are the major factors in vocational choices by young people, especially boys. The emphasis in such choice, as in pursuit of the vocation later, is on the interests of the given individual, though, of course, "service" motives are influential with a great many. But the implications of these interests for social and economic organization as a whole, and *vice versa*, are not generally realized. A considerable minority do have some grasp of these implications, as membership in labor unions, farmers' cooperatives, business men's organizations and professional associations would attest. Even in the case of these organizations, interest usually centers in the immediate advantages to their individual members which may be gained by the requisite organizational efforts. Their interests in markets, wage scales, fees for professional services, working conditions, and other benefits to the membership are their main concern, while elimination of waste, correction of maladjustments, abolition of injustices and protection of public interests are of secondary consideration, or no consideration at all, to them. Moreover, very few members of vocations, whether organized or not, ever seriously question the soundness of the more fundamental institutional arrangements that condition vocational

interests. Here, of course, is the locus of the more important problems affecting those interests. These various vocational influences are perhaps just as potent in the development of the citizen as are influences centering in family, age and school groups.

Fundamental class divisions, those based on ownership or non-ownership of property and the use to which property is put, are also very influential in the development of the citizen. They vitally affect the distribution of national income, and *pari passu* the distribution of opportunities for the cultivation of civic as well as other cultural interests. Class membership influences, indeed, every phase of personality development. The tastes, interests, attitudes, achievements of the individual depend on it. Yet few realize the implications of that fact, or envisage the possibility of bettering their lives or the lives of their children through the reconstruction of class relationships. Class, like vocational, relationships are viewed from the standpoint of the individual's more immediate interests. Class divisions are taken for granted; and the wage earner, landowner, tenant farmer, professional man or capitalist merely aspires to become a richer, more prosperous, more influential member of his class, or else a member of some other class, generally one richer and more influential than his own. So far as these groups are class conscious and active at all, they are concerned mainly in aggrandizing their class and hence their individual interests, or, what is another side of the same thing,

in putting opposed classes at a disadvantage. These class interests and associations constitute an important part of the citizen's social environment, and his attitudes are shaped and his comprehension of social problems limited accordingly.

Adults also have *their* age groups, other than those connected with their economic interests. These include social circles, clubs, lodges, fraternal orders, and similar associations. The church and neighborhood might also be included under this category. Taken together, they monopolize most of the adult's time and attention that is not devoted to domestic and vocational interests. Negatively stated, they divert attention from community problems, for in themselves they make but little contribution, directly or indirectly, to the treatment of those problems.

The church is a partial exception to this rule, of course, yet churches that stimulate a genuine interest in the deeper public questions of the time are comparatively rare. The church does render a distinct service in upholding accepted moral standards, but it contributes comparatively little to the solution of moral *problems* raised by changing social conditions. The neighborhood is also a partial exception, since it still functions, to some extent, as an agency for "local improvements" and, in many rural sections, for action on educational and other community problems. In the main, however, the local neighborhood has ceased to be a significant group for civic purposes.

As a general rule, these various age-groups of adults are concerned with matters not civic in character, and they contribute but little, therefore, to the development of citizenship. Obviously, the political, economic and other social conditions environing these groups greatly influence their character, but either this is not realized, or, if it is, that fact has but little effect on their activities.

Community centers, parent-teacher associations, women's clubs, drama leagues, study groups and a variety of local organizations established for "serious" purposes represent a reaction against the situation just depicted, but so far their influence has not been extensive or profound. Yet they appear to hold out considerable promise for the future which should not be overlooked.

We come finally to the community itself, viewed as an agency in the development of the citizen. In the broad sense, as including the nation at large and its various subdivisions, the community embraces all the individual and group interests already discussed. But it includes much more. It is also identified with the political, economic and social institutions which underlie and in some measure coordinate all those interests. The problems of the citizen, though related to his family, vocational and other group interests, are primarily community problems, for they are coterminous, not with the group divisions of the community, but with the community itself.

The community is constituted, as regards its per-

sonnel, by citizens with interests canalized, limited and largely monopolized by groups other than the community as such. Also, as pointed out, the interrelations of group interests, and the implications of the latter for community action transcending group lines, are not realized by the great mass of citizens. The development of the citizen from childhood onwards is conditioned by that fact. He assimilates the outlook, the attitudes, the limited interests of his elders, and in turn impresses these on the succeeding generation.

That this is the general fact can scarcely be doubted by anyone who has given much consideration to community problems. General ignorance and indifference regarding those problems is impressive evidence of it. The very small amount of time devoted to studying and dealing with them is evidence of the same fact. Let anyone compare the time devoted by the average citizen to his family, his vocation or even his lodge, club or intimate social circle, with the time given to community interests, and he can scarcely be in doubt regarding the matter. The various groups previously discussed almost wholly absorb his time, interest and effort, wherefore but little is left over for the community as such.

Not only do these various groups monopolize the effort and interest of the citizen, but they interfere with cooperation in community affairs, so far as time and interest are available for the latter. Families, vocations, social classes, religious sects and age-

groups are *exclusive* in character, and they develop in their members attitudes of antagonism, antipathy, suspicion, or, at least, of indifference and uncooperativeness toward other groups in the same categories. There are of course many exceptions to this rule, but these do not invalidate it *as* a rule. To the groups mentioned must be added others based on race, nationality and party. Partisan groupings are important almost everywhere in the United States, while racial or nationalistic groupings are found throughout large sections and in numerous local communities of the country. To cite some specific instances, Protestants and Catholics, whites and blacks, business men and wage earners, lawyers and day laborers do not always cooperate enthusiastically in community affairs, or associate comfortably on the same committees or even in the same assemblies. This is less true of people from different families, parties, lodges, clubs, and the like, but even in their case cooperation in community affairs is of an *ad hoc* character, and established somewhat laboriously at that. The basis for it is not laid in the early development of the individual. And the deep cleavages based on differences in race, religion, vocation and social class are sufficient in themselves to prevent the efficient cooperation, *as* citizens, of people so divided. The community, in short, is an assemblage of groups divided by their interests, and by their antipathy, contempt or indifference toward one another. It is characterized by its group particularisms and isola-

tions. Capacities for cooperation, loyalty and intellectual effort are developed in relation to other groups, in the main, not the community itself. It must be said, in qualification of these statements, that urgently felt needs, such as those for fire protection, water supply, educational opportunities, "law and order," control of international relations and the like, which cannot be supplied by other agencies, do stimulate some interest in the community and some development of community organization. But community interest and organization are altogether inadequate for the manifold tasks properly devolving on the community. Moreover, this deficiency exposes the community to the invasion of aggressive group interests that possess themselves of communal authority and utilize it for their own ends. Community problems are, in fact, largely created by such aggressions. The community thus characterized is a most important part of the citizen's social environment, and fosters in him attitudes and viewpoints that help to make the community itself what it is.

So far we have analyzed the development of the citizen in terms of the group interests and attitudes which so largely constitute his environment. But all these interests in turn have their determining factors and these must be identified and evaluated before the possibilities of a more rational citizenship can be clearly envisaged. We now proceed to this part of the inquiry. Attention will first be directed to the cultural and geographic factors in the situation, after

which hereditary traits and capacities as correlative factors may be briefly considered.

As F. J. Turner first clearly demonstrated, the frontier and the pioneering settlement that went with it have exerted a profound influence on the development of our political and social characteristics. Free land in the West offered everybody an opportunity of becoming an independent, land-owning farmer. The supply of land was so great that farms were chosen on the basis of individual taste, and extensive agriculture soon predominated over the intensive type. These factors gave rise to the isolated homestead, and with other factors to a self-sufficing type of economy which, in turn, stimulated the development of self-reliance, individual initiative, familocentrism, uncooperativeness and distrust or resentment of community control. These traits were not unadapted to the conditions of that period, and they were of course balanced by rough and ready cooperation in defense against the Indians, maintenance of order and the like. The economic situation of the Western pioneers, and especially their common status as land-owning farmers, inevitably stimulated the growth of a democratic spirit, and a demand, soon conceded, for political equality with the settled communities of the East. These factors, together with the agitation of labor organizations on the Eastern seaboard, resulted in the early establishment of approximately universal manhood suffrage

for all except Negro slaves. Henceforth, adult white males were to share equally in political power. The use of this power, however, was not to interfere with individual initiative and *laissez faire* in economic undertakings.

This concurrent development of individualism and political democracy was of course influenced by many factors besides the economic conditions of the frontier, notably the doctrine of natural rights then current in Western Europe and America, with its highly individualistic implications for law, politics and industry.¹ The grand result was that the village community, long the dominant type of social organization in Europe, was not successfully transplanted in America; and that the aristocratic political institutions of the Old World maintained themselves here only until the Western movement had become the decisive factor in our national life, and slavery had been abolished in the South.

The social solidarity and control represented by the village community from which our forefathers came did not persist during the pioneering period of our history, because they could at least be dispensed with, and the land settlement policy of the federal government was not based on a recognition of their value. They have never been reestablished, though the need for them has now become very

¹ This topic is discussed at length in Dewey's *The Public and Its Problems*, pp. 86 ff.

great. This is because the extreme individualism developed during the pioneer period has persisted in face of all the tendencies that might have undermined it. The tenacity of tradition and habit has been here the decisive factor, but it has been sanctioned and reenforced by property institutions and other environmental influences.

Formal political democracy also persists, despite the fact that the approximate economic equality which produced it has long since disappeared. Perhaps the most crucial issue confronting us today is whether our ideal of political democracy will be extended to the industrial system, or whether actual economic inequality will result in the explicit repudiation of political democracy as it has already subverted its substance.

Features of our constitutional system developed during the formative period of our history bear vitally on the status of the citizen today. Framed at a time when the doctrine of natural rights was dominant; embodying the principle of separate political powers (a principle applied not only in the organization of federal, state and local governments, but in the distribution of powers among these governments); and, as interpreted, assigning to the least responsible branch of government the function of defining the scope of public authority, our constitutional system has proved itself peculiarly irresponsible to popular needs and demands, compared with the systems of other countries, and thus operated

both to hinder and to discourage the citizen's participation in government.²

Another heritage from the pioneer period, yet influenced by present economic arrangements, is a marked mobility of the population, particularly of farm tenants and, to lesser degree, of urban wage earners. The attitudes created during the western movement, continuation of the process of settlement, migration from country to city, and a system of rural tenancy unfavorable to settled domicile on the part of farm tenants are the principal factors in this remarkable phenomenon. The mobility in question is obviously not conducive to the growth of community attachments, and the assumption of responsibility for community problems. On the contrary, it complicates such problems, and increases the burden of responsibility falling to the more settled elements of the community. The level of citizenship attained by the latter, however, would suggest that our excessive mobility is not so troublesome a heritage from pioneer days as is our extreme individualism.

Property and contract institutions are one exceedingly important expression of the reigning individualistic philosophy. In fundamentals these were here from the beginning of the pioneer period, but they interacted, so to speak, with the land factor to produce the economic conditions of that period, and these in turn gave those institutions a sort of crystal-

² Cf. Laski, H. J., "The American Political System," *Harpers Magazine*, Vol. 157, pp. 20-28.

line structure highly refractory to attempts at modifying them in accordance with changing economic conditions subsequent to that time.

These institutions together with other factors have determined the division of our society into more or less sharply demarcated economic classes, and inevitably concentrated the attention of the individual on his own economic interests. This has served to perpetuate the individualism of the pioneer period, prevent the realization, or at least the admission, that production has taken on a cooperative, communal character, and motivate opposition to all attempts at modification of property and contract institutions in accordance with that fact. Economic institutions have of course been modified through the rise of the corporation, the labor union, the cooperative marketing association and some development of public ownership, yet the dominant emphasis in our economic life still rests on private initiative, profit-making, and, in general, individualistic competition for income or income-producing property. Of course the improvement of transportation, the expansion of markets, the growth of machine production, the specialization of labor and the accumulation of capital have contributed, along with the institution of private property, to the development of economic inequality, the rise of distinct economic classes and the increasing influence of the profit motive.

Other phases of social life have developed in com-

plexity, along with the economic, all of them inter-related, and presenting a host of problems, to which the principle of individual initiative and responsibility offers no solution. Thus we have countless industrial, housing, medical, educational, recreational, penal, political and other problems intricately interrelated, and affecting local communities, states, regions, the country at large and even world society, all of them requiring for successful treatment the most painstaking study by competent investigators, and organized community action—local, state, national, international—in putting the requisite measures into effect.

The bearing of our national individualism, our property and contract institutions, on this situation has perhaps been made sufficiently clear. Another cultural factor no less potent must now be considered. This we may call the *conception of work as the primary means to individual welfare*. The great mass of people fully believe that they can provide well for themselves and their dependents by diligence in their work. Even when they are pessimistic regarding this possibility, they conceive of no other means which might contribute substantially to that object. This conception was substantially correct when a self-sufficing type of economy prevailed, for then individual welfare did depend on diligence in one's work far more than on anything else. But the conception has become less and less true as that type of economy declined, and expanding markets and the price

régime in general have become proportionately predominant. The welfare of a man and his family to-day is dependent on the price which his labor, his product or his capital commands in the market, and this in turn depends on a vast system of competing, conflicting, interrelated forces in which he and all others in the same market are involved. Not only is the price of what the individual buys and sells in this market thus determined, but the *amount* of the wealth produced for distribution is vitally influenced by a correspondingly complex, and in part identical, set of factors. Hence the salvation of the farmer or the wage earner, for instance, will not come alone from their producing more, as some business men seem to think, but from their exercise of greater control over their market relations and over other features of the economic system affecting their interests. The same observation applies to all other economic groups.

Problems not susceptible of adequate statement in economic terms are just as vital. Those pertaining to public health, leisure-time, the educational system, conservation of natural resources, size and quality of population, race relationships, political institutions, international affairs and many other phases of social life come in this category.

Problems of this order cannot be solved by diligence in producing wheat, tending a machine, treating the sick or any other vocational activity. They are primarily problems of *relationships* among ac-

tivities of this character, as well as other, non-economic, activities in which individuals and groups engage. The practical solution of these problems is quite as important to the individual as diligence and proficiency in his work. But the mass of citizens behave as if they thought there were no such problems, or as if these problems would automatically solve themselves, or as if some one else could be safely intrusted with their solution. But the assertion may be hazarded that if problems of this order are ever to be handled in the interest of the citizen, the citizen himself must work at them just as seriously and as intelligently as he works at his job.

Corresponding to the work conception of welfare is an archaic conception of citizenship. Relatively few people take their duties as citizens very seriously, if we may judge from their behavior. Citizenship is a sort of residual interest with the great mass of voters, which is attended to only when and if their work, their family, their church, their lodge, their car or their favorite movie house does not claim their attention. Hardly more than an infinitesimal portion of the study and effort requisite to competent citizenship is devoted by the average citizen to his civic functions. This is due in part to our extreme individualism, our archaic work tradition, and, as we shall see, to our essentially inept system of civic education. Moreover, citizenship conceptions and practices established during the early period of our history, when they were fairly well adapted to the

prevailing conditions, have persisted into the succeeding period, to the conditions of which they are altogether unadapted. To put it briefly, we are attempting to control a machine-made civilization by a handicraft citizenship. It follows that if control is to match conditions, the interests of the common man must be radically reorganized, so that his functions as a citizen shall be emphasized equally with his functions as a producer or as a member of a family.

It should be clear, in the light of the foregoing analysis, why the civic implications of interests centering in the family, the vocation, the economic class, the church and even the school, not to mention the various age groups, have not been generally realized. A myopic individualism, an outworn work tradition, a handicraft conception of citizenship, persisting by virtue of their own inertia, have stood in the way.

How are we meeting this situation? By what agencies do we attempt to balance the influences on civic development here set forth? Part of the answer is that, apart from a few pioneer thinkers and civic leaders, we fail to realize that there is any such situation as that depicted in the preceding pages, and even the pioneers have not probed it deeply enough to understand fully the problems and difficulties involved. Nevertheless, three important lines of effort are directed to the improvement of citizenship, or at least are conceived to have that as a consequence. One of these is concerned with reforms in political and governmental machinery. A second is directed

to the abolition or modification of the individualistic principle in industry. The third is organized educational effort aimed at the better training of citizens for their responsibilities. We shall discuss here the third line of effort only, and for two reasons. First, upon educational effort in the broad sense will depend the reforms achieved by the other two lines of effort, and the uses made of such reforms, although these in turn will condition subsequent educational effort. Secondly, this type of effort is by far the most influential on the development of contemporary citizenship, the problem in which we are here specially interested. The first and second types of effort, however, will receive due consideration in the following chapter.

The function of the school in civic education is a crucial one. It is the community agency expressly designed to perform this and other educational functions, while the church, the newspaper, the political party and other agencies contributing to civic education are dominated by traditions, interests and purposes which the community as such can do but little to control, but which, on the contrary, do much to influence the community. The school is of course subject to similar influences, but it can nevertheless exercise a considerable measure of autonomy in defining its functions, and in applying the methods deemed requisite to their performance.

Let us restate and elaborate the problem of civic education faced by the schools. First of all, it re-

ceives into its care young boys and girls, the development of whose attitudes has already gone far, and will go much farther, under the influences previously indicated. To the average pupil social life revolves around his family, his play group, his father's vocation and the school itself. Family, play and vocational interests narrowly conceived are thus given the major emphasis in his thoughts and aspirations. One function of the school is to help the child realize the broader social implications of these interests, and cultivate in him the habits and attitudes that will make such realization effective in a practical sense.

Again, the average child is taught by his parents that a certain political party is the right one, and that the members of other parties are quite deluded if not downright wicked. Investigation shows that voters' politics is determined in a large percentage of cases by their parents' politics. Moreover, the child receives little real instruction in civic questions at home; but, on the contrary, imbibes there prejudices and attitudes that interfere with efforts by the school or other agencies to give such instruction.

The influences of the local community operate in the same direction. There is apt to be strong pressure—suggestion, criticism and even ostracism—in favor of affiliation with one of the dominant parties, or of an “independence” in politics restricted to choices between those parties. These pressures affect older persons most directly, of course, but children respond to them also, and will yield to their influence later

on, unless fortified against it through the requisite type of civic education.

The child not only needs to be emancipated from the ideas and attitudes generated by these early influences, but, so far as possible, to have his interest in the more vital public questions of the day aroused, and his information about them gradually built up. Somewhere in his educational development, moreover, he needs to study the nature of society, the forces that shape its development, the political, economic and other social institutions that constitute its framework, and thus gain a proper perspective on his problems and responsibilities as a citizen.

It is incomparably more important, however, for him to develop *interest* in these problems, and capacity to *think independently* about them, than to acquire the greatest possible amount of information concerning them. This is so, of course, because social problems are constantly changing in character, and information on them must be kept up-to-date if it is to have any value, whereas only a genuine interest can motivate the continuous study of social problems that is requisite to adequate knowledge of them; and ability to think independently about these problems, in view of the prejudice and propaganda so rife in contemporary society, is essential to the formulation of conclusions having some relation to the facts.

The schools are doing something toward the achievement of these objectives. What is more encouraging, they are developing and improving their

efforts in this direction. The social studies are being emphasized more and more in the curriculum, and the growth of extra-curricular activities represents an increasingly significant contribution to the development of capacities for leadership, cooperation and self-government, which, of course, are essential to competent citizenship in a democracy.

But other aspects of civic education by the schools are not so encouraging. As pointed out, emphasis in school work is on training for "earning a living," for homemaking and, in general, for the pursuit of just those interests that now divert attention from civic affairs. Most teachers have themselves grown up in an environment dominated by such interests and share the essentially non-civic attitudes created thereby. Moreover, they generally imbibe the partisan prejudices current in their communities, and are poorly equipped, therefore, to foster a critical, skeptical attitude toward these on the part of their students. The teachers to whom these characterizations do not apply must proceed with the greatest circumspection in their attempts to prepare students for an independent, reflective type of citizenship, because taxpayers, newspaper owners, boards of education and even school superintendents are generally distrustful of teaching that encourages critical scrutiny of things as they are.

Even were these things not so, the school could not go very far in equipping its pupils for citizenship, owing to the immaturity of the latter, and their limited

period of training. The requisite interest in civic questions, and capacity to think independently about them, could scarcely be developed by the age of fourteen or eighteen, however thorough and enlightened civic training in the schools might be.

The same general analysis applies in only less degree to civic training received by college students. Immaturity and limited period of training, while real factors, are not so influential in their case; but individualistic attitudes, domination by current prejudices and failure to grasp the problem of civic training are probably but little less pronounced among college than among elementary and high-school teachers.

When schooling has been completed, the youth is turned back into the general community, with the narrow group interests, the partisan prejudices, the pressures for conformity, there dominant. He is expected to think his way through this environment and act intelligently with regard to civic questions. At least educators, clergymen, and other community leaders apparently entertain this expectation. The real fact, it should be obvious, is that the youth has been only very partially emancipated from the attitudes generated by the forces indicated, and is promptly brought under their influence again, if indeed he was ever insulated from them by the tutelage of the school.

Let us look somewhat more closely at the situation of the citizen thus prepared for his responsibilities.

He is faced by a host of problems, local, state, national and international in scope, all claiming his attention. They are *his* problems, and he cannot evade them if they are to be decided in his interest. If they are decided *for* him by others, it is fairly certain that the decisions will not be primarily in his interest. Yet he starts out with but little real knowledge of these problems, probably with less interest in them, and with even less ability to think independently about them.

He largely depends on the newspaper and the popular periodical for his information and beliefs about all these problems. Relatively few citizens read serious books or reliable "journals of opinion" on such questions. But the intellectual fare served the citizen by the newspaper and popular magazine is certainly not such as to assist him in forming his own conclusions on public questions, though, with other helps, it might contribute to this object.

We may summarize briefly the reasons why this is so. For one thing, the purpose of the newspaper and the magazine, with relatively few exceptions, is not primarily educational in character. They are money-making enterprises, whose success as such depends on circulation and advertising. Circulation depends, in turn, on the appeal to the interests of possible readers. But readers' interests are shaped by influences of the kind we have indicated. A burning interest in public questions is not one of them. Sensational events relative to these questions are re-

ported, but this really caters to interest of a different sort. Real news about social, political and economic developments is given, of course, but this is largely for the purpose of attracting and holding the more "serious readers," a small minority of the total number. Interpretation of the news, whether in the news columns or on the editorial page, must likewise be in line with the interests and attitudes of the readers. Besides, newspaper and magazine owners share much the same interests and attitudes as do their readers, while the pressure of advertisers and their own special bias as business men would serve to give their publications a conservative tone, even if readers would welcome a more radical or liberal one. The net result is that news on important public questions is of a highly selected, fragmentary character, while editorial interpretations reflect the prevailing prejudices or attitudes, when they do not take on an even more conservative complexion. Consequently, the change actually favored by these publications is generally innocuously liberal or else essentially reactionary in character.

The church sometimes assists the citizen to meet his responsibilities. This is particularly true of churches that definitely foster a socialized religion, and identify themselves with the secular interests of the community. Without minimizing the value of their services, it may fairly be said that such churches are exceptional. Their influence reaches only a small fraction of the adult population. The great major-

ity of ministers and church members have grown up in the social environment we have depicted, and have but little taste for a study of civic problems, save where these can be clearly linked up with conventional moral standards or sectarian doctrines. While many ministers have come under educational influences somewhat destructive of the attitudes and viewpoints fostered by the community at large, they cannot do very much, as a rule, to modify the interests and ideas of their parishioners. The instruction in civic questions actually undertaken by the church is therefore of a fragmentary character, and generally biased in the direction of the dominant attitudes and interests of the community. It should be noted, moreover, that the more orthodox churches, a great majority of the total number, foster an other-worldly conception of human welfare that definitely deadens interest in things of this world and the possibility of making them better.

The political party may be conceived as an agency for civic education, and even as an organization of citizens for the formulation and execution of public policies. Its educational functions assume great importance, indeed, when its rôle in legislation, in law enforcement, in the selection of personnel for the public service, is taken into consideration. Educational activities of vast scope and variety are necessarily associated with these functions.

The most significant fact about these educational functions of the party, from the standpoint of our

inquiry, is that they are shaped by and directed toward interests other than those of the citizen as such. This fact is so well recognized by serious students of politics that we may dispense with any extended elaboration of it. But a few comments will be in order.

Political parties themselves are essentially organizations of professional politicians, not, in any significant sense, of the rank and file of party members. We can at least say that parties are controlled by this special group. The party therefore primarily serves the interests of one special vocational group, and its relations with other vocational interests and with the interests of the public at large are dominated by that fact. Certain conditions, however, vitally influence party administration in behalf of this special vocational interest.

One condition is the existence of group interests, especially economic interests, naturally concerned in political action affecting the realization of their objects. These various interests are not equally well organized or equipped with financial resources for the promotion of political action. The wealthiest and most efficiently organized groups will have the advantage over antagonistic or rival groups in this regard. In general, politicians find it advantageous to ally themselves with the interests that have the most mobilizable cash at their disposal, or other inducements having a cash equivalent. Greater monetary rewards are of course secured in this way, and

greater financial resources for maintaining and strengthening the hold of the party on the electorate.

Business interests, especially large corporate interests, fulfill these specifications. By contrast, farmers and wage earners are decidedly inferior, while some professional interests are well situated, others not so, in these respects. Even more significant, perhaps, is that fact that the interests of the public at large, as distinct and in some measure divergent from the economic interests of special groups, are hardly organized at all. The general social interest in the conservation of natural resources, development of the public health service, improvement of housing conditions, protection of consumers against unfair prices and adulterated goods, to mention only a few significant illustrations, is hardly organized at all, whereas economic interests opposed to or at least not altogether in harmony with the public interest in these matters are quite efficiently organized. These instances illustrate a *general* rule, and perhaps the most significant fact in American politics today. We may add that it is problematical whether public interest in such matters is capable of such efficient organization as are special interests therein. That is probably because, at bottom, the citizen's interest is unconcentrated, unfocused, diffused throughout the entire system of social relationships, while business and other economic interests, by comparison, are highly concentrated, focused in specific concrete sit-

uations, and severally restricted to relatively limited areas of social life.

Another condition affecting the politician's work is the existence of more or less active public opinion on specific questions of which he has to take account. The outstanding instance at the present time is prohibition. As a general rule, politicians themselves undertake to cultivate public opinion on such questions only when it favors their own special interests to do so. Not infrequently they must adjust themselves to strong currents of public sentiment in whose development they have had little or no part. That is true, in the main, of public opinion on the prohibition question. The politician thrives best when the electorate is indifferent regarding public questions, save where public interest lends itself to exploitation by his party organization in connection with primary or general elections.

The implications of this very general analysis for our special problem should be clear. It is rarely to the interest of the party as at present controlled to stimulate the interest of the citizen in the questions that concern him, and least of all to help him work out well-grounded conclusions in regard to them. To do so would generally contravene the interests of the professional politician and of the interests allied therewith. On the contrary, he must counteract, where possible, currents of sentiment and opinion prejudicial to those interests. If he may not do that,

he must adjust himself to those currents with the least prejudice possible to such interests. The issues raised or emphasized in connection with political campaigns naturally have in view partisan advantage, and it is only occasionally that these coincide with issues of moment to the public at large. Even when the latter is the case, it is normally no part of politician's purpose to promote a consideration of such issues on their merits. In brief, the politician strives for political power by whatever procedures are best calculated to win support of the electorate, and at the same time compromise his own interests as little as may be. Enlightenment of the citizen as to *his* interests must be resorted to but rarely in this undertaking.

Obviously a schematic analysis of this character needs qualification in numerous particulars. Some politicians have the welfare of the public at heart and contribute as best they may to enlightenment of the public on issues that concern it. They have some influence on party policy and performance. Perhaps most politicians are desirous of promoting the public welfare insofar as their own personal interests are not prejudiced by the process. Moreover, they probably have little difficulty in convincing themselves that their interests are quite compatible with the public welfare. Their environment and training are such as to make them sincere believers in the righteousness of the interests to which they devote themselves. Again, minor parties and their leaders

are in many cases exceptions to the general rules here stated. They have contributed much to the vitalization of important public issues neglected by the two dominant parties. And, finally, what may be regarded as a significant tendency toward organization of the public interests in social, political and economic questions is represented by a growing number of social service and civic agencies, while the serious study of these questions from the public point of view is being promoted by forums, civic centers, community churches and other agencies.

The significant fact brought out by the foregoing analysis is that these various agencies put together do not supply the conditions requisite to the development and practice of competent citizenship, but that, on the contrary, they interpose serious obstacles to such a consummation. They do not furnish the citizen adequate information on his problems; nor supply an effective stimulus to the development of his interest in these problems; nor give him much real help, but rather the contrary, in correcting the bias and other deficiencies of his early training for citizenship; nor constitute an organization of the citizen himself for the promotion of his interests in public affairs.

This is the general result. There are, as indicated, minor deviations from it, which may be significant of promises yet to be realized. *Some* citizens know how to procure reliable information on public questions, when such information is available at all; and

to organize themselves for the propagation of their views on these questions, and the translation thereof into practice. But such citizens are exceptional. By virtue of superior intelligence, suitable educational opportunities and the requisite amount of leisure the problem of competent citizenship has been solved in their case, so far as that may be so in the absence of a solution for the great mass of citizens. It has not been solved for the latter because there is no *institutional organization* for the purpose, with all that implies in the way of educational effort, information service and machinery for *citizen* activity in public affairs. The church, the press, the political party are in the main concerned with *other* institutional purposes, and contribute but partially, incidentally and even negatively to the objects which the institutional organization of citizens might subserve.

Development of the citizen under the influences previously recounted and the want of any institutional organization to make good the deficiencies of that development together produce a highly plastic, controllable factor in public affairs which can be readily manipulated by the more powerful interests for their own purposes. Lacking a critical attitude toward public questions, wanting much real ability to think about these questions for himself, and deprived of effective aid in overcoming these handicaps, the citizen inevitably falls a prey to mass suggestion, irrational fears and economic pressures,

applied to him that his acquiescence in the purposes of special group interests may be secured. These instruments of control, however, may be and are much more effectively wielded by the interests, already indicated, that enjoy resources of finance and organization superior to those of rival interests. Moreover, as pointed out, all these interests put together do not represent, except in a more or less perverted sense, the citizen's interest in the questions involved. The result is that the citizen's action or inaction in public affairs supports, generally speaking, the more powerful of the special group interests concerned, not a just accommodation of these interests, and, least of all, the distinctive public interest therein. This conclusion could be illustrated by the facts relative to conservation of natural resources, development of the public health service, protection of public interest in the price and quality of consumers' goods, or almost any other contemporary social problem.

We may now recapitulate the more salient results of the foregoing analysis. Most outstanding of all is the fact that, owing to the conditions of our historical development, family, vocational and other non-civic groups have claimed and largely monopolized the interest of the citizen. The community and the state *as groups* have scarcely existed for him, save at times of crisis when they could be galvanized into dynamic entities claiming his loyalty and devotion. But with the expansion of economic and other group interests, his problems developed

apace, and his functions as a citizen assumed greater and greater importance. His civic interest and activity, exiguous at best, had to be spread out over ever enlarging areas of social life, and in the process became so diluted as to count for relatively little in the formulation and execution of public policy. His continued domination by the work conception of welfare that arose during the handicraft period, the diffuse, unconcentrated nature of his civic interests in the later period, the individualistic and otherwise maladapted character of his training for citizenship all combined to prevent the development of the civic interest, intelligence and activity demanded by the changed conditions. The highly concentrated interests of professional politicians, and of the powerful economic groups concerned in political action, could easily overwhelm the citizen's interest in public affairs under these conditions, and incidentally contribute to the perpetuation of his indifference, ignorance and inactivity. In short, the citizen is beset with highly organized group interests knowing rather definitely what they want and determined to get it, whereas he rarely knows what he wants and is rather irresolute in his attempts to get things he believes he does want.

The citizen, then, is unorganized in a world of organized group pressures; he suffers from individual isolation in a highly corporate society; he remains without an institution of his own in an institutional-

ized civilization. Under these conditions, the interest, the intelligence, the activity requisite to the fulfillment of his functions are out of the question. American society as at present constituted does not and cannot produce the type of citizenship that might solve its problems. In all probability the growth of non-voting in the United States is little more than a superficial symptom of the situation thus depicted.

So far our survey of factors in the creation of citizenship has left out of account the hereditary traits and capacities that function at every stage of this process. These are fully as potent as the cultural and geographic factors. Our very general and incomplete knowledge of man's hereditary endowment necessarily limits any analysis of this factor in the development of citizenship. It may be possible, however, to offer some observations not altogether lacking in interest. Unfortunately, these must be largely negative in character.

It is obvious, I suppose, that many problems will prove insoluble by the human mind, however much time the race may have at its disposal, and however favorable the educational and other conditions affecting research in those problems. It is also doubtless true that many problems, or what would be problems to a higher intelligence, can never be recognized as such by the human mind. I for one am inclined to think that social relationships embrace

many such problems and that, as a consequence, the human race must continue to muddle along in dealing with its more complex social problems.

There is a wide range of native capacities to develop an understanding of problems, including social problems, and of their solutions. Numerous social problems have been or will be solved by relatively gifted minds, that will be beyond the comprehension of many persons affected thereby. This statement will doubtless remain true under the most favorable conditions for the development of native intellectual capacities.

It is just as true, however, that the process of solving the soluble problems might be greatly accelerated by the institution of the requisite measures, and that a very much larger portion of people than at present might be so educated as to comprehend these problems and their solutions, so far as these may be worked out. We do not know, of course, just what is possible in these directions, as there is at present no way of testing fully either the intellectual or the political capacities of the various sorts of individuals that constitute human society. It is important, obviously, that progress toward all these goals be facilitated by every means possible.

A somewhat similar analysis, general and rather negative in character, could be made of the non-intellectual traits in man's hereditary equipment. If man is endowed at birth with more or less specific emotional dispositions and instinctive tendencies,

those traits certainly condition his behavior throughout his life, including his behavior as a citizen. Biologists and psychologists are not agreed as to the existence of such traits, or as to the nature and number of them if any such do exist. They all agree, of course, that emotions and impulses appear in the process of development. But there is no consensus of opinion as to the measure in which the development of these traits might be controlled through educational efforts in the home, the school and elsewhere. In brief, we are even more in the dark regarding these traits than as regards intellectual capacities. We can hardly speculate to much purpose, therefore, regarding the ultimate bearing of such factors on problems of citizenship. I myself happen to be of the opinion that even under the most favorable educational and other environmental influences, these traits will tend to disqualify many adults for the exacting type of citizenship demanded by modern civilization, and interfere in varying degrees with the acceptable discharge of civic responsibilities by all other adults.

The inertia of habit is recognized by psychology and by popular thought alike. It is a fundamental biological trait of man as of other animal species. That factor influences behavior in every field of human endeavor as much as does intelligence or emotional disposition. It is exceedingly difficult and indeed largely impossible to keep habits up-to-date as the situations to which they are adjustments undergo

change. This is particularly true as regards political, economic and other social conditions where, as is so largely the case, the consequences of habitual responses are widely separated from the responses themselves, and the connection between them correspondingly difficult to identify. Contemporary citizenship is in considerable measure vitiated by just this factor, due not only to the inertia of habit in general, but also to the fact that the mass of citizens have not been trained to analyze the consequences to themselves of the various political responses, habitual and non-habitual, among which they must choose.

We are largely in the dark here, too, as to the degree in which, under a rational institutional system for the development of citizenship, political habits might be made flexible and therefore adjustable to changing social conditions. Doubtless, incomparably more is possible in this direction than has ever yet been achieved. Still, I for one believe that human beings will always be more or less cursed by out-of-date habits in every field of endeavor, however determined their efforts to make habit flexible. It seems likely that, for the reason already suggested, this will be particularly true as regards political and other complex social relationships. If so, adults will be disqualified in varying degrees by this factor for the discharge of civic functions. Many will be so seriously disqualified that they can contribute little or nothing of positive value to citizenship; others

will be able to think and act in a fairly rational manner as regards civic questions; perhaps the great majority will fall at various points between these extremes.

This very schematic analysis must not be taken to imply that intellectual capacities, impulses, emotions and habits develop or function independently of one another. They are all organically related throughout development, and are indeed separable only in analysis, not in reality. We can say, however, that as *distinguishable functions* of the organism, their influence on one another is most significant. The greater the development of intelligence, the more flexible will habit be, and obversely; and the same relation will obtain between intelligence, on the one hand, and impulse and emotion, on the other. Much depends, therefore, on the degree to which intellectual capacities are trained and utilized, to the end that habit, impulse and emotion may be under more effective control.

The general point is that these basic biological traits of human beings will, under any environmental conditions, qualify or disqualify in varying degrees the adult members of the community for the assumption of responsibilities as citizens. We have no basis for an estimate of the proportion that will be so seriously disqualified that they must be liabilities rather than assets in civic matters. My own guess is that it will be a considerable one.

We might relate these speculations regarding

man's hereditary equipment to the analysis of geographic and cultural factors in citizenship. Human personalities, groups, interests, activities are, without exception, the complex syntheses or resultants of factors from all three of the basic categories indicated. The resultant in any given case will be determined by the specific factors from the several categories that are operative therein, and the processes whereby these have been synthesized to produce that resultant. Contemporary American civilization is thus determined, and so are all its various aspects, including citizenship as variously conceived and practiced. We have seen something of the range and variety of the factors that go into the making of this citizenship. An exhaustive analysis would surely show that all the potent factors in American life are also factors in its citizenship. Our own analysis has been limited to the more significant factors.

Many questions are raised by such an analysis. To what extent citizenship may be made competent through control of the factors therein is perhaps the most vital question. It will also be the most difficult of any to answer. Just what measures of control would accomplish this object, whether these measures are practicable, and, if so, how they could be put into operation are general questions that embrace a host of specific ones. There is also the question whether a large portion of adults will not be disqualified under any conditions, because of inescap-

able biological limitations, for the type of citizenship demanded by modern society; and, if so, what policy should be adopted regarding them. These questions will occupy us throughout the discussion to follow.

CHAPTER III

CURRENT POLITICAL REMEDIES

A CRITICAL examination of current proposals for the improvement of citizenship or of politics in general, from the standpoint of the preceding discussion, should serve to appraise their contributions to the solution of problems there raised. In undertaking such an examination, I shall concentrate on the proposals most emphasized in scientific or popular discussions of these questions, and especially those based on some recognition of the basic factors in the general situation such as have been pointed out in the previous chapter.

We may dismiss with brief comment the drive to reduce non-voting. It is attempting to cure a deep-seated malady, to speak metaphorically, by treating one of its symptoms. Any amount of voting at the polls would scarcely modify the factors that make voters themselves what they are, and that is the crucial problem. Even if this drive succeeded in getting 80 or 90 per cent instead of 50 per cent of the eligible voters to participate in the elections, I cannot see that politics would be thereby changed for the better in any significant way. The extra 30 or 40 per cent would very likely be distributed among

the various parties, platforms, and policies submitted by initiative or referendum in much the same proportions as is the present 50 per cent. This might not be quite true of primary elections (where the participants are generally much less than 50 per cent of the eligible voters), yet few conversant with party politics would suppose that a mere increase in the primary vote could occasion much difficulty to professional politicians. I would say, in short, that it makes very little difference under present conditions whether the vote at elections is light or heavy. The intelligence represented by the vote is the important thing. The drive against non-voting can have value only as it stimulates genuine political interest, thought and activity on the part of the voter. I doubt whether it will contribute substantially to this object.

A number of current programs contemplate changes in political or governmental machinery which it is believed will make the citizen a more influential factor in public affairs, either by contributing to the development of his political intelligence, or by removing obstructions to the execution of his wishes regarding political matters. Under this head come the proposals for the short ballot, proportional representation, realignment of political parties, initiative, referendum and recall, democratization of procedures for constitutional amendment, and restoration of freedom of discussion.

I shall discuss these proposals only in so far as

they may be deemed to offer substantial contributions to the development of a more competent citizenship. It will be assumed that their adoption would do this only as it resulted in constructive modifications of the basic factors in citizenship such as have been pointed out. No attempt will be made to present the varying claims preferred for these several proposals by their proponents. These, of course, range from the more extreme ones that represent the given reform as a panacea for most of our political ills, to those based on a critical examination of its possibilities.

The Short Ballot. Reduction in the number of elective offices diminishes the burden of electoral choices imposed on the voter, enables him to procure more information about the candidates and hence to exercise greater discrimination in choosing among them, and, by concentrating official responsibilities, permits him to appraise more intelligently the performances of those intrusted with these responsibilities. It is generally conceded that short-ballot cities are better governed, as a rule, than communities that have not adopted the system. The same result is likely to follow adoption of the system in state government.

These improvements practically exhaust the possible contributions of the short ballot to the development of a more effective citizenship. It does something, perhaps, but I think not very much, to stimulate interest in and study of public questions.

Citizens of short-ballot cities are not conspicuously more intelligent and active in the discharge of their functions than are those in communities not blessed with this system. None of those cities, so far as I know, have made exceptional progress, compared with long-ballot cities, in dealing with problems coming within the purview of municipal government. The Federal Government has always been based on short-ballot principles, and the possibilities of the system have in this case been given a thorough test, but a citizenship competent in dealing with national affairs has not resulted from it. Only 50 per cent of the eligible voters participate in presidential elections; the great majority of citizens are quite ignorant, indifferent and inactive as regards the tariff, the conservation of natural resources, and most other federal problems; and many of these problems at least are either neglected or decided in behalf of powerful special interests concerned therein, not of the country at large. In brief, the short ballot gives greater effect to the citizen's interest, intelligence and activity in public affairs than does the alternative system, but it contributes little to these essentials of competent citizenship. A consideration of this system in connection with our survey of factors in citizenship would show why this is so. It scarcely touches any of these factors, nor does it open up an avenue of approach whereby they might be effectively attacked.

Proportional Representation. Similar considera-

tions apply to this widely heralded political reform. It is designed, of course, to effect a more equitable representation of the electorate than does the traditional district system of representation. It does achieve this object, and hence must be regarded as a reform which removes obstacles to the realization of the citizen's wishes. The political complexion, the debates and the decisions of legislative assemblies where the system prevails are more or less different from what they would otherwise be. This in turn doubtless has some influence on citizens' opinions and perhaps on their interest in public questions.

When so much is said, however, the possible contributions of the system to the improvement of citizenship have been told. The operation of the system will do little, so far as I can see, to intensify the interest of the citizen in public questions, or to improve the quality of his thinking about them. No noteworthy developments along these lines seem to have resulted from adoption of the system in European countries, and our less extensive experience with the system does not indicate a prospect of any such developments in this country. It is true that the adoption of proportional representation in some American communities has been followed by temporarily successful campaigns against entrenched political machines therein, but it seems doubtful whether the major share of the credit for such successes is properly attributable to the system itself. In any case no marked access of political interest and rationality

on the citizen's part has resulted from the adoption of this reform. Proportional representation, like the short ballot, is a more effective medium than is the alternative system for expression of the citizen's opinions and wishes regarding public matters, but it contributes little to the development of his political interest and intelligence. And the reasons for this limited result are much the same. It scarcely touches the dominant factors in the development and activity of the citizen, nor does it offer a means whereby these might be more rationally controlled.

The Realignment of Political Parties. Various publicists have in recent years advocated a realignment of political parties as a means of promoting the consideration of public issues on their merits. They insist that the differences between the two dominant parties are not very substantial ones, that liberals and conservatives are rather evenly divided between them both, and that neither of them can for that reason pursue a really consistent policy of conservatism or of liberalism in its treatment of public questions. It is believed that two major parties representing these contrasted viewpoints would not only promote discussion of public issues on their merits but, in so doing, contribute substantially to the development of the citizen's interest and intelligence in public affairs. The more radically inclined, however, favor the establishment of a strong labor party, which they hope would eventually become one of the two dominant parties, thus shelving one of the

existing parties, as the Labor Party of Great Britain is said to be doing in that country.

Such a realignment would in all probability have some of the results anticipated for it. We can say, for one thing, that voters who recognize the unsubstantial character of the differences between the Republican and Democratic Parties, and who at the same time feel that neither of them adequately represents their political convictions, might well be stimulated to increased political activity by the establishment of a party offering them a more satisfactory medium of expression.

It may be pointed out, however, that it is only liberals or progressives who cannot find a place among the existing party organizations. The two old parties are both under conservative control, except in isolated sections of the country, while the Socialist and Workers Parties offer congenial political affiliations to the more radically disposed. We have no way of estimating the number of liberals who are thus without a satisfactory medium for political activity. But it seems to be relatively small. The vote for La Follette in 1924 is not a reliable index of it, for disaffected farmers and wage earners together with Socialists outside these classes constituted the bulk of it; and the disaffection of farmers and wage earners was not sufficiently pronounced afterwards to result in the organization of a vigorous third-party movement. It is true, of course, that a considerable number of genuine liberals are enrolled in the

ranks of the two old parties, that many of them hope to liberalize the policies of these parties by "boring from within," and that a goodly portion of this latter number expect to accomplish more by these tactics than they think would be possible by means of a new liberal party.

Any realignment will obviously depend on a far more persistent and extensive discontent with political conditions than has been manifested so far. A development of this sort therefore *presupposes* much the type of political interest among the masses that, according to the argument, the proposed alignment itself is to stimulate. Were this necessary condition developed and the realignment effected, however, discussion of public policies by party leaders would very likely be more sincere and illuminating than at present. In so far it would contribute to the development of a more intelligent and perhaps more active citizenship. Yet I cannot see that, in the absence of a revolutionary transformation in our dominant political traditions, this contribution would be a very substantial or enduring one. The two new dominant parties would be controlled by professional politicians, just as are the present parties, and the vocational interests of the politicians would probably not be more compatible with a sincere and vigorous policy of political education than is now the case. Politicians would still want to win at primary and general elections, for their prosperity would depend on it, and their appeals for electoral support

would doubtless be framed accordingly, with the resultant straddling of issues, specious claims and other varieties of humbuggery so characteristic of political campaigns at the present time.

It is, I think, because the Democratic and Republican Parties have been confronted by much the same electoral problems, and the necessity of dealing with these problems in much the same ways, that there has been such marked convergence in their policies and tactics. In parts of the country that were not thoroughly committed, traditionally, to one or the other of those parties, and that therefore held the balance of power between them, both parties have necessarily catered to the same interests, recognized the same prejudices, made the same promises and, in general, acted much the same all along the line. Liberal and conservative parties would have to operate in a like environment and their respective adjustments to it would eventually be quite similar, in all probability. These statements doubtless require qualification in certain details, but they will, I think, be found substantially correct as to essentials.

There appears to be only one possibility of effecting a fundamental realignment in American politics that would be permanently fruitful. This would be to build up gradually—for it would necessarily be so—a party composed of groups whose interests are not justly treated by the existing parties, until it had won the support of approximately half of the active electorate. It could then take its place

in the two-party system, which, we may assume, would still be dominated by professional politicians of the type that now flourish. The only combination of groups that could furnish so much electoral strength would be the farmers and wage earners. Such a program would not succeed, of course, unless a sufficient number of these classes could be weaned away from their affiliations with the old parties to constitute a dominant party. This will certainly be an arduous undertaking at best, and may not be a feasible one. Difficult as that will be, another condition of success will probably prove even more difficult of attainment. That will be the recruiting of an adequate personnel for the functions of leadership and organization, while the party is being built up. Such a personnel cannot be attracted by the patronage and other opportunities for gain that serve to recruit the working forces of the two dominant parties, and it is not at all certain that, in our American political environment, any other inducements would be sufficient. It is just here, if I mistake not, that we may find the explanation of the failure of seemingly promising movements toward a realignment in American politics. The movements of 1896, 1912 and 1924 would seem to have collapsed chiefly for this reason.

Even if, despite these adverse conditions, a fundamental political realignment should occur and endure, it would offer only a partial solution of the problem we are considering. Party discussion and activity under a new political alignment would chiefly

affect voters, and hence adults whose attitudes and interests had already been developed and crystallized through the influences set forth in the previous chapter. It would not contribute very substantially to the molding of those attitudes and interests during the crucial early years of the citizen's development. The individualistic influences of family, vocational and other group interests, the work conception of welfare, the limitations of civic education through the school, the isolation of the individual citizen from his fellows, and other factors in the development and activity of the citizen could not be sufficiently modified by a new system of parties to produce an essentially new type of citizenship. Generally speaking, party activity will reflect influences of this order much more than it will modify them. For this reason party realignments having some relation to controversial public issues, such as have occurred here and elsewhere, serve to express better, but not so much to transform, the attitudes and interests of the publics to which they appeal.

The Initiative, Referendum and Recall. These devices of popular government are primarily designed, I suppose, to provide checks on legislative, executive and judicial officials whereby their acts may be reviewed or their services terminated by their constituencies. The expediency of these several procedures has of course been a subject of vigorous debate, and those specializing on the problem are not yet agreed as to the answer. I shall not enter into the details of

this controversy, nor set forth the practical results achieved by the use of these procedures, but offer some remarks on their possible contributions to the solution of our special problem.

Up until the World War the application of these devices seems, on the whole, to have promoted the public welfare, and to have stimulated interest in and more or less real thinking about public questions on the part of the electorate. But war and post-war developments have affected the serviceability of these as well as other instruments of popular government. One of these developments is of such crucial and far-reaching significance, that any discussion of popular government which does not recognize its importance is likely to result in erroneous conclusions. This is the discovery that public opinion can be largely made to order, and that political action by the electorate can thus be readily controlled. For this reason the problems of democracy no longer center in the institutional arrangements whereby popular rule is exercised, but in the processes whereby popular attitudes and opinions are created.

The uses made of the initiative, referendum and recall henceforth will depend on the nature and extent of the manipulations to which the electorate is subjected with a view to molding its wishes for expression through these procedures. There is no doubt that the advantages in this process of manipulation lie with the interests enjoying superior organizational and financial resources. Experience

has amply demonstrated this to be so, and those interests have largely recognized the fact. For this reason the attitudes of liberals and conservatives toward these devices of popular government are being reversed. In England, for instance, the Conservative Party favors, while the Labor Party opposes, their adoption; and a like reversal of attitudes is taking place in the United States.

These measures must therefore be regarded as of very doubtful expediency from the standpoint of those who wish to secure a fair hearing for the less powerful economic interests, and, more generally, a consideration of all public questions on their merits. We cannot say whether these procedures will be more or less extensively applied under the new order of things, and therefore whether more or less discussion of public questions will result from their application. Consequently, we do not know whether they will contribute more or less than formerly to the stimulation of public interest in these questions. But of one thing we may be fairly certain, which is that they will contribute less to the *enlightenment* of the public on questions whose discussion is provoked by their application.

Fundamentally, this change in the uses of these and other instruments of popular government has resulted from the discovery that lies and half-truths are just as influential as the truth itself in the formation of public opinion, and that the respective volumes of iteration and suggestion put behind com-

peting truths and falsehoods normally decide which of them shall prevail. The governments of the warring countries convincingly demonstrated *this* truth, and all sorts of interests are now following their example. Before that time there was a prevailing prejudice that in the end truth would win out against falsehood, and therefore a greater confidence in public discussions of those who believed truth to be on their side, and a rather half-hearted opposition of those who doubted whether this was true of *their* case. Hence the different uses made of the initiative, referendum and recall in the periods before and after the War.

Democratization of Procedures for Constitutional Amendment. Much the same considerations apply to this proposal as to the initiative, referendum and recall. Under more democratic amending procedures, indeed, proposed amendments are submitted to the electorate for ratification or rejection, when not also initiated by it. Propaganda dominates or will dominate this as well as ordinary legislative applications of these procedures. This is also true of the deliberations of constitutional conventions or of legislative assemblies in the formulation of amendments for submission to the electorate. Similar considerations apply to the recall of judicial decisions, which may of course be regarded as a device for democratizing the procedure of constitutional amendment. It is to be assumed, therefore, that the influence of more democratic amending procedures on the rôle

of the citizen in public affairs would be of much the same sort as that of the initiative, referendum and recall in their ordinary applications. We may accordingly dispense with a detailed exposition of this position. It should be noted, of course, that substantial modifications of our constitutional law effected through more democratic amending procedures would affect the scope or the method of political action, and to some extent the treatment of social problems not directly subject to the jurisdiction of the state, all depending on the nature of the constitutional changes thus established. *Pro tanto*, the functions of citizens as well as of politicians and public officials would be correspondingly modified.

So far there has been no marked reversal of attitudes on the part of progressives and conservatives toward the democratization of our federal and state constitutions. But I believe it will come eventually. Certainly, under the régime of propaganda, conservatives have little, but progressives much, to fear from such a change; and, conversely, conservatives might hope much, and progressives but little, from this change.

The situation as regards proposals for the extension of popular government is a somewhat ironical one. Progressives formerly held that the cure for evils of democracy was more democracy, but are now beginning to suspect that less, not more, democracy will prove the lesser evil; whereas conservatives formerly opposed extensions of democracy as

prejudicial to their interests, but are now becoming the champions of measures aimed at this objective. Propaganda has mounted the throne, and in doing so worked a veritable revolution in our various conceptions of democracy.

Restoration of Freedom of Discussion. This propaganda revolution has not yet worked a transformation in traditional attitudes toward freedom of discussion, except one that is probably temporary, but it may do so in the future. Conservatives during and since the War have often restricted discussion by others than themselves, and many of the restrictions imposed by them still persist. These restrictions have of course been opposed by the liberals, particularly by those who understand the principle of free discussion and its practical implications. Conservatives will, I think, eventually eliminate these restrictions, since they will probably learn that freedom of discussion cannot harm them; and liberals in turn will find that the interests they have at heart will not be greatly advanced by a restoration of this principle. Discussion will be propaganda in large part, whether or no discussion is free, and in either case will redound to the advantage of those who exercise the dominating control over its content.

It would appear, therefore, that under a régime of propaganda freedom of discussion is of comparatively minor importance. This is so because the use of this freedom cannot seriously undermine the power of propaganda itself. Indeed it could be

argued that the interests favoring preservation of the *status quo* would profit from a scrupulous observance of this principle. They could then plausibly claim that all interests were given a fair chance to impress their views upon the public; and those disadvantaged by the régime of propaganda would have difficulty in refuting this claim. That policy would harm the dominant interests but little if any, since it is the content not the freedom of discussion that really matters, and their control of content could scarcely be challenged.

Some significant qualifications of these statements, however, may be offered. The reign of propaganda itself may be attacked, and any effective attack will involve discussion of a certain sort. The training of citizens, young and old, in the study of public issues for themselves, including the analysis of alleged evidence thereon, and especially the critical examination of propaganda itself, will be the only possible way of destroying this power, and substituting for it the reflective consideration of public questions. Well conceived, resolute attempts to establish groups or institutions, or to utilize existing agencies, for this purpose will be a menace to the interests that thrive under a régime of propaganda. Here is where, as I conceive, the next great battle for popular rights will be fought. When the fight is staged, restrictions on freedom of discussion will doubtless be applied by the menaced interests, so far as they find it expedient to do so. For *this* reason, and not for any

considerations of immediate practical advantage, it is, most important that the principle of free discussion be vindicated anew, and, what is of incomparably greater importance, that a resolute attempt be made to teach the people its meaning and significance, so that when the principle again becomes practically valuable, it may not be violated with impunity.

A less important qualification of the general position may be indicated. Interests especially disadvantaged under a régime of propaganda may come to realize the insuperable handicaps it imposes upon them, conclude that democratic political institutions imply intolerable injustices under these conditions, explicitly repudiate the principles upon which those institutions rest, and strive to bring about some sort of a dictatorship as a way out of their difficulties. In that case, these interests could be greatly hampered by the suppression of their publications, prohibition of their meetings, or frustration of any attempts of theirs to establish schools or discussion groups for the elaboration and dissemination of their doctrines. There is little doubt that the opposed interests would pursue these tactics and that they would be temporarily successful in doing so. It is perhaps an arguable question whether restrictions on freedom of discussion under the assumed conditions would or would not be justifiable from the standpoint of a broader public policy.

The implications of these observations for our

special problems should be clear. Public discussion before the régime of propaganda was inaugurated probably contributed, on the whole, to the enlightenment of the citizen on public affairs, though it could do relatively little to modify the attitudes and conceptions fostered by the social environment as a whole, and constituting the premises of his political thinking. But under the new régime discussion commonly enlightens less than it misleads the citizen, and if it modifies the premises of his thought and action in political matters, such modifications must be mostly of a reactionary character. But free discussion might at some future time embrace educational efforts calculated to release the citizen from the tyranny of propaganda, and train him in a philosophy and technique of citizenship adapted to his needs.

Here must end the discussion of proposed reforms in political and governmental institutions, regarded as contributions to the development of a more competent citizenship. I have singled out for examination only the more promising proposals, and attempted fairly to assess their significance for our special problem. Other proposals might have been considered in this connection, including those contemplating more stringent regulation of primary elections, limitation of campaign expenditures, extension of government research, more responsible budgeting of public expenditures, extension of the merit system in the civil service, and the development of woman's activity in politics. These I have not con-

sidered because, in my judgment, they would contribute relatively little to the improvement of citizenship. Many of them call for useful reforms in political and governmental institutions, and would indirectly enhance the influence of the citizen in public affairs, but none of them offers, so far as I can see, any very weighty contribution to the development of civic intelligence and activity as such.

It may be noted that progress in instituting reforms of this order, such as woman suffrage, the initiative, referendum and recall, direct primaries, the popular election of senators, corrupt practices acts, the commission form of government, the merit system in the civil service, municipal research and the budgeting of public expenditures, has been coincident with a progressive decline of the citizen's interest and activity in public affairs. That fact together with the detailed evidences set forth in the discussion of specific reforms should make us very dubious as to the possibility of regenerating American citizenship through measures of this character.

The reason for their limited contributions in this direction is that, while some of them embody valuable reforms in the *procedures* of citizenship, none of them represents an effective attack on its *substance* or *content*. They are therefore condemned to comparative sterility, so far as *this* problem is concerned.

Numerous programs of change are advocated, however, which would radically modify the substance

of citizenship, and indeed usher in a new social order. These are the programs for a radical reconstruction of economic relationships connoted by private ownership of capital and freedom of contract, together with the individual initiative, business competition, profit-making, economic inequality and class distinctions that are bound up with these fundamental institutions of the present social order. The more significant programs in this category are state socialism,¹ guild socialism, syndicalism, communism, anarchism and consumers' cooperation. All these offer alternatives to private capitalism, and some of them contemplate the abolition of the state. They are not mutually exclusive in the sense that two or more of them could not be applied in the same society, either in combination to the same economic activities, or separately to different economic activities. Various radical groups do propose eclectic programs of this nature. That is true, for instance, of the Fabian Society and of our own Socialist Party.

I shall not describe here the aims of these various programs, the tactics favored as a means of realizing them, or the types of social organization likely to result from their adoption. I shall assume that these programs might be feasible, in order fairly to consider their bearing on the more fundamental problems of citizenship. But I shall discuss the several programs separately so far as may be neces-

¹ This term as used here means collective ownership and control of economic enterprises, under the auspices of the state.

sary to bring out their true significance in this connection.

The problems of citizenship implicated in these programs may, for the sake of clarity, be divided into two categories: (1) those involved in the adoption or rejection of the several programs; (2) those implicated in the state or states of society anticipated by the advocates of these programs.

The first group of problems have reference to the proposed abolition of private capitalism, and the substitution of the given new economic system for it. Except for certain types of anarchism, all these proposals contemplate a collective ownership and control of economic enterprises. According to the different programs, however, ownership and control would be variously delegated to producers, to consumers, to the public at large, or to two or all three of these groups. Business competition, profit-making, individual initiative and class distinctions would be abolished under all these programs, with the exceptions noted. Modified forms of individual ownership and profit-making are essential features of consumers' cooperation, but that system is highly socialistic in character, compared with private capitalism. It follows, therefore, that, excepting the individualistic types of anarchism, all propose a revolution in the basic institutions of the present economic order.

Moreover, all types of anarchism propose the abolition of the state, and the substitution for it of other agencies of social control. Syndicalism osten-

sibly advocates the abolition of the state also, but it favors a type of social organization that would exercise the more essential functions of the state. Certain enthusiastic advocates of consumers' cooperation believe this type of economic organization is generally applicable, and that with its progressive adoption the state would decline and eventually disappear. The state under *any* of these systems that imply political organization at all would be very different from the state under private capitalism.

It is obvious that in the United States none of these programs could be extensively adopted without its active promotion by a large number of *citizens*, and at least passive consent to its adoption by a majority of citizens. Before these prerequisites to a revolutionary development of this character could be provided, citizens' conceptions and attitudes would have to be radically transformed. Their extreme individualism, their preoccupation with vocational activities, their absorption in the interests of their families, their churches and other groups to which they belong, and, on the other hand, their ignorance, indifference and inactivity with reference to their political, economic and other social problems would all have to be supplanted by something very different before they would favor or consent to the adoption of any such program.

But their present attitudes and conceptions are, as we have seen, the inevitable resultants of influences bound up with the *present* social order, and

could hardly be revolutionized while this order persists. Various possibilities of effecting some more or less substantial modification of these attitudes and conceptions have been considered, and found, with one exception, to offer but little promise in this direction. That exception, it will be recalled, is the possibility of establishing new or utilizing existing agencies to develop in the citizen a type of interest, intelligence and activity that would be adapted to the discharge of his functions. Only citizens so equipped would be capable of introducing any of the proposed radical systems, if expedient, or of intelligently rejecting them, if inexpedient.

Some progress can doubtless be made in the application of certain of these systems without any such basic regeneration of citizenship. Consumers' cooperation is making steady though slow progress in a number of countries with social conditions much like our own, and it appears not unlikely that a similar development will eventually occur in the United States. State socialism is also making substantial progress in most countries of the world, including the United States. The pressure of social need, the failure of private capitalism to meet it in various fields, and the obvious superiority of these systems in many other fields account for the progress made in the adoption of these rival systems. It may be that a more extensive and indeed general adoption of alternatives to private capitalism will come through the pressure of just such circumstances.

But it is by no means certain that a development of this character, granting its desirability, could be thus assured. And it is certain that rational decisions on questions in this field are largely precluded by the type of citizenship now prevalent. For, in addition to the individualistic prejudices and interests automatically fostered by our environment, is the influence of propaganda, which will certainly be turned against any proposals for the reconstruction of the economic system. Its effect may already be seen on all sides, and it is sure to become more pronounced as movements for the supersession of private capitalism again become active. It is, I think, quite possible that propaganda together with the traditional bias of the people against cooperative undertakings could block indefinitely the extensive adoption of alternatives to private capitalism in fields where they are demonstrably superior to the latter, and, what is perhaps more significant, prevent experimentation in other fields designed to discover the fittest types of economic organization therein. Moreover, present conditions obviously accentuate the possibility that subordinate economic interests will become disaffected toward democratic political institutions as a means of securing due recognition of their claims, and undertake to establish by force some sort of a dictatorship as a way of vindicating them.

The point in all this, be it noted, is *not* that some alternative to private capitalism should be generally adopted, but that citizenship as at present con-

ditioned by propaganda and other subversive influences makes rational decisions on this question to a large extent impossible. And the *irrational* decisions on the question may include a definitive rejection of alternatives to private capitalism as the dominant type of economic organization, which, in turn, may lead to attempts at a dictatorship, with the consequences implied by any such attempts. Moreover, the irrational decisions will certainly include rejections of such alternatives in specific instances, where they are demonstrably superior to private capitalism, as well as rejections of proposals for experiments designed to test this question.²

Operation of the *systems* contemplated by these various programs would involve problems of citizenship largely distinct from those raised by the proposals themselves. Advocates of these programs have generally recognized that fact, and many of them have devoted considerable attention to this group of problems. As might be expected, some do not adequately appreciate the difficulties of these questions, while others are less open to criticism in

² It should be noted that the problems of citizenship involved in these various programs are not exclusively political in character. The majority of them, according to their advocates, could be introduced only through the use of non-political methods, though the application of such methods would of course be conditioned by political action of one sort or another. And they all depend on education as a means of preparing the way for their adoption. It is contended here that present educational influences are such as to make rational decisions on the questions raised by these programs difficult if not impossible.

this regard. Naturally, the advocates of the various radical programs take very divergent positions on such questions, so far as they speculate about them at all.

A survey and criticism of these positions is beyond the scope of our discussion; but I shall offer such observations on the general question as seem pertinent to our special inquiry.

There is a marked tendency among opponents of private capitalism to assume that the more difficult problems of politics would disappear with the abolition of that system. They claim, as a rule, that political authority is a derivative of economic power, whether or no political institutions are nominally democratic in character, and that the establishment of economic democracy would connote the establishment of political democracy as well. A claim less emphasized, perhaps, is that a socialized economic system would automatically foster the attitudes, conceptions and interests requisite to competent citizenship in modern society, whereas an individualistic system fosters just the opposite.

These claims, I think, have a large measure of truth in them, as is indeed implied by the previous analysis of factors in contemporary citizenship. But it is easy to overemphasize them, and advocates of revolutionary economic programs are prone to do that. We may say as to the first claim that, while such gross economic inequalities as arise under private capitalism would probably not develop under

any one of the alternative systems, it seems quite likely that inequalities of power as between different vocational or industrial groups would develop, and that these would result in political inequalities. Differences in political interest and capacity would also very likely tend to produce similar inequalities. As to the second claim, it may be granted that a socialized economic system would foster the attitudes, conceptions and interests requisite to competent citizenship, since the operation of any such system would necessarily depend on a spirit of cooperation and the accommodation of private interests to the common welfare.

But these factors alone would not foster the types of interest, intelligence and activity requisite to the solution of the citizen's problems under a new social order. For one thing, these problems would probably be more difficult and demand more time and effort on the citizen's part than do the problems of the contemporary citizen. This is so because society is likely to increase in complexity as time goes on, with a corresponding complication of its problems; and also because a vast range of problems now decided by private individuals, namely, most types of economic problems, would then be decided by a much larger number of citizens, whether as specialized groups of producers or consumers, or as members of the state or community.

Extensive knowledge, genuine interest and untiring effort would necessarily be brought to bear on

these problems if they were to be competently handled. These requisites of good citizenship would hardly be automatically produced by a socialized, co-operative economic system. The problems of citizenship would lie largely in inter-group relationships not coming within the daily experiences of the individual, and a recognition and understanding of such problems could come only through educational efforts aimed at this objective. Moreover, under a new economic order, as under private capitalism, the individual would be largely absorbed in the interests of the smaller, more intimate groups with which he was identified. Family, vocational and other special group interests might be as potent then as now in molding the attitudes and conceptions of the citizen, unless educational efforts should be undertaken that were expressly designed to impress upon him their broader social implications. While some radical theorists, particularly certain guild socialists, have elaborated their programs to include machinery for the exercise of the citizen's functions, they all, so far as I know, take competent citizens for *granted*, and fail to recognize the *special* educational problems involved in the *creation* of competent citizenship.

It may be added that these speculations are supported by actual experience with collectivistic developments here and elsewhere. The rank and file of consumers' cooperators are notoriously ignorant, indifferent and inactive with regard to the control

and management of their enterprises, so long as dividends on purchases are forthcoming; and few of them realize or care about the revolutionary implications of the movement which they passively support. Similarly, state ownership and control of economic enterprises, which is so extensive here and abroad, has in itself done relatively little to undermine the individualism of the citizen, and stimulate interest in public affairs. The average citizen scarcely realizes that many of these enterprises are living demonstrations of the feasibility of this alternative to private capitalism, and that they add emphasis to the question whether it might not be substituted for the latter on a much larger scale. Indeed, the extensive adoption of state socialism in the United States, as in the fields of education, research, recreation and medical service, all of them touching vital concerns of the citizen, has been coincident with a marked decline in his interest and activity as a member of the state.

Summing up, three general conclusions regarding the bearing of these various programs on problems of citizenship seem to be warranted: (1) The citizen as developed under present conditions is largely incapable of rational decisions on the questions raised by these programs, and is likely for that reason to prevent desirable applications of the latter, either specific or general; (2) the economic and political systems contemplated by these programs, while they would probably eliminate some hindrances to good

citizenship, would not in themselves assure the development of such citizenship; (3) educational efforts expressly designed to create competent citizenship are requisite to rational decisions on the questions presented by these alternatives to private capitalism, and would be quite as requisite to the proper performance of the citizen's functions, should one or more of those alternatives be generally adopted.

Programs for the improvement of citizenship differing radically from those considered so far are now being elaborated. These are represented by movements for the establishment of community centers, the development of adult education, and the wider application of social-work technique in the treatment of social problems. These movements offer many suggestions and some significant demonstrations as to the possibilities of a more competent citizenship under modern social conditions. The examination of these programs would best be deferred, however, until the possible functions of citizenship and the conditions of their performance have been more systematically treated.

CHAPTER IV

THE PUBLIC: FACT OR PHANTOM?

THE analysis of citizenship presented in previous chapters might well make us despair of the citizen's future and, what amounts to the same thing, of any eventual approximation to democratic social control. For we have seen that the citizen does not, in fact, govern and, indeed, that he is relatively a minor factor in government under democratic institutions; that the forces which make him what he is could not be readily modified; and, finally, that his influence in government has steadily declined at the same time that numerous reforms designed to extend popular government were being put into effect. It would appear that almost every *sort* of expedient for curing the ills of democracy, including the lack of it, has been tried and found wanting; or at any rate that so many promising measures have failed to produce the results expected, a strong presumption is created against more than very limited success of new ones that may be tried.

Many writers about democracy have indeed come to this conclusion, and ceased to believe in the pos-

sibility of self-government in social relationships at all. One thinks here of H. L. Mencken and his disciples, of the eugenists and their program, of the communists and their explicit repudiation of democratic ideals. These schools of political thought have much to teach us, and we would do well to profit by it. The more or less independent analysis herein set forth will support some of their conclusions, but carry adverse implications for others. I must let it speak for itself in this connection, without attempting a systematic examination of the various issues involved.

The remainder of our study is to be of a more positive, constructive character. It will be based on the provisional hypothesis, subject to experimental test, that a closer approach to democracy than the world has yet exhibited is possible; that the citizen can exercise more vital functions of control than he now exercises; and that these possibilities are to be realized through an exhaustive analysis of the factors in the development of citizenship, and a systematic, resolute utilization of instrumentalities for the *creation* of competent citizenship, which such an analysis might identify or whose possibilities it might reveal.

One of the most noteworthy attempts to redefine the nature of the public and of public opinion in the light of recent developments is represented by Mr. Walter Lippmann's *The Phantom Public*. An examination of the views there expounded will

furnish a point of departure for our own study of the problem.

Mr. Lippmann accepts as final the lessons about democracy so dramatically taught by war and post-war experience, including the demonstration of the actual rôle played by the citizen under democratic institutions. He offers a fairly novel statement of the citizen's function, on the basis of that experience; analyzes the conditions affecting exercise of the function as he defines it, and suggests procedures whereby that function might be more acceptably performed. In other words, the actual function of the citizen is accepted as a norm of what his function must be, and means to its perfection on that basis are considered.

It is a cardinal contention of Mr. Lippmann that the public does not and cannot deal with public questions on their merits. A public he defines, not as a fixed body of individuals, but as the persons who happen to be interested in an "affair," and interested not as actors, or those charged with executive responsibility therein, but as outsiders or spectators. Such random publics cannot know a public question from the inside, and hence cannot judge of it on its merits. Such problems must be handled by the parties directly involved, for only they can understand them.

As a matter of fact, the public does not express an *opinion* on public questions, but aligns itself for or against proposals relative to these questions.

This it does by supporting one or another party of the actors or "executive men" who are directly involved in the given situation. It is necessarily guided in the process by coarse signs indicating where its sympathies should turn. *This* type of judgment, be it repeated, is made apart from the intrinsic merits of the question at issue, for it is based on a sample of behavior (of the executive men) or an aspect of the situation; in short, on rough external evidence. The education of the public, consistently with this principle, should have as its end preparation of its members for the discernment of individuals who can compose crises in public affairs.

The substantive *interest* of the public in public affairs is that a "régime of rule, contract and custom" be maintained. This is the only *common* interest, and the only function the public does or can discharge is to vindicate it. But the public is interested in *specific* rules, contracts and customs only when they are broken or their validity challenged, and then because the *régime* of such rules, contracts and customs is endangered. When such a crisis arises, the only function the public can exercise is, not to judge of it on its merits, but to identify and support the individuals who are able to compose it.

Tentatively and by way of illustration, Mr. Lippmann offers certain tests which the public may utilize in the performance of this function. One of these

is the test of inquiry. If one party to a controversy is willing to accept inquiry as a means of elucidating the questions at issue, but the other party is not, it is clear where the public sympathies should turn. The author does not make it clear what tests can be applied when *this* one is not decisive, that is, when *both* sides are willing or unwilling, as the case may be, to accept inquiry. Other tests may be applied in judging proposed new rules to supplant old ones that have ceased to work. According to these tests a new rule must "provide for its own clarification," for "its own amendment by consent," and for "due notice that amendment will be proposed." All these are samples, be it noted, of the rough criteria that the public may employ in deciding where its sympathies shall lie in public disputes.

They are also illustrations of the *more analytical* tests the public may apply in judging such disputes. Normally, the public aligns itself in more wholesale fashion, by choosing between the Ins and Outs. And this is the substance of political democracy. "To support the Ins when things are going well; to support the Outs when they seem to be going badly, this, in spite of all that has been said about tweedledum and tweedledee, is the essence of popular government." ¹

The salient points of Mr. Lippmann's thesis are summarized in his own statement of the principles underlying his proposals:

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 126.

1. Executive action is not for the public. The public acts only by aligning itself as the partisan of some one in a position to act executively.

2. The intrinsic merits of a question are not for the public. The public intervenes from the outside upon the work of the insiders.

3. The anticipation, the analysis and the solution of a question are not for the public. The public's judgment rests on a small sample of the facts at issue.

4. The specific, technical, intimate criteria required in the handling of a question are not for the public. The public's criteria are generalized for many problems; they turn essentially on procedure and the overt, external forms of behavior.

5. What is left for the public is a judgment as to whether the actors in the controversy are following a settled rule of behavior or their own arbitrary desires. This judgment must be made by sampling an external aspect of the behavior of the insiders.

6. In order that this sampling shall be pertinent, it is necessary to discover criteria, suitable to the nature of public opinion, which can be relied upon to distinguish between reasonable and arbitrary behavior.

7. For the purposes of social action, reasonable behavior is conduct which follows a settled course whether in making a rule, in enforcing it or in amending it.²

The public implied in the doctrines thus sketched is the only sort of public we have ever had, or ever can have, according to Mr. Lippmann. The public of orthodox democratic theory is a *phantom public*, and its opinion a phantom opinion. We would be wise to shape our institutions, our procedures,

² *Ibid.*, pp. 144-145.

our education for citizenship in accordance with the nature of the real, not of this phantom, public.

My analysis of this thesis will be directed to four points: (1) The value of tests applicable by the citizen to public controversies, such as Mr. Lippmann proposes; (2) the nature of the citizen's interest in public questions; (3.) the dictum that the public cannot judge of such questions on their merits; and (4) the etiological conception of the public implied by the thesis.

One must concede Mr. Lippmann's acumen in apprehending the import of our political experience since 1914, and his resolute grappling with many of the questions accentuated thereby. His work helps to supply a much needed corrective of the superficial optimism, now gaining headway, which would explain away the negations of democracy during and since the War as temporary aberrations from the normal order of things, and extol some such panacea as education or the abolition of economic inequality as a means of establishing genuine democracy in every domain of social life. Having said so much, I find myself becoming critical toward his diagnosis of our political ills, and the prescription he would apply to them.

Some tests of the sort he proposes would, I think, have valuable applications. That is true, for instance, of willingness to accept inquiry, by the parties to public disputes. Applied to the primary scandals of recent years, the corruptionists of the

Harding administration, employers refusing information on profits, and the like, the test yields unambiguous conclusions. Moreover, such a test is applicable in some measure by all sorts of publics, whatever the degree of their intelligence, or the intensity of their interest in public affairs.

I am inclined to think, however, that an adequate repertory of *such* tests can hardly be devised, one that will enable the public to perform the functions of alignment Mr. Lippmann assigns to it. Perhaps we might regard as tests of the same sort, but applicable to different types of situations, freedom of discussion and respect for law. Mr. Lippmann himself attaches considerable importance to the latter, and has shown on other occasions that he believes in the former. But all such tests put together would not, I think, enable the public to discharge all its aligning functions, even if the tests were dependable ones.

But *these* tests at least are not altogether of this character. The dominant factions of the Republican party persistently opposed inquiry into the activities of the corruptionists in the Harding administration, most of the country's leading newspapers supported this opposition, and, together, they succeeded in convincing a large part, perhaps a majority, of the public that thoroughgoing inquiry was unnecessary, if not undesirable. Freedom of discussion, apparently a simple test, is not more dependable. Its implications, like those of the inquiry test, may

be so obscured by deliberate attempts to do so, that decisive applications of it in situations where it is most significant become impossible. The test of legality is doubtless more dependable than either of those two. Yet it, too, fails where it becomes of crucial significance, particularly where a serious public question is involved in the enforcement of a law. It is not, for instance, an adequate criterion of conduct in regard to legal restrictions on freedom of discussion, legal censorship of books or plays, or legal prohibition of cigarette or liquor sales. We should probably find, on probing the matter further, that there are many situations where such tests would not yield dependable conclusions, or where the public could be led to think this was the case. If that is so of tests that seem so simple, what must we say of more complicated tests, such as Mr. Lippmann would have the public apply in judging new rules? What could a public unable decisively to apply the tests of inquiry, legality and freedom of discussion do with tests designed to show whether a new rule provides for its own clarification, its own amendment by consent, and due notice that its amendment will be proposed?

Such tests are not dependable because the public, or a sufficient portion of it, has not an adequate grasp of the principles implied therein, or sufficient ability in administering them, to know just how, when and where they are applicable to the judgment of public questions. The public is lacking in

these requisites because it is not adequately educated, and also because it is *miseducated*, in such matters. Propaganda can make anything political uncertain, where people are not trained to discount propaganda itself. This is so not only in cases where the simpler tests might be applied, as in the instances cited, but in situations where these tests would not yield decisive conclusions. Under a régime of propaganda, parties to a controversy that might be afraid of the relevant facts properly interpreted need not on that account be afraid of inquiry. Majority reports and majority decisions are often unsound or unjust ones, because the judgments of official inquirers may be biased by this and other influences. An acute student of the Railroad Labor Board, to cite only one illustration, showed that the Board did not function impartially, because the railway executives had the power to mold public opinion on questions coming before the Board, and, through that, the opinion of the Board member supposed to represent the public, and holding the balance of power between the railway and the union members of the Board.

Moreover, a public that could, under these conditions, apply such tests in the judgment of public disputes would also be qualified to exercise more positive functions in the disposition of public questions. A member of the public who really grasped the implications of the inquiry, the free-speech and other such tests would grasp much besides, and that

understanding could be utilized in the consideration of public questions on their merits. This is so, in part, because education of the public could not be thus specialized, even if the attempt were made; and, in part, because the implications of such tests can be fully comprehended only in relation to substantive public questions with which, in practice, they are bound up. But we may concede that tests of this sort are very valuable in the hands of a public competent to apply them, even though such a public could be intrusted with much besides their application.

I should also take issue with Mr. Lippmann's contention that the public interest lies exclusively in the maintenance of a régime of law, contract and custom. This position would, it seems to me, align him with the advocates of "law and order" from whom we have heard so much in recent years, though Mr. Lippmann's régime would doubtless be a more tolerant and reasonable one than would theirs. But his sympathies certainly do not lie in that camp, and I have no desire to put its label on him. I fear that I have not fully grasped his intent on this point, for what I understand him to mean seems so fallacious that I am loath to believe him guilty of it.

But discussing the position as I understand it, I would point out that, according to it, the public must sanction any abuse, anything prejudicial to the common welfare, that does not lead to a dispute or crisis of some sort; and that it must sanction any

sort of solution applied to such a situation that will "compose" or allay controversy about it. The position would imply, for instance, that the public is not interested in the farmer, the wage earner or a group of consumers unless or until they or their opponents make trouble of which the public must take cognizance. The mistreatment of children, the oppression of racial minorities, the exploitation of backward nations, the manhandling of prisoners would thus be of no concern to the public so long as no overt crisis arises in regard to any of these things.

If such are the implications of Mr. Lippmann's position, then it seems to me very nearly the antithesis of one based on a functional analysis of contemporary social organization. While the maintenance of a régime of law, contract and custom is one important interest of the public, there are other public interests not secondary in importance to that one. Such a régime could embrace the most widely varying standards of justice and welfare, as indeed it has; and the public not only can but does exert enormous influence in determining *what* standards of this category shall prevail at any given time and place. And, as I shall attempt to show later, it can do a great deal more than it now does in enforcing valid standards.

There are, I think, two sorts of positive functions that the public exercises—and might exercise more effectively—in regard to public questions, and

that measure its substantive interests in those questions. (1) The public has an interest in virtually all public questions that is more or less distinct from the interests of the parties actively involved therein, and that must be vindicated by the public, if it is to be vindicated at all. (2) It can and does intervene in public disputes to sanction what it regards as just accommodations of the active interests implicated therein. Although public action in behalf of the latter, as of the former, interest is seriously deficient in many and probably the great majority of instances, there is much evidence tending to show that its action in both directions might be much more intelligent and effective. Besides, as a general rule, public action is the *only* factor that can be utilized to protect the public's own distinctive interest in public questions; and it is also the only factor available for the protection of special interests in these questions, when such interests are hopelessly handicapped in pressing their claims against their opponents.

Any amount of evidence could be cited in support of these statements and, *as qualified*, none or very little against them. I will first show that the public does have substantive interests of the sorts indicated. That it does much to vindicate these interests will be brought out in a later part of the discussion.

Let us take some illustrations, from various fields, of distinctive public interests in public questions. The conservation of natural resources furnishes one such

illustration. Society, or the public, has an interest in the conservative use of national resources, but very often the special interests involved do not have. Our timber resources, for instance, have been largely depleted by logging and lumbering interests that thrived by quick and wasteful exploitation. Neither the timber owners nor their employees nor any other special-interest group had much if anything to gain by timber conservation. There were some exceptions to this rule, but nevertheless it *was* the rule, with the result that a serious problem of timber conservation arose. And the initiative in dealing with it has rested with the public or persons representing the public interest. Of course, *consumers'* interests have been involved and more or less influential in the situation, but consumers' interests are largely synonymous with public interests in such matters. Take railroad rates as another illustration. Neither railroad owners nor railroad employees have the same interest as the public in this matter. Other things are not quite equal, but, if they were, railroad owners and employees would be interested in maintaining the highest possible rates, and the public in securing the lowest possible ones. Or, allowing for the unequal things, owners and employees are interested respectively in the highest profits and wages possible, but that is certainly not the public's interest. Again, consider the case of preventive medicine. Under present conditions, the interest of the medical profession lies

rather in unpreventive than in preventive medicine, though exceptions must be allowed for. That is not the public's interest. To offer still another illustration, commercial recreation enterprises thrive best in the absence of effectively competing enterprises under community auspices; but the public interest is probably subserved by such competition. In none of these cases is there a special group interest that can be relied upon to uphold the public interest, and for the sufficient reason that public interests and special group interests are not altogether identical or compatible. Such illustrations could be multiplied *ad libitum*.

These distinctive public interests are considered so vital in various fields, whether rightly or wrongly, that the public through its governmental agencies has assumed primary responsibility for the services therein. This has been done because of a belief that private interests could not or would not provide services of the quality or amount demanded by the public. Public fire and police protection, a public army and navy, public education, public research laboratories, public libraries, public parks and playgrounds, public forests and many other public enterprises came thus to be established. Would Mr. Lippmann say that public interest in these undertakings lies only in the maintenance of a régime of law, contract and custom, so far as appertaining thereto? The special-interest groups concerned in these enterprises, those constituting the "executive men,"

are the teachers, the firemen, the soldiers, the foresters, the construction gangs and the like, including experts and administrative officers. Is not the public interested *as* the public in the quality and scope of their services? Were not these groups established or brought under public control because public interest demanded it? Is it not the public interest itself that, in these cases, creates special group interests and that constitutes the *raison d'être* of the latter? Negative answers to these questions would, I submit, be manifestly absurd.

Public interest in other fields is often considered so vital, and to be so prejudiced by uncontrolled special interests therein, that extensive public regulation has been undertaken. It is manifestly a distinctive substantive interest of the public that motivates such interference with private special interests and creates another special interest, that of the regulating personnel, for the protection of its (the public's) interest. It is therefore absurd to suppose that the public has an interest only in the maintenance of law, contract and custom in this realm of private interests. Regulation is generally undertaken because the private interests sanctioned by the antecedent régime of law, contract and custom were believed to be not altogether compatible with a distinctive vital interest of the public.

The public has a substantive interest in practically all phases of social life, because in a society based on a highly developed specialization of functions,

the welfare of everybody is bound up with the activities of everybody else, or very nearly so. Every industry, every vocation, is producing for a vast market in which the general public is the buyer. This is true even of producers' goods, for their cost is ultimately borne by the purchasers of consumers' goods. The qualities, prices and amounts of everything which the public collectively and distributively buys are determined by the conditions and activities of the various vocations and industries that put their wares or services on the market, and by the distribution of the public's dollar among them and their individual members. The same sort of interdependence characterizes other than economic interests, or aspects of social interests other than the economic. This does not, of course, imply that the public must as a public intervene in all these interests with a view to protecting its own distinctive interests. But where its more vital interests would be fostered by such intervention, it would be foolish not to act accordingly. All this seems so obvious that it should not be necessary to affirm it. But Mr. Lippmann denies it, if I understand him correctly.

Mr. Lippmann's position also implies that the public has no interest in situations involving questions of justice or welfare to the active participants therein, except when public order is threatened. I would affirm the contrary, which is, of course, the orthodox position. This position seems warranted by the fact that public intervention directed to such

questions has produced beneficent results, and might in the future be much more productive of such results. All the efforts in behalf of oppressed or exploited groups by others than themselves come in this category, save only where they were designed to avert or allay a crisis. Disinterested efforts in behalf of women, children, wage earners, Negroes, delinquents and dependents are familiar instances. Such efforts have undoubtedly improved the lot of those to whose welfare they were directed, though of course there are many exceptions.

Not only do these efforts justify, by their results, this type of public interest, but they represent a discharge of public obligations as well. Society is largely responsible, in the etiological sense, for the injustices, inequalities and oppressions suffered by its members. These evils result, in part, from its customs, its institutions, its ideals; and the public, or the responsible portion of the social group, sanctions these controls, and is ethically responsible for their evil results. To deny that the public has a valid interest in the elimination of these evils is tantamount to a denial that social groups have ethical responsibilities. Even if public service of the disadvantaged groups in society were wholly gratuitous, not obligatory, in character, it would still represent a justifiable public interest, since it could scarcely be maintained that the rendering of a positive service to those in need of it is not a legitimate activity.

It is scarcely necessary to observe that the two types of public interest here distinguished—public self-interest, and public interest in the welfare of disadvantaged groups—are not separate in reality. Such groups obviously constitute a considerable part of the public; and their welfare, in a society like ours, vitally affects the welfare of the public at large.

Mr. Lippmann might perhaps defend himself against these strictures by saying that the public can deal with its legitimate interests, whatever their nature, by composing crises or adjudicating disputes in which they are involved; or, in other words, that such crises or disputes will sooner or later show where the public interests lie and present the opportunity of dealing with them in the way he suggests. This contention would be partially valid so far as parties to disputes with real grievances were conscious of that fact and, in addition, had the means of pressing their claims on public attention. Organized, group-conscious farmers, wage earners, racial or national minorities with such grievances would conform to these specifications. Even these groups would hardly be capably assisted by the public if it confined its efforts to measures aimed at the elimination of disturbances in the régime of law, contract and custom.

But cases of this sort constitute only a small portion of those in which vital public interests are at stake. They do not include the innumerable situa-

tions, covering every phase of social life, in which public as distinct from special group interests are involved. The distinctive interests of the public in the conservation of natural resources, preventive medicine, wholesome recreation and the like would not, as a rule, be pressed on its attention by crises or disputes due to conflict between special-interest groups involved therein, and for the reason that any such conflict would not be concerned with the distinctive public interest in those situations.

Nor could the public rely on crises or disputes to reveal injustices or oppressions of which their victims were not conscious, or which the latter had no way of pressing on public attention. These undoubtedly include a large portion of the situations involving questions of justice or welfare to their participants, and coming, as I have insisted, within the scope of public interest and responsibility. Crises in these situations, if they are to be provoked at all, must be provoked by the public itself, that is, by private citizens or public officials representing what they regard as the public interest. This is of course actually done by social workers, public officials and others of influence who believe themselves to be public servants, whether in an official or an unofficial capacity. Crises or issues so provoked, however, would not illustrate but actually contravene the public interest as Mr. Lippmann conceives it.³

³ The foregoing discussion does not contradict the doctrine that

A third main point of Mr. Lippmann's thesis is his dictum that the public cannot judge public questions on their merits. If this means that not all the public can judge all public questions, or that a majority of the public cannot judge even a majority of such questions, then it is undoubtedly true. If it be interpreted to mean, however, that various specific publics cannot judge numerous specific questions on their merits, then it is untrue. Moreover, the capacity of the public or of its constituent specific publics for such judgments can probably be very greatly expanded beyond the limits of its or their present capacities. Just how much enlargement is possible, no one knows, of course.

Many evidences supporting these contentions have already been adduced in other connections. Virtually all the efforts on behalf of vital public interests imply and must necessarily be based on judgments of the questions involved on their merits. The need for conservation of natural resources was demonstrated by members of the public who formed judgments on this question; such successes as the movement for conservation has achieved were made possible by similar, though generally less original, judgments of a much larger section of the public.

public opinion can only arise where controversial issues are involved. The validity of that conception is taken for granted, the discussion itself being concerned with the scope and function of public controversy. The means of *fostering* fruitful controversy, within the limits defined, is one of the major problems on which the inquiry as a whole is focused.

Similar statements would apply to the enactment of pure food laws, limitation of child labor, legal protection of women workers, development of public health service, establishment of parks and playgrounds, and any number of public measures whose results have justified their adoption. It is true, of course, that only a relatively small minority of the public is apt to be interested in any such question, and that most of its members will have only crude and often erroneous judgments thereon, but they nevertheless do judge that question on what are conceived to be its merits. Leadership in pressing these questions on public attention and in stimulating public judgments thereon is obviously exercised by only a few, but those few may be taken as representatives of substantive public interests in these questions. A public is like other groups in this regard, leadership both intellectual and organizational being a necessity.

It cannot be too strongly emphasized that public interests can be vindicated *only* by public activity in judging public questions on their merits (and of course judging them correctly) and in insisting that measures be taken in consonance with such judgments. As has been pointed out, public interests are not ordinarily revealed, much less vindicated, by conflicts of special interests bound up with the public interests, and the adjudication of those conflicts solely in the interest of maintaining a régime of law, contract and custom. Moreover, special inter-

ests put so much pressure on those exercising public authority that this must be counterbalanced, if public interests are not to be overridden, by pressure from the public itself.

It may be pointed out, too, that support of one or the other party to a dispute must be based on a judgment of the substantive questions at issue, if the public interest is not to be overlooked. That, in fact, is now done; only, unfortunately, it is very incompetently done in perhaps the great majority of instances. Decisions between the Ins and the Outs at election time must necessarily be based on their respective policies with respect to prohibition, the farmers' problems, revision of the tariff and the like, if the vital interests of the public in these matters are to be safeguarded. And politicians know that their careers depend in some measure on their response to public judgments, whether right or wrong, on just such questions.

Mr. Lippmann recognizes that the public, or rather various specific publics, *attempt* to judge questions of this order on their merits. But he contends that this is a function for which the public is unfit, and which it can therefore attempt only with unfortunate results. My contention is that public interests are bound up with such questions, and that these interests can be protected only through judgments on those questions by the public itself, together with measures based on these judgments. In showing, if it has been shown, that the public

does make such judgments as a matter of fact, and that these and the measures based thereon have been most influential in the advancement of legitimate public interests, it is not implied that the public as a whole is at all competent in the discharge of its functions. On the contrary, the interest, intelligence and activity of the public in the performance of these functions are woefully inadequate compared with the need. The most cursory survey of public problems and efforts to deal with them in the public interest demonstrates this quite conclusively. But I am advancing the hypothesis, subject to experimental test, that the public might become incomparably more competent than it now is in dealing with its problems. That hypothesis is based on an etiological conception of the public very different from the one implied by Mr. Lippmann's thesis. This brings us to the fourth and last main point (or implication) of the thesis that is to be examined here.

Mr. Lippmann implies throughout his discussion that the publics of the future must be much like those of the present, not only in kind but in degree as well. They can never judge public questions on their merits nor act in accordance with judgments of this character. This limitation of the public should be recognized as such, and its rôle in public affairs shaped accordingly.

This conception I reject, on the ground that the factors in the development of the citizen's interest, intelligence and activity in public affairs are in con-

siderable measure subject to social control. That is true, in particular, of institutions, traditions, ideals, attitudes, techniques and other *cultural* factors in that development; and, through the control of these factors, geographic conditions and even hereditary traits, capacities and limitations involved in the citizen's development can be partially controlled also. Conceding the serious limitations on the possibilities of such control, I would nevertheless argue that by means of feasible control measures a type of citizenship can be produced that will be immeasurably superior to the type or types now prevalent. If, as I have contended, judgments on public questions by members of the public, together with endeavors based on these judgments, now count for much in the advancement of public interests, they may be made to count for a great deal more through rational, systematic efforts to *create* the public interest, intelligence and activity requisite to this purpose. It is one of the aims of the present inquiry to identify the factors in the development of the citizen, or contribute to such identification, and thus assist in laying the foundations for well-conceived efforts directed to that object.

It will be seen from the foregoing discussion of Mr. Lippmann's thesis, that he has, in my judgment, misconceived the nature of the public interest in public questions; underrated the ability of the public to judge those questions on their merits; exaggerated the importance of tests applicable by

the public in the judgment of public controversies; and accepted a faulty etiological conception of the public with its unsound implications respecting the possibility of more competent publics in the future. Despite these adverse criticisms, I recognize the value of his challenge to traditional conceptions of public opinion and popular government, and the stimulus it applies for a revision of these conceptions in the light of recent experience.

I will now proceed to offer some specifications for the construction of a citizenship as competent as may be for the discharge of its functions. Nothing will be gained by underestimating the difficulty of the undertaking, and we might accordingly begin by emphasizing further the magnitude and complexity of the tasks confronting the citizen. If it should develop, as seems not unlikely, that individual citizens cannot function effectively in all the tasks described, we shall be confronted by the question whether they must not specialize in the performance of these tasks and, if so, on what principle this specialization shall be based. More adequately stated, we shall have to consider what *structure* of citizenship will be requisite to the successful performance of citizenship functions.

I have argued that citizens generally have two types of interest in public questions: (1) interest therein as affecting the personal welfare of the citizen himself; (2) interest in the welfare of those actively involved in these questions, designated by

Mr. Lippmann as actors or participants in the given situations. The first type of interest is illustrated in the bearing on the citizen's welfare of the qualities and prices of consumers' goods put on the market by the various producing interests. It comprehends, of course, an interest in the maintenance of law, contract and custom so stressed by Mr. Lippmann, and, more generally, an interest in the harmonious and efficient functioning of social organization in all its phases. The second type of interest is represented by efforts to promote the welfare of children, women, Negroes, wage earners and other socially handicapped groups, for which the public is ethically responsible, and which, as experience shows, it can foster in greater or lesser measure.

A third type of interest comes within the scope of citizenship broadly conceived. This is the more special, personal interest of the individual as a member of a family, a vocation, an economic class and other groups playing a vital part in his life. We may include this type of interest with the other two as civic in character, because they are all concerned with social relationships, and the preparation and organization of the individual for promotion of that type could hardly be separated in practice from those involved in promoting the other two types. This third type of interest is fostered, education apart, by developing special organizations for its protection, such as unions, cooperative marketing associations and the like; and also by securing

representation for it in the consideration, adoption and execution of public policies in which it is implicated.

The scope of these interests is obviously very extensive, and covers a host of problems, many of them complex and difficult to a marked degree. The first type of public interest is practically coterminous with social life itself, since, as has already been emphasized, the peoples of the world are organized in one great, complex, closely articulated society, whose members are thus made vitally interdependent, wherefore the improper functioning of any great number of them is apt to affect adversely most of the others. To speak in more concrete terms, the welfare of all depends on the efficient functioning of the farmers, the wage earners, the business men, the physicians, the teachers, the housewives and all other trades, vocations and professions which supply services or commodities to the public or its individual members. Stated in different terms, the public welfare is dependent on the conservation of natural resources, the size, quality and distribution of population, the productiveness of the industrial system, the equitable division of wealth, the elimination of preventable disease, the provision of wholesome housing accommodations, the efficiency of public education, the intelligent use of leisure time, the prevention of crime, the harmonious cooperation of racial, national, religious and other social groups, and the adaptation of social, political and economic

institutions to the rational control of all such interests. Each of the items enumerated embraces many problems of vital concern to the public which must be treated from that point of view if public welfare is to be subserved.

Special group interests involving questions of justice or welfare to the active participants are almost as broad in scope. Public interest in questions of this category is most pronounced, of course, where groups with divergent interests and unequal power to protect them are concerned. But almost any type of social relationship is affected by this type of public interest, since the parties to such relationships are hardly ever on a basis of equality so far as power to protect their respective interests is concerned. Man-woman, husband-wife, parent-child, teacher-pupil, employer-employee, landlord-tenant, business man-farmer, merchant-customer, physician-patient, lawyer-client, creditor-debtor, white-Negro, large nation-small nation, government-citizen, conservative-radical and many other similar relationships illustrate this fact. Generally speaking, the second party in each of these several relationships is at a disadvantage, compared with the first party, in securing recognition of its just claims. And the first party very often, if not generally, takes advantage of its superior power to deny or ignore the claims of the second party. All such statements are relative, of course, and must not be accepted as of general validity, unless the proper qualifications are

made. The point is that the injustices, oppressions and exploitations in such relationships are so extensive and so serious in their results that the intervention of a third party to protect the welfare of the disadvantaged parties is often a necessity. The only party available for this purpose is the public, including associations and individual members thereof acting in its behalf. The public is not concerned solely, of course, in purging such relationships of their injustices and exploitations, but also in making them positively fruitful for the parties thereto, so far as it may do so. Obviously, the public itself is distributively enmeshed in relationships of this character, and in undertaking to improve them contributes to the personal welfare of its members. Also, of course, social relationships of this order are largely constitutive of social organization in general, and by virtue of that fact implicate all types of public interest.

The third type of civic interest pertains to the welfare of the individual as a member of a family, a vocation, a class and other groups affecting his welfare. This type of interest is pretty nearly as broad as are the other two types just considered. The distinctions of these interests from one another are indeed functional, not ontological, in character, having reference rather to different aspects or relationships of the same social activities, than to different activities. If this be so, almost any social

problem is likely to be affected with this third type of civic interest.

Experience has abundantly shown that disinterested attempts to accommodate divergent group interests are most successful where the special groups concerned are fairly evenly matched as regards ability to protect their own interests. It is therefore important that vocations, economic classes, races, nations and other groups among which protective organizations may have been slow in developing should be assisted in the establishment of such organizations. But the concept of special group interests here accepted implies that the participants therein are largely responsible for their protection and development, and that citizenship embraces this as one of its major functions. To illustrate, teachers must act as an organized group in the promotion of their vocational interests; wage earners as an organized group in vindicating their class interests; racial or national minorities as organized groups in securing recognition of their special interests. It is hardly necessary to observe that, whatever may be the case in the future, disadvantaged group interests in the past could rely on the public only to a limited extent in securing recognition of their just claims, having been obliged, as a general rule, to extort such recognition through organized efforts of their own.

Preparation for citizenship in the broad sense of

the term will embrace these specialized group interests as well as the more generalized types of public interest coming within the scope of the citizen's functions. The training and organization of citizens will accordingly be concerned in part with the same interests, the more general public ones, but in part differentiated on the basis of their several vocational, class and other special group interests. Thus farmers, wage earners and business men as members of the public will have much the same interest in general public questions, but as members of different economic classes will have differentiated interests with respect to many economic questions.

CHAPTER V

THE CONDITIONS OF COMPETENT CITIZENSHIP

HOW shall citizens develop the interest, the intelligence, the activity necessary to cope with the vast range of problems here indicated? What institutions will be found indispensable to this undertaking? What types of educational effort will be essential, and under what auspices shall these be organized? How far may existing agencies be utilized for these purposes? What sorts of specialization in the performance of citizenship functions will be necessary? What ultimate limitations to the achievements of citizenship will experience reveal? These general questions obviously include innumerable specific ones, many of them now insoluble for lack of adequate evidence. Any systematic treatment of such questions must therefore be partially speculative in character, and proceed by way of formulating hypotheses whose validity can only be tested by experience. With this caution in mind, I shall attempt to work out the more probable solutions of these questions, and to indicate lines along which definitive solutions might be sought.

I shall begin by specifying the sorts of knowl-

edge which, as I think, the citizen must have if he is to deal with his problems intelligently. No phase of our society can be understood without at least a fair understanding of society as a whole. Society may not be an organism, but it can nevertheless be regarded as having numerous organs bound together in a more or less unitary structure. No one of these organs may be understood without viewing it in relation to the whole. I should say, accordingly, that only the most superficial notions of any but very minor social problems are possible without an understanding of the major specialized organs and functions of society at large, and the ways whereby these are constituted into a unitary whole. The family and its problems, for instance, cannot be understood apart from the economic system, the social status of women and other basic features of social life. The problems of the wage earner, the farmer or the business man are similarly bound up with the economic system, political organization and indeed social life as a whole. Educational problems are likewise related to every phase of social life and to the interrelations of these phases. We could say much the same thing of population problems, health problems, leisure-time problems or indeed any group of major social problems that might be mentioned. The point need not be labored, for anyone with even a superficial knowledge of the social sciences will concede its validity.

My contention is that no one can be a competent

citizen who does not have a fair grasp of social organization as a whole, and its conditioning of specific social problems. This, if true, means that competent citizenship is based on at least an elementary knowledge of history, sociology, economics and political science, especially those phases thereof that illumine the problems of the particular citizen. To add some details, the competent citizen must understand the nature and significance—in some substantial measure—of population problems, natural resources, the price régime, machine production, private property, economic classes, modern nationalism, the American constitutional system, political parties, public opinion, scientific method and other basic factors in social organization. In the absence of such knowledge the citizen's ideas about public questions cannot be grounded in reality, and he readily falls a prey to the irrational influences brought to bear on him and all too often directed to other interests than his own.

In addition to a general knowledge of social, political and economic organization, the citizen needs a somewhat thorough grounding in the major social problems of the time, those pertaining to the welfare of the farmers, the status of the wage earner, the efficiency of industry, the distribution of wealth, the position of women, the functions of the family, the conflict of races, the relationships between nations, the education of the young, the use of leisure time, the prevention of disease, and many

others. These various problems must of course be understood in relation to the social, political and economic organization which have produced them and in terms of which they must be solved.

Then the competent citizen requires a more intensive knowledge of the special group interests in which he participates. Negroes need an understanding of their interests as a repressed minority; farmers of their producing and marketing interests; teachers, physicians, mechanics and other vocational groups of their special interests; and likewise with all the vital groups in contemporary society. These various group interests must also be understood in relation to one another and to the general social, political and economic organization under which they are necessarily coordinated.

Equipped with these sorts of knowledge, the citizen will be able to judge his problems on their merits, as they arise in the ordinary course of events. The knowledge specified, however, will only furnish a basis for the consideration of current problems; the latter will necessarily be studied on their own account, and in relation to their specific conditioning factors. Needless to say, the citizen's study of current problems, in view of their scope and complexity, can be as wide and intensive as he will let it be. Specialization on these problems will doubtless be necessary, however, in the interest of competent citizenship itself. But it must be insisted that there can be but little specialization, as among different

citizens, in the studies furnishing the indispensable basis of competent citizenship, however specialized the citizen's activities in dealing with current problems may be.

All this varied assortment of knowledge, whatever the satisfactions of its acquisition in itself, will be justified primarily as instrumental to intelligent *action* in civic affairs. It is more difficult to specify the sorts and amounts of action involved in competent citizenship than to furnish specifications for the necessary knowledge. It will be even more difficult to design the institutions requisite to the knowledge and action implied by this type of citizenship. Here I shall undertake only some general specifications for the citizen's action with respect to his problems.

One necessary type of action will be the expression of his judgments on civic questions, and in such manner that public officials or others directly responsible for the treatment of those questions will not be left in doubt as to the nature of the judgments expressed. Obviously the citizen cannot be expected to express himself on all the specific questions involved in public policies, but under a carefully articulated system of citizen specialization on public questions, it might be possible for citizens as a body to express themselves on all the questions which cannot be left to the discretion of those dealing directly therewith. It is obvious that at present adequate media are not available for the

expression of the citizen's judgments on public questions, despite the paucity of these judgments. On questions of war and peace, for instance, which are at least as important as the recurrent question of electing a Democrat or a Republican to the Presidency, citizens may not express their judgments except partially, informally and inconclusively. I shall reserve for a later chapter the task of specifying more adequate media for this purpose.

A second necessary type of citizen activity will be the selection, in one way or another, of agents for the elaboration and execution of policies on civic questions in conformity with the citizen's judgments. Ordinary election machinery might perhaps be utilized for this purpose, but its operation would have to be dominated by citizens themselves instead of by professional politicians with special vocational interests not altogether compatible with the citizen's welfare. It seems not unlikely, however, that, under a régime of citizenship such as is here contemplated, traditional types of party organization would be poorly adapted to the function of choosing agents for execution of the citizen's mandates. In any case the choice of public servants must really be the citizen's own, if his judgments are to be the basis of public policy. These choices will of course necessitate judgments on the qualifications of those who may be considered for public responsibilities, including judgments on the performances of those previously intrusted with such responsibilities. The in-

stitutional arrangements for this division of the citizen's functions will be considered in a later part of the discussion.

A third general type of citizen activity might be the direct performance of certain civic functions by local groups of citizens. This category of functions might include the inspection of government services in the local community, whether by local, regional or federal agencies; the study of law enforcement, also in local areas, particularly where there was reason to believe that improvements therein were needed; and the investigation of local conditions not under governmental jurisdiction which it might be desirable to bring within the scope of public control. Services of this type might be coordinated on a state-wide or national scale and directed towards definite objectives whose attainment depended on the citizen's direct cooperation. This type of action might prove very valuable as a means of intensifying the citizen's interest in his problems, testing and elaborating his knowledge of these problems, and giving him a check on those charged with the execution of his policies. Service on official committees charged with advisory or supervisory functions would perhaps come under citizen action of the same general category.

It is quite likely that a fourth type of activity will have a place in the régime here depicted. Many citizens will no doubt develop intensive interests in particular questions, organize themselves to study

such questions, disseminate their views thereon, and apply other sorts of pressure to give their views practical effect in public undertakings. Special group interests will certainly proceed thus in formulating their demands and attempting to secure their recognition. Such an organization of citizens as is here depicted would be prepared, however, to digest the views and demands emanating from these sources, appraise them from the standpoint of the public interest, and shape its action accordingly.

Nothing in these specifications implies that the services of leaders and experts will not be required. On the contrary, citizens will need instruction by public officials regarding the conditions and issues involved in public policies, as well as advice by experts on matters within their special fields and at the same time subject to the citizen's judgment and action. There should, in fact, be the freest interchange of information and opinion between the citizen and the executor of his mandates, to the end that the citizen's judgments and actions may be based on expert opinion as to relevant matters beyond the range of his own competency, and that the executor may base his activities on a correct interpretation of the citizen's wishes.

The régime here sketched is characterized by a type of interest, intelligence and activity the possibility of which receives no sanction from historic experience except perhaps in the case of ancient Greece, modern Denmark and the Communist Party

of Russia. It is obvious that we could not duplicate any of those instances in this country, even if we desired to do so, since of course the factors involved therein could not be reproduced here. At the same time they may have much to teach us regarding our problems. We shall see, I think, that this is actually the case. But we must consider the task before us in terms of its own conditioning factors, primarily, if we are properly to assess its difficulties.

We may discuss first some specific tasks of a negative character. It is obvious, I suppose, that the extreme individualism of the American citizen must be superseded by something which, while not its exact antithesis, will yet be very different. The citizen's problems are corporate in character, and can be solved only by the integration of individual interests into collective wholes, based on a recognition of that fact. While didactic instruction may do much to undermine archaic forms of individualism, the most effective attack will probably come from building up civic activities of a cooperative character which will in effect condemn them to extinction by disuse. Nevertheless, the realistic study of social conditions and problems will help to discredit the reigning types of individualism and prepare the way for activities based on the opposite principle.

Then the work conception of welfare must be killed off, though of course the half-truth in it must be retained. By every method available, whether didactic or experimental in character, the fact must

be driven home to the citizen that his welfare depends as much on his citizenship as on his work. This is perhaps not an easily demonstrated fact, as the effects of diligence in one's work on one's welfare are more palpable than are the effects on welfare of tariff schedules, changing price levels, the business cycle and other factors coming within the area of civic control. Nevertheless, this truth is demonstrable, even to relatively untutored minds. Effective assault on the tradition will also come, of course, from the development of civic activities which imply its unsoundness.

Corresponding to the work conception of welfare is an archaic conception of citizenship itself. According to that conception, citizenship is a sort of residuary interest which need not be taken very seriously, nor command any great amount of the citizen's time and effort. The conception also implies that literacy, a rudimentary study of government and perhaps a course or two in community civics are all the preparation needed for the practice of citizenship. This conception must be destroyed root and branch, if effective citizenship is to be developed. It will be attacked in much the same ways and on much the same occasions as the work conception of welfare.

Part of the attack on the reigning individualistic and work traditions will take the form of demonstrating to the citizen the dependence of his interests as an individual, and as a member of a family,

a vocation and other groups, on the social, economic and political order with which these are organically bound up, and the consequent necessity of protecting and enhancing those interests through control of the relationships constituting that order. In other words, the civic implications of those interests must be made clear to the citizen. The claims of other groups than his own to his interest and protection can be made clear in the same way.

Another conception that must be cleared away holds that education is equivalent to schooling and is "finished" with the latter. This conception never was true, but it is more pernicious today than ever before, and will become increasingly so as time goes on. It tends to blight all the substantial interests of the individual, not alone those of a civic character. The kaleidoscopic changes in all phases of social life make it impossible for the individual to adapt himself successfully to his social environment without continuous, intensive study thereof throughout life. In other words, adult education, now so widely discussed, is a necessity. The conception in question can be effectively attacked by demonstration of its unsoundness, and, of course, by gradually ceasing to act in accordance with it.

The extermination of these conceptions means that the twenty-four hours of the day will not be utilized as they are now. That will be especially true for adults, but children's use of their time will be affected also. But, concentrating our attention on

adults, we may point out some of the changes necessary to a more rational use of their twenty-four hours a day.

Supersession of the work conception by a *work-and-citizenship* conception of welfare would not adequately meet present-day needs. Life embraces many interests besides vocational and civic ones. Art, literature and science are among these interests, as also, of course, are society (in the conventional sense), travel, sport and hobbies of whatever sort. The life of the masses is impoverished now by their virtual exclusion from the higher intellectual and æsthetic interests as much as by the arrested development of their civic interests. It goes without saying, of course, that capacities for developing appreciation of these interests range all the way from a little above zero to those of the most gifted persons; but the capacities of the great majority in this direction, whether great or small, remain relatively uncultivated throughout their lives.

It is not my purpose to explore the problems created by this fact, but to consider them only so far as they bear on our own special citizenship problems. These problems, however, are all in the same world, affect the same lives, and well-conceived efforts toward their solution must therefore be more or less coordinated. The community center and adult education movements, for instance, recognize both classes of problems, and so do the more enlightened systems of formal education. Moreover, a compe-

tent citizen is inevitably more than just that. He is a *person*, sensitive to other vital interests of his environment, particularly scientific and æsthetic ones. These latter are indeed inextricably related in many ways to civic interests. Their organization, educationally and otherwise, will therefore be more or less unitary in character, certainly not divided into independent systems.

Well, if the masses are to participate in these various interests according to their capacities, they must all be made primary interests, as primary as are work interests. The latter will of course be primary in a special sense, for all other interests depend on them; but, for that matter, non-work interests are also primary in another special sense. And these non-work interests can be made accessible to all, since industrial arts and available natural resources efficiently utilized, as they might be under a rational economic system, would release enough time from work for the participation of everybody in these various interests, taste and capacity permitting.

This involves, clearly, a reorganization of the uses to which the twenty-four hours of the day are put. We need not disturb the time devoted to sleep, as no way has been found of dispensing with it, or indeed of improving on it, as the most satisfying use for part of our twenty-four hours. Nor can we, incidentally to our special inquiry, offer specifications for reducing the time given to domestic cares.

So far as we are concerned, let the same amount of time be given in the future as at present to preparing the meals, washing the dishes, cleaning the rooms, firing the furnace, mowing the lawn, doing the shopping and, last but not least, bringing up the children.

Having made these concessions to unavoidable necessities, we can suggest revised uses of the hours in the day still remaining. The opinion might be hazarded that an average of at least two hours a day must be devoted by the citizen to his citizenship if he is to be competent therein. This two hours will, of course, be spent in various ways, including attendance at meetings, service on committees, and the perusal of books, magazines and newspapers. I would also hazard the opinion that the study and enjoyment of the arts and sciences not directly related to civic interests is entitled to an average of two hours a day. These particular estimates are not, of course, important in themselves, but nothing could be more important than the principle they illustrate.

But assuming, for sake of the argument, that an average of four hours a day may be profitably devoted to civic, intellectual and æsthetic interests, tastes and capacities permitting, the question arises, where is this amount of time to come from? Obviously, the adult, if he is to find that much time for these interests, must stop doing some of the things

he now does, or at least stop doing them so much. Part of the time will be provided, perhaps, by shortening the work day. No opinion as to the proper length of the work day, in view of these prospective new demands on our twenty-four hours, will satisfy everybody, but I would suggest that six hours work a day *plus* competent citizenship will be at least as productive as eight or ten hours plus incompetent citizenship, not to mention the more equitable distribution of the fruits of production which competent citizenship would probably promote. The suggestion implies that more than two of the four hours needed might be provided by a decrease in the work day. The remainder of the time required could be sliced off from various time-consuming activities of the adult. Some could be taken from the Ford, some from the movies, some from the lodge, some from gossip and possibly some, be it whispered, from the church.

Nothing in these proposals implies that everybody can develop abilities for participation in intellectual and æsthetic interests at their higher levels, nor that everybody will devote the same amount of time as everybody else to them. Nor is there a parallel implication as to civic interests. The world will doubtless always contain many people devoid of any high capacities for the practice of citizenship, or for the appreciation of art, literature or science. They will be entitled to their movies, their

story magazines, their lodges, their poolrooms, their joyrides, and the like. These things are of course good, in season, for other people as well.

These proposals for the abolition of prevailing work, citizenship and educational conceptions, the substitution for them of conceptions recognizing present-day needs and opportunities, and the consequent reorganization of the uses made of our twenty-four hours a day imply a revolutionary transformation of the outlook and the interests of the common man: Anyone who does not believe in miracles will recognize the stupendous difficulties of such a transformation. Present traditions, attitudes and interests perpetuate themselves and thus render very problematical any marked developments in the opposite direction, certainly for a long time to come. Let us identify some of the major problems involved in the undertaking, and, so far as possible, the type of methods whereby they might be attacked.

Accredited institutions, including the school, the church, the press and the political party, can be relied on only to a limited extent for assistance in this undertaking. In the main, these institutions must reflect the *given* attitudes and interests of their constituencies, though if their operating personnel—teachers, clergy, journalists, politicians—should be captivated by the vision of a social order constructed along the lines indicated, they could do much to lead their constituencies in its direction. My opinion, however, is that our main reliance must be placed

on other agencies, ones called into being for this express purpose and concentrating on the tasks involved in its attainment.

Some specifications for such agencies will be offered in later chapters. Here we want rather to explore the more crucial problems they will face and the resources that may be available for coping with them. In so doing let us concentrate on our special citizenship problems, and consider other developmental problems of the adult only as they affect those problems.

It doubtless will not be very illuminating to state that the central problems are of a psychological character. But we can narrow down the statement and assert that our most crucial problems will be pedagogical ones. In more specific terms still, these problems will be the ones involved in making the civic environment real and interesting to the citizen. He must be helped to visualize the social, economic and political relationships in which he is enmeshed and that largely make him what he is. He must be taught to see the unseen, as it were, for social *relationships* are of that character.

This will be a task of no little difficulty. But I believe pedagogical methods are available whereby it may be accomplished. For one thing, these relationships may be dramatized for the citizen, or expounded in terms of the persons, the actors, taking part in them. The case method of teaching developed by the lawyers can be applied here, just as

it is being applied by the schools in social science instruction. Abundant case materials for this purpose, interesting and even exciting in character, can be procured with little difficulty. Then the movie can be utilized also in dramatizing social relationships, and in rendering visible conditions spatially and even temporally remote from the learner. Legitimate drama can be employed for the same purpose. Local problems in turn can be made real and vital through direct observation of the conditions that embody them. All these conditions, relations and problems can be expressed in terms of the experiences, the needs, the ambitions of the learner himself or of other human beings like him, including his own associates. By such pedagogical devices the civic environment can be made real to the citizen. Sufficient time, patience and ingenuity devoted to the task should make it a feasible one.

But the problems thus made real must be studied and in some measure mastered by the citizen, if he is to cope with them intelligently. If his interest therein has already been aroused by methods such as those indicated, the task here will be to supply him necessary helps in his study of them. Yet it is important not to deaden, but to enhance, his interest by adapting the methods of study to his tastes and capacities. Two prime requisites to the solution of this problem may be suggested. Group study is one of them; qualified leadership, the other.

Group study is necessary, because the interplay

and clash of face-to-face discussion is far more interesting to the majority of people than the perusal of printed documents. Under skilled leadership such discussion can be as interesting, within its limits, as any other type of activity. Moreover, face-to-face discussion furnishes an indispensable condition to the stimulation and development of independent thought by the student. That condition, briefly put, is *talk* by the student himself. No one perhaps ever follows out a complicated line of thought to its logical conclusion except under the stimulus of communicating it to some one else. This makes painstaking formulation of the given ideas necessary, and in this process they are more or less clarified, elaborated and systematized. Moreover, the challenge of others' comments and criticisms provides a necessary stimulus to the testing of one's ideas, the examination of their implications and the correction of their inconsistencies. These, of course, are not unsubstantiated speculations, for every live teacher in school or out has verified them in his own experience.

The main point is that abundant opportunity must be provided the citizen to talk and be talked to about his problems. An indispensable part of this opportunity can be provided only by relatively small groups, for only they give opportunities for *enough* talk of this character. Larger meetings have their place, of course, but without the small groups in addition, they cannot accomplish very much. Here, if

I mistake not, the limitations of the stump, the platform, the pulpit and the radio are partially indicated. The small discussion group is an indispensable complement thereto; or, better stated, those agencies will function as more or less valuable supplements to the discussion group, when the latter comes into its own.

The interest thus aroused should suffice to motivate the necessary reading on the part of the learner, the amount required to supply background and ballast to the group discussion. By virtue of this feature, discussion groups would be in the nature of classes, but not of the disciplined, regimented sort so common in our schools. And the fact that these groups would be voluntary in character should serve to check any tendencies there might be toward authoritarian direction and instruction thereof.

The success attained by such groups will depend largely on their leadership, assuming, as we may, that leadership will be necessary. The psychology of leadership has not been much developed as yet, and therefore only very general specifications as to the type of leaders required can be offered. Stating these in untechnical terms, we can say that one qualified for this work must thoroughly believe in it; realize the difficulties involved in inspiring citizens voluntarily to impose on themselves rigorous, sustained, systematic study of civic questions; be adept in making those problems real, vital and challenging to the citizen; skillful in identifying reliable evidence

on such problems and presenting fairly the conflicting interpretations thereof; and competent in steering group discussion toward its proper objective. This objective, it may be added, is the clarification of problems, the examination of conflicting hypotheses and the formulation of such conclusions as may be warranted by the evidence. These qualifications are exacting ones, and it will doubtless always be more or less difficult to develop a sufficient number of leaders endowed with them.

Any such undertaking will raise difficult pedagogical problems. We can as yet hardly identify the more significant of these problems, because they lie in a *terra incognita* still to be explored. It is most important, therefore, that a pedagogy of civic education for adults, as well as of adult education in general, be developed. Research in its problems will necessarily include experiments with various techniques of civic and other phases of adult education. But case histories of citizens, competent, incompetent and indifferent, will furnish invaluable materials for it. It will, of course, utilize all the applicable techniques of testing and statistical analysis that may be available, together with such phases of social and psychological theory as may also be applicable. Further specifications for this type of research need not here be suggested.

Group study of the sort specified can be advantageously associated with activities of a different character. By combining it with the study and ap-

preciation of science, literature, drama, music and the plastic arts, and with activities of a more "sociable" character, such as festivals, pageants, celebrations and purely "social" occasions, its possible monotony would be relieved, friendliness encouraged, cooperation fostered. This is one respect in which intellectual and æsthetic interests will be related to civic ones. The animating principle will be the correlation of these various interests in such a way as to enhance their appeal to the adult, and integrate them into a rational scheme of life. Here in all probability is a clue to the partial solution of the pedagogical problems involved in adult education.

Then, too, the study of civic problems will be related, in practice, to the actual treatment of those problems. Inspection of local conditions, service on committees, and the selection of candidates for public office will all be based on the systematic study of social problems, and will at the same time add concreteness and interest to such study. These more practical activities of the citizen will require suitable institutional arrangements, and the latter will be related in an organic fashion to group organizations for study purposes. Suggestions as to the nature of these arrangements will be offered in due season. The point here is that the more "practical" activities of the citizen can be related to his study of civic questions in such a way as partially to solve the pedagogical problems involved therein.

Before leaving the topic of discussion groups, it should be pointed out that these will furnish powerful and very necessary sanctions for resistance to irrational prejudices and biases current in the community. Group discussion of the sort specified will certainly lead to unconventional viewpoints and attitudes on public questions, and those avowing unorthodoxy in such matters will certainly be subject to pressure by the conventional people in the interest of conformity to their ideas. Most people succumb to such pressure when they have to meet it as individuals. But, under our scheme, the discussion groups that produced unconventional individuals in civic matters would furnish them the sympathy and protection needed for expressing and giving practical effect to their opinions.

In undertaking to foster civic activities of the sort here contemplated, the question will arise whether social pressure might be applied in securing the cooperation of citizens not attracted through the intrinsic appeal of those activities. Various types of pressure might be utilized in this way. For one thing, an ethical sanction of good citizenship might be gradually developed. The good citizen as an ethical ideal might be made as appealing to the average man as is the ideal of the good father and husband, or as the ideal of the good physician or the good teacher is to the members of the medical or the teaching profession. A species of social prestige might attach to hearty cooperation in the ac-

tivities of the new citizenship. Shirking civic responsibilities might eventually be one of the things "that isn't done." A sort of stigma or disgrace might be visited on the citizen who remained ignorant of civic questions and refused to do his part in dealing with them. In fine, good citizenship, allowing for diverse capacities, might become an ethical norm, a requisite of respectability, even though it sanctioned unconventional opinions and attitudes on the substantive questions of citizenship. Pressure of these sorts is now applied to secure conformity in dress, manners and almost every other phase of human behavior. Can the same sorts of pressure be applied in behalf of good citizenship? Or will the only effective motivation lie in the appeal of civic interests themselves, as these are interpreted in terms of the experiences and needs of the citizen? I am in doubt as to these questions. I am inclined to think, however, that judicious use of social pressures for this purpose might have fruitful results; but that the main reliance must be placed on the intrinsic appeal of civic interests in themselves. Obviously, pressures of this sort could be applied only after the movement toward the new citizenship had partially established itself and acquired some measure of prestige.

The movement itself will undoubtedly have to resist just such pressures, as it will go counter to many prejudices, many vested interests, backed by sanctions of this character. It will in all probability

have to battle for its autonomy, its freedom from control by accredited social institutions. The powers that be will sense the threat it implies, the challenge to their rule which it will offer. Their opposition together with the pressures applied by the conventional people generally will make the beginnings of the movement especially difficult, for they will thus tend to frighten away from it at first all save those who have the intelligence to recognize its significance, and the courage to ally themselves with it in the face of group hostility.

But independence of external control and resistiveness to hostile criticism are indispensable conditions of ultimate success, and compromise on these essentials would be fatal. Fortunately, the pioneers of the movement can appeal to our traditional freedom of teaching, of discussion, of association, in their resistance to grossly repressive measures, whether by the state or by non-official groups upholding the *status quo*. In that appeal they can count on the support of many besides themselves, and thus, not unlikely, secure the freedom necessary to their efforts.

The movement as it advances will face difficult problems of finance. The institutions essential to competent citizenship will require a large directing personnel, professional in character, whose services must be remunerated; possibly much material equipment that will be expensive; and considerable outlays for various other services and facilities. Our

experience with popular education, community recreation, preventive medicine and other such undertakings raises serious doubts whether adequate funds can be raised among participants in the movement, in the form of donations, membership dues or fees for specific services. Public funds could not be drawn on until the movement became politically influential, and grave risks, perhaps too serious to be incurred, would attach to subventions from this source. Possessors of large fortunes able to provide the necessary endowment might not be attracted by the idea, and, even if they were, dependence on this source might have something of a deadening effect on the spirit of the movement. Perhaps the movement might finance itself in the beginning from the offerings of its own members, some of whom would be people of means, and eventually appeal for a wider support without compromising its integrity. The financial history of the church and of social-work agencies indicates perhaps that the problems of finance will not be insoluble.

Many of these problems will meet us again when the task of elaborating specifications for an articulated system of citizenship institutions is taken up.

I can imagine that the suggestions offered in this chapter will provoke "reactions" the most various on the part of those best qualified to judge them. Biological determinists will doubtless put them down as largely utopian in character. They will say that citizenship is determined far more by hereditary

capacities and limitations than by environmental influences, and concede but little value to a program emphasizing the importance of the latter. Cultural determinists, on the other hand, might very well wax enthusiastic over a program of this character, since, of course, they stress environmental as against hereditary influences in their theory of behavior. I myself happen to believe that hereditary and environmental influences are equally potent in behavior, and consequently that neither great enthusiasm nor extreme skepticism toward such a program is justifiable.

But that itself is a debatable position, along with the others. There are of course many variants of these several positions, and still other positions could hardly be classified under any one of them. *All* these positions are debatable in character, for the advocates of none such have succeeded in convincing their opponents of its correctness, and the latter are presumably as competent as they are themselves to judge the issues involved. Scientifically regarded, therefore, our program is of a hypothetical character. No one may say, dogmatically, just how sound or unsound it is.

This means that, at the least, there is a chance of its offering some possibilities of civic improvement, and, at the most, very great possibilities in this direction. Only a thorough trial of the program itself can tell. But the stakes of success are so great that it would seem everyone devoted to the public wel-

fare might agree to cooperate in giving it such a test. I myself offer it, not on the assumption that the citizen might become *the* dominant factor in social control, but that he might become *one* of the dominant factors, along with professional politicians and special interests of the sort *now* in the saddle.

CHAPTER VI

THE POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF SOCIAL WORK

THREE fairly distinct types of endeavor are being directed to the improvement of fundamental conditions affecting citizenship in this country. These are generally designated by the rubrics social work, adult education and community organization. While their approaches to the problem are different, they are rather closely related, and some activities could be classified under two or all three types. But I propose to take them up separately and attempt to appraise their contributions, actual and potential, to the development of good citizenship. I shall deal in the present chapter with social work, taking the term in a somewhat broader sense than is customary.

No attempt will be made to trace the history of the social-work movement.¹ Suffice it to say that, except for aid to dependent families and other less "constructive" phases of "social service," the most significant developments have occurred mainly in the past quarter of a century. As a result, there are

¹ S. A. Queen's *Social Work in the Light of History* gives a general account of this development.

now organized efforts to solve in a practical sense almost all the major problems of the time. Population problems, labor problems, farm problems, housing problems, public health problems, leisure-time problems, race problems, international problems, domestic political problems, and many others are thus under treatment at the present time. These efforts are variously local, regional and national in scope, and, as might be expected, differ widely as regards efficiency and results accomplished. But all together they represent substantial and in some cases far-reaching contributions to the solution of problems with which they have been concerned.

Social-work agencies are usually established through the initiative of a few individuals. The prime movers may be professional social workers, or outsiders engaged in other pursuits who believe in the social-work technique. An agency must, as a rule, have considerable funds if it is to accomplish anything of importance. These are usually supplied by members in the form of dues, or by members or outsiders as outright contributions. Recently the community-chest method of financing social-work agencies in local communities has come into vogue. In any case financial support must be appealed for in one way or another, as unsolicited contributions furnish only a small fraction of the funds required. All together an enormous amount of money is now devoted to this type of activity. Most of this comes, necessarily, from wealthy or well-to-do individuals,

living or dead, the latter making posthumous contributions in the form of endowments to particular agencies, or of foundations which may or may not be restricted to the promotion of specific causes deemed worthy. The more important agencies are usually though not always incorporated, and have constitutions and by-laws governing election of officers, appointment of committees, engagement of the staff, formulation of policies, and accounting for funds.

The term social work has been applied in the past to a great variety of services, actual or alleged, and characterized by all degrees of expertness or inexpertness. An attempt is now being made to standardize the meaning of the term and restrict it to services that are genuine and at the same time of a truly expert character. The standardizers, however, are not yet agreed as to the sorts of services and degrees of expertness to be designated by this term. For that reason discussion of the subject here must be somewhat general and provisional in character.

The methods of social-work agencies are largely determined by the specific objects in view. Organizations like the National Child Labor Committee and the National Housing Association are chiefly engaged in promoting the enactment and enforcement of legislation. The American Public Health Association, on the other hand, is primarily concerned in the standardization of public health work, and in

the adoption of standards formulated through its efforts. Other agencies experiment with playgrounds, neighborhood centers, visiting teachers and the like in order to find workable solutions of the problems under consideration; and, when these are found, urge their adoption by governmental or other agencies having the financial resources and the administrative machinery to apply them generally. Still other agencies, such as the family welfare society and the privately endowed hospital, often depend entirely on non-official sources for cooperation in achieving their objects. Many other types of procedure could be mentioned.

Despite these diversities, the activities of the various social-work agencies have many features in common and are animated by much the same spirit. The motives are generally social or humanitarian in character. Efforts are planned and directed in what is conceived to be the interest of the community at large or of underprivileged elements therein. While social workers are perhaps not less self-seeking than other people, their efforts are primarily directed to the welfare of other groups than themselves. In this they are of course not unlike teachers, physicians and clergymen imbued with the professional spirit proper to their callings.

A procedure common to all social-work agencies of the better type is painstaking investigation of their problems. This includes the collation of available information, and the collection of fresh data

necessary to the elucidation of the problems in hand. They often undertake experiments to test hypotheses not susceptible of verification otherwise. In recent years, for instance, there has been much experimenting with health clinics, and with various "constructive" uses of leisure time. The more scientifically minded recognize, of course, that any new type of social effort is experimental in character, whether or no regarded as such by its initiators.

These investigations are usually not of a "theoretical" nature. They are designed to elucidate so-called practical problems, and to find solutions for them. There is little active interest, as a rule, in the more theoretical problems bound up with the practical ones, such, for instance, as those in which a sociologist or economist would be interested. This restriction of investigational activities has its advantages, but, obviously, its disadvantages as well. There is a tendency among social workers, however, to ground themselves more thoroughly in the scientific disciplines bearing on their efforts, and to utilize the results of those sciences in their own special investigations.

Social-work agencies also commonly engage in educational activities designed to develop public sentiment favorable to their programs. The nature of these activities, like other phases of their effort, is necessarily affected by the particular objects to be achieved. Where a law is to be enacted, educational efforts will be directed to the public at large, or to

the section of it likely to be sympathetic and at the same time influential with the legislative body considering the matter. In promoting the use of a health center, on the other hand, such efforts are largely directed to the poorer and more ignorant elements of the community for whom the center is primarily maintained. Always attention must be given to the problem of financial support, except in the case of agencies adequately financed by endowments; and this involves special educational efforts directed to possible members or contributors. The community chest assumes this burden for member societies, where this method of financing is in operation.

All available media are utilized in these educational activities. Books, journals, pamphlets, leaflets, press releases, posters, circular letters, lectures, conferences, mass meetings and talks on the radio are thus utilized.

Beyond these investigational and educational activities, the procedures of the various agencies exhibit diverse types, due to the differences in their objectives and the final measures requisite to their attainment. Agencies working for legislation must bring pressure to bear on legislators and politicians, which is done both by the preparatory publicity and by a species of lobbying not unlike that employed by special-interest groups promoting legislative programs. Social-work agencies also often attempt, sometimes with success, to secure recognition of their

proposals in political platforms. These semi-political objects may be promoted directly through conferences with legislative and platform committees, or through the mediation of such organizations as the General Federation of Women's Clubs or the National Congress of Parents and Teachers. The more direct efforts, while conducted by staff members or special representatives of the given agency, are often ably seconded by its members who write or otherwise bring pressure to bear on those whom it is desired to influence. Some organizations have participated actively in political campaigns for the purpose of promoting the election of candidates sympathetic to their proposals. The Citizens' Union of New York City and voters' leagues in other cities have done this, and the Anti-Saloon League, whether or no it be regarded as a social-work agency, has made extensive use of the same tactics. The political activities of such agencies are usually not of a partisan character.

Agencies interested in legislation are also interested in law enforcement. Promotion of efficiency in the latter involves the study of administrative practices, consultation with officials regarding their improvement and, where necessary, publicity campaigns in favor of better enforcement, or even for the removal of officials deemed to be disqualified for their responsibilities. Reforms of administrative machinery are often promoted with the same object in view.

Agencies whose work is not so closely bound up with the enactment and enforcement of law naturally employ different methods in the final stages of their activities. For example, family welfare societies minister directly to their "clients"; anti-tuberculosis associations establish clinics and instruct the public in preventive measures; and playground associations assist in the organization of play activities and securing the necessary facilities for them.

Finally, social-work agencies cooperate in the promotion of common objects. They unite in supporting needed state legislation, in establishing new agencies for the treatment of neglected problems, and in holding conferences for interchange of ideas. Closely articulated action by agencies dealing with related problems is a normal procedure in this field. Definite machinery for such purposes is established as the need arises. Of course, cooperation in this as in any other field is far from perfect.

The achievements of a few agencies employing these methods may be summarized in order to illustrate the significance of the general movement, and prepare the way for a tentative evaluation of it later on.

The American Birth Control League furnishes our first illustration. The League is a newcomer in the field of social work and as yet it can show but few tangible results of its efforts. Its work, however, is most promising from the standpoint of

those who believe in birth control as one approach to the treatment of population problems.¹

The Clinical Research Department of the League constantly endeavors to develop better contraceptive methods that are safe, effective and adaptable to everyone. Educational efforts consist of lectures and debates before any organization that can be reached; distribution of quantities of literature to lists, either sent in or compiled by the League; and international conferences at which scientists from all over the world discuss problems of birth control in their various aspects. The League has introduced bills in a number of state legislatures embodying needed amendments of laws on birth control, but as yet has been unable to secure action on any of these measures. It has also attempted, but unsuccessfully, to have the federal law amended. It has not attempted to have a birth-control plank included in the platform of any political party, believing the time is not yet ripe for that step.

The obstacles encountered in the work of the League are extreme conservatism, and active opposition by a certain powerful religious denomination. That body has succeeded in blocking legislation, and bringing pressure to bear in various places where meetings were to be held, so that these had to be called off. It has also worked inside the medical profession to prevent discussion of contraception before medical groups, and opposed endorsements by any medical society of proposed legislation amending state laws.

Despite these obstacles, the President of the League claims that there is a better understanding all over the country of what birth control means and what it will do toward checking the reproduction of the unfit. Moreover, the League has

¹ The summary of its activities is adapted from a private letter by Mrs. Margaret Sanger, President of the League.

on its lists the names of many well-known practitioners to whom it can refer patients whose own doctors have refused to help them. It may be added ² that the growing interest in birth control and the growing practice of it among all classes of people (as revealed by declining birth rates) indicate that the League's claims of accomplishment are not exaggerated ones. The developments noted are not of course due entirely to the League's activities.

The next illustration will be the National Child Labor Committee, which has now been in existence about a quarter of a century.³

The change that public opinion on child labor has undergone since the organization of the Committee may best be expressed by a brief outline of comparison between state child labor and compulsory school attendance standards of 1904, the year of the organization of the Committee, and those of two decades later:

1904 States	1924 States
13 Fourteen year limit for factory work	46
1 Eight hour day under 16 in factories	36
8 Night work prohibited under 16 in factories	43
34 Compulsory school attendance law	48
1900 Census, Children in Commerce and Industry, ages 10 to 15	688,207
1920 Census, Children in Commerce and Industry, 10 to 15	413,549

² Mrs. Sanger is not responsible for this observation.

³ This account is taken, with only minor adaptations, from a "Condensed Statement of Work of National Child Labor Committee, Past, Present, and Future," issued by the Committee in 1927.

The records of the National Child Labor Committee show the important part it played in effecting legislation which resulted in raising these state standards.

From the very first the Committee undertook to do its work along three lines—investigation, public education and legislation. First, investigations were made to learn the facts. Second, public education was carried on to set the facts before the people. Third, legislation was secured as a result of public opinion.

Year after year representatives of the Committee were in attendance at legislative sessions of many states giving information, aiding in the local campaigns, advising, attending committee hearings and sometimes aiding in drafting and revising laws—doing in fact everything possible to secure for children adequate protection from harmful employment.

The Committee's attention was at first focused largely on children employed in mines, glass factories and textile mills. The evils incident to this use of children were the most spectacular and believed to be the most serious.

In mines the sore spot was Pennsylvania. Of the 24,000 children 10-15 years of age employed in mines in the United States, 14,000 were employed in Pennsylvania. The Committee estimated that 12,000 of the 14,000 were under 14 years of age.

The employment of children at night was the most serious aspect of their use by glass factories. In four states, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, West Virginia and Indiana, 3,500 under 16 were working in glass factories—the majority of them at night.

The worst forms of child labor in the textile industry were found in the Southern States. The Committee estimated that 60,000 children between 6 and 16 years of age were employed in Southern cotton mills, 34 states did not prohibit the labor of children under 14, and 10,000 below that age worked in these states.

Changes came slowly. After much agitation, children under 16 years of age were excluded by law from mines in Pennsylvania in 1911, in Ohio in 1913, in Indiana in 1921, in Illinois in 1917 and in West Virginia in 1919.

Children under 16 years of age were excluded from employment in glass factories in New Jersey in 1911, in Pennsylvania in 1915 and in West Virginia in 1919.

Children under 14 years of age were prohibited from work in cotton mills in Georgia in 1914 (with poverty exemptions from 12 to 14), in Alabama and South Carolina in 1916 and in North Carolina in 1919. Children under 16 years of age were prohibited from working more than 8 hours a day in the cotton mills in Alabama in 1919. Georgia and North Carolina still have a 10-hour day and South Carolina has no regulation as to hours of employment during the day. Children under 16 years of age were prohibited from working at night in the cotton mills in Alabama in 1907, in South Carolina in 1911 and in North Carolina in 1913. Georgia still allows children 14½ to 16 years of age to work at night in cotton mills.

The National Child Labor Committee had not been working many years before it became evident that some sort of uniformity in standards was desirable if all children were to have even an approximately equal opportunity. In view of this it prepared for the Commission on Uniform Laws of the American Bar Association a uniform child labor law which was adopted and published by the Bar Association in 1911 and also published by the Committee.

Gradually the Committee began to give consideration to the employment of children in places other than in mines, glass factories and textile mills. It investigated street trading, night messenger service, homework, cannery work and agricultural work by children. In this wider field it soon became evident that intelligent action could not be taken in attempting to solve the child labor problems without giving

consideration to kindred subjects—education, health, recreation, and juvenile court legislation.

At the invitation of interested persons in the different states the Committee made investigations and published reports of its studies on *Child Welfare in Oklahoma*, 1917; *Child Welfare in North Carolina*, 1918; *Child Welfare in Alabama*, 1918; *Child Welfare in Kentucky*, 1919.

Other studies of the Committee include *Child Welfare in Tennessee*, 1920; *Rural Child Welfare in West Virginia*, 1922; *Child Labor in the Sugar Beet Fields of Michigan*, 1923; *Children Working in the Sugar Beet Fields of the North Platte Valley of Nebraska*, 1924; *Cleveland School Children Who Sell on the Streets*, published by the Ohio Consumers' League in 1924; a study of tenement homework in New York City made in 1924 in cooperation with the New York Commission to Examine Laws Relating to the Welfare of Children; and *Child Labor Among Cotton Growers of Texas*, 1924.

Early in its history the Committee was led by experience to the belief that the National Government had a distinct responsibility in this field. It successfully urged upon Congress a study "On Conditions of Women and Child Wage Earners in the United States," which was made and published. (Document 645, 61st Congress, 1911).

As early as 1907 it began to urge the establishment of some sort of Federal Bureau devoted to children. In 1912 the Children's Bureau was established.

The Committee became convinced by its first ten years of endeavor within the states of the need for a Federal Child Labor Law to establish uniform minimum standards. It supported the First Federal Child Labor bill, known as the Commerce Child Labor Law, which was passed September 1, 1916, and which was declared unconstitutional June 3, 1918. Continuing in its belief that Federal regulation of the employment of children was needed, the Na-

tional Child Labor Committee gave its active support to the Second Child Labor Bill, which was passed February 24, 1919, and which also was declared unconstitutional May 15, 1922.

In 1924-5 the Committee was associated with other national organizations in support of the proposed Child Labor Amendment to the Federal Constitution which was passed by Congress, but so far has been ratified by only 5 states.

In the last two years, the Committee has focused its attention on four problems: (1) It has continued its agricultural studies, and published two volumes on agricultural child labor in Colorado, and a brief report on Denver and Farm Labor Families. (2) It has studied the enforcement of child labor laws in local communities (Virginia, Kentucky and Missouri), publishing reports thereof. (3) It has conducted local campaigns for state legislation, preparing special publications for local use. (4) It has conducted a general information service, publishing special pamphlets, bibliographies, etc.

The Committee does not claim credit for all the achievements itemized in this summary. Abolition of harmful child labor has been a popular cause, owing to general interest in child welfare; and, consequently, many organizations have cooperated in the Committee's work. These include federations of women's clubs and numerous other agencies not engaged in social work as we have characterized it. But the Child Labor Committee has led in the movement and may properly claim a large share of the credit for its results.

The National Committee for Mental Hygiene applies the social-work technique to problems of

a different sort. A summary of progress in this field will indicate the methods and results of its activity.⁴

Ten years ago there was a discouraging lack of public interest in even the humanitarian care of those ill from nervous and mental diseases. Such information as was current among the general public as to the causes of these diseases, their nature and course was largely misinformation; students were allowed to graduate from medical schools with practically no knowledge of and no interest in psychiatry; the early manifestations of these diseases were entirely unrecognized; to be cared for even in an asylum a patient must needs be "dangerously mad"; the relationship between the early manifestations of nervous and mental disorders, delinquency, dependency and general social inefficiency was scarcely even suspected by leaders in the professional groups dealing with these problems; annually, meetings were held by national bodies which discussed various social problems, but with little understanding or realization of the importance of the personal equation.

Today asylums are becoming hospitals; names are changed—from "State Insane Asylum" to "State Hospital for Mental Diseases"; from "State Board of Insanity" to "State Commission for Mental Hygiene" (and these changes are not merely changes in name). The State of Connecticut has established a Division of Mental Hygiene in its Department of Health, and other States are planning to do so. The City of Newark has a Bureau of Mental Hygiene, and other cities will soon have such bureaus. Through changes in State laws, voluntary and temporary care, observation, emergency care and hospital facilities are being made more

⁴ From Beers, Clifford W., *The Mental Hygiene Movement*, pp. 350-353; reprinted from the revised edition of *A Mind That Found Itself* (1923), by the same author.

accessible. Out-patient departments and mental hygiene clinics are being organized and extended so that expert local facilities may be at the service of the community. Care and treatment in many hospitals have improved and the number who annually recover from mental illness increases. More attention is being focused upon the early manifestations of mental illness; and the relationship between these early conditions and delinquency, dependency and social maladjustment generally are now recognized. With this recognition has come the establishment of psychiatric clinics in juvenile courts and the extension of these clinics to adult courts. Furthermore, similar clinics are being established in prisons and reformatories. Many States which had no special institutions for the feeble-minded have established them, and soon all States will have such institutions. Organizations dealing with delinquent and dependent children, instead of planning, in a blind sort of way, for placing out children, are seeking to understand the special mental disabilities and aptitudes of children. Universities and colleges, reflecting student interest, are forming courses in mental hygiene; and normal schools are organizing courses in the mental hygiene of childhood. Collections of books and pamphlets on mental hygiene have been made and are now accessible to the public. Statistics on mental disease have been made uniform in this country and similar work is being done with reference to mental deficiency. Schools of social work are giving instruction in mental hygiene and in the two largest schools of the country a course in mental hygiene is required for graduation. A permanent Division of Mental Hygiene has been established by the National Conference of Social Work and the meetings of this division are among those which attract the largest audiences at the Conference. Social agencies dealing with various aspects of human problems have felt the need not only of workers with some knowledge of mental hygiene, but of workers with very special knowledge and, to

supply these, courses for the training of psychiatric social workers have been established. Industry has become interested and special researches have been undertaken by such organizations as the New York Engineering Foundation, and a national federation for the study of industrial personnel has been organized, of which The National Committee for Mental Hygiene is a member. This interest that has permeated various fields of activity has reacted upon the medical schools and is bringing about more adequate teaching of psychiatry and the development of clinics; and, in turn, has led to a definite plan, now being put into effect, of endowing chairs of psychiatry in medical schools and providing adequate teaching facilities.

Societies for Mental Hygiene, affiliated with the National Committee, have been organized in twenty States, plans for organizing them in six other States are now under way, and groups interested in plans for organizing such societies exist in a number of other States. . . . Leading citizens in the various States, appreciating the need for organized mental hygiene work, willingly serve as members of the directorates of these societies. It is evident that in time all States will have such indispensable social agencies, or their equivalent, at work within their borders. Owing to the difficulty of securing adequate funds for the proper development of their pioneer work, some of the State Societies are not yet able to employ full-time medical directors or psychiatric social workers. But even these organizations are able to exert a helpful influence and through them persons in need of advice can usually be aided. Through those societies and committees which have been able to employ salaried workers, thousands of people, during the past few years, have been helped.

Although this summary does not indicate explicitly the rôle played by the National Committee in the mental hygiene movement, those acquainted with

its history know that the Committee's influence has dominated it. Many other agencies have of course cooperated in the movement and share the credit for its results.

The New York Bureau of Municipal Research furnishes our final illustration of social-work methods and results. Its activity is local not national in scope, though it has had a nation-wide influence. It was established for the investigation of municipal administration in New York City, and for the promotion of reforms shown thereby to be needed. The materials here presented are taken from *Twenty Years of Municipal Research*, published by the Governmental Research Conference.

Success attended the efforts of the new institution from its very start. Within a few years the New York bureau had made a very definite and beneficial impression upon the administrative affairs. During its first six years of existence, the bureau received in contributions \$402,000, besides \$268,000 for special purposes. Its small staff grew to almost fifty. The movement expressed itself, to a large extent, in finance administration; in a revision of the city's accounting and reporting methods; in the adoption of a budget that could be understood and through which expenditures could be controlled; in standardization of salaries and supplies, and in better protection to the city's trading credit through more prompt payment of bills. While in no wise striving for the spectacular, the work of the bureau in securing a \$2,000,000 annual increase of revenues through a reorganization of water collections, the recovering of \$848,000 from street railways for paving done between the rails at public expense, and the releasing of \$10,000,000 for reduction of taxes in

1912 by a reconciliation of the Comptroller's books and the various departmental books brought the activities of the new agency before the public in a decidedly favorable light.

The bureau was the first institution in the United States to apply scientific methods of research to the problems of public administration with a view of effecting practical improvements in government. It made the first general surveys in municipal, state and federal administration; and among its many important studies was the survey which resulted in the first centralized public agency to deal with the health of children—the Bureau of Child Hygiene of the New York City Health Department. The bureau blazed the trail for public budget systems in this country both from the standpoint of public education and budget technique. It developed standards of civil service administration, public purchasing and government accounting, and introduced unit costs and objective tests of administrative efficiency in government.

The Bureau of Municipal Research and the Institute (an agency maintained by the Bureau) have prepared not less than 4,600 reports of varying degrees of importance since 1906. Some 1,300 full time and part time students have matriculated for its work, many of whom are now in public service, and 125 major field studies and surveys have been undertaken in addition to many more individual visits to city, county and state governments in connection with special research projects.

During the last ten years practically all of the survey work of the Bureau has been undertaken at the request of governors, legislative committees, mayors, and other official agencies.

The same pamphlet describes as follows the methods employed by bureaus of municipal research generally:

The question is often asked: how do the bureaus get their recommendations acted upon? Does not such work arouse the antagonism of public officials? The bureaus are, of course, unofficial bodies. In a final test they have no means of accomplishing their ends other than the force of public opinion. But this test is seldom necessary for the bureaus are not fault-finding bodies. They do not go snooping about at random to see if they can uncover graft or inefficiency. In place of "mud-throwing" the bureaus offer critical study and constructive suggestion. In practically every city they have been able to establish a reputation for fairness and have won the confidence and respect of public officers. Indeed, a great deal of the work is undertaken at the request of the officials themselves. When a study is completed, a report is made to the proper authorities and every opportunity given to the official concerned to bring about the proposed changes or improvements.

The bureaus strive for close harmony and cooperation in all things, for they realize that the forcing of a reform upon a stubborn or unfriendly official may seriously militate against their own future usefulness. To the credit of the bureaus, however, it must be said that they are ready and courageous enough to risk their all when the taking of a militant attitude is the only conceivable way of securing a much needed improvement or change. Early in its life the New York bureau threw its full power into the establishment of the principle that the majority has no right to impose wasteful and incompetent government upon the minority, and upon this principle furnished Governor Hughes with sufficient evidence of waste and incompetence in the administration of Borough President Ahern as to cause that official's removal. By the same token the Chicago bureau of public efficiency laid its case before the bar of public opinion when the treasurer of Cook County refused the bureau access to his office and records. The issuance of a publication deal-

ing with the situation, entitled "A Plea for Publicity in the Office of the County Treasurer," caused the treasurer to change his mind and to facilitate in every way the investigation at hand. Not long ago the Duluth organization, failing in all harmonious efforts to check an obvious extravagance, was forced into the public press with full page advertisements—and won its point. But the customary procedure is to secure the adoption of its work without resort to "fire-works" or undue controversy.

Since the establishment of the New York Bureau similar agencies have been established in over forty cities, besides three or four bureaus for state research, and the Institute for Government Research at Washington, D. C., primarily concerned with problems of the national government. Agencies in foreign countries have also been patterned after the New York Bureau. Some of the municipal bureaus have been remarkably successful, and indeed have worked radical transformations in the financial and administrative practices of local governments in their communities.

These are impressive showings. A systematic exposition of the achievements of social-work agencies generally would be still more impressive. Such results achieved in so short a time may well excite enthusiasm over the social-work technique and the possibilities of its further application. The future may show that these possibilities are truly revolutionary in character.

What is the significance of this remarkable movement for problems of citizenship? Does it provide

the citizen a medium whereby he might become a dominant factor in public affairs? What are its limitations, considered as a contribution to the development of responsible government? A consideration of these questions, though necessarily somewhat speculative in character at this stage of the movement, should be helpful in the further investigation of the citizen's problems.

We can start by saying that social workers are themselves citizens in a special sense. They may be considered professional citizens, as may also, though in a different sense, professional politicians and public officials. Social workers have indeed multiplied and flourished partly because politicians and officials proved themselves not altogether satisfactory as professional citizens. They have provided a sort of representation for elements of the public and for public interests that political parties and governmental agencies could not or would not adequately represent. In doing that they have modified the policies and practices of these political representatives of the public. In effect they are building up a great institution of public service which may eventually be as influential in public affairs as the political party itself. It seems indeed quite possible that a hundred years hence the rise and growth of social work in the United States will be adjudged as significant a development in our institutions of social control as was the development of political parties during the last century.

But, like the political party, social-work agencies labor under circumstances that set more or less definite boundaries to their field of service. Exposition of these limitations will serve to indicate phases of civic activity which other agencies are better qualified to direct, and perhaps assist social workers better to define their field of service and even, to some extent, overcome the limitations themselves.

As already suggested, social-work agencies enlist the cooperation of citizens having certain distinguishing qualifications, and constituting but a small fraction of the entire citizen body. These qualifications are, first, a relatively keen interest in public questions, especially those under treatment by the given agency; and, second, the possession of sufficient wealth to permit financial support of such agencies, in the form of contributions or membership dues. Persons otherwise influential are eagerly sought as members by the social-work agency, but these are found among citizens having the two qualifications specified.

Under the community-chest method of financing, a relatively large percentage of citizens cooperate by contributing to the support of local agencies, but many of these do so because of the tremendous pressure applied in the chest campaign, not because of a genuine interest in the work of those agencies. In any case the prime motive of appeals for wider citizen cooperation is generally a financial one, as anybody will recognize who is an object of such solicita-

tion by mail or otherwise. This is necessarily so, because the service of the social-work agency is directly proportionate, quantitatively regarded, to the size of its budget, while direct citizen cooperation in its work is either of subordinate importance, in the achievement of its objects, or, if not, it may usually be enlisted through the judicious expenditure of funds for the purpose.

These conditions limit in various ways the nature and scope of social-work activities. For one thing, the educational phases thereof do not affect, except indirectly and remotely, the great mass of citizens, and contribute but little, relatively speaking, to the further education of those whom they do reach. There are of course many exceptions to this rule, but it may be safely asserted that the number of people whose civic attitudes and interest are fundamentally modified by the educational activities of social-work agencies is relatively small.

This is partly because their prime interest in their supporters concerns their financial cooperation, not their civic development. And enlistment of their financial support is normally secured by appealing to their attitudes and interests *as given*, which all too often are of a sentimental nature, not grounded on a thorough understanding of the questions at issue. It is also partly due to the educational procedures employed by those agencies. These, as already noted, emphasize printed communications, and "meetings" of an occasional nature. Social agencies

do not foster, save in exceptional cases, the continuous, progressive study of public questions, which alone can lead to any very adequate comprehension of them. More significant still, they do not promote such study by means of the discussion group. And the latter is indispensable to the cultivation of interest and understanding not of a dilettante, superficial character (save for the intellectually "élite"); and indispensable, also, to the cultivation of interest and understanding of any sort on the part of the masses. In short, the social-work agency leaves the masses of citizens as it finds them, that is, isolated, indifferent, ineffective, so far as intelligent, active participation in civic interests is concerned.⁵ It offers a citizenship *institution* only to a small minority; and one that develops and utilizes the civic capacities of this minority only to a limited degree.

Partly because of these deficiencies in educational procedures, and partly because the social worker is so dependent on well-to-do persons for financial support, agencies attempting to deal with the underlying factors in unsatisfactory social conditions are generally unable to secure adequate funds for their work, while agencies whose work carries a simple, sentimental appeal are apt to be generously sup-

⁵ Exceptions must of course be allowed for, as in the case of social settlements engaged in educational activities of a civic character, or of health clinics and recreational agencies that must at least educate their constituencies to the point of accepting their services. Some of the more significant exceptions will be considered in the next two chapters.

ported. For instance, service to crippled children or dependent families is quite adequately supported, as a rule, but not organized efforts to protect civil liberties or promote needed changes in the economic system. The great majority of contributors to social-work agencies are not prepared by training and experience to appreciate the importance of the more constructive programs, while the wealthier contributors are usually biased by their training and experience *against* such programs, even when they understand something of their significance. These observations would require qualification to fit all cases, but they are valid as a general rule. The American Civil Liberties Union, The National Civil Service Reform League, The American Association for Labor Legislation and similar organizations are partial exceptions, but it is agencies of just this type that are unable to command adequate financial support, and that, consequently, can meet only a small part of the need for their services.

Given the public to which the social worker must appeal, and the educational procedures available to him in dealing with it, his educational activities are inevitably *propagandist* in nature. The public at present can be reached most readily and effectively by propagandist methods, and social-work agencies are obliged to use them, for otherwise they could show but meager results for their activities and could appeal with only limited success for the funds upon which their existence depends. Discussion of public

questions on their merits, and patient training of the public itself to work out its own conclusions on these questions are necessarily slow processes which would appeal only to a small minority of persons who might support social-work agencies, and especially of those who might do most in the way of financial support. Hence the propagandist character of the social worker's educational activities. These observations do not imply any unsoundness in the proposals thus advocated, nor any insincerity on the part of those engaged in such activities. Social workers are perhaps usually convinced of the soundness of what they say in print or on the platform. But the *milieu* in which they operate hardly fosters a wholly objective attitude on their part; and the necessity for quick results forces propagandist methods upon them, even though these be not altogether to their taste.

The necessity of using propagandist methods, together with dependence on the wealthy for financial support, condemns social work to comparative impotence so far as the treatment of social problems affected by powerful special interests is concerned. Fundamental changes in political and economic institutions do not appeal to the wealthy, as a rule, and money for propaganda in favor of such changes is hard to find. And money so spent is apt to be more than matched by money devoted to just the opposite. In fine, when it comes to the more fundamental social problems, particularly those affected by pow-

erful vested interests, the social-work method is largely inapplicable or at least ineffective. The social worker's propaganda for changes in the interest of disadvantaged groups or of the public at large is no match, in such cases, for the propaganda that can be bought by the opposing interests. The defeat suffered by the proposed child labor amendment, the limited success of the movement for sickness and other phases of social insurance, the very slow development of the merit system in the public service, and much similar evidence could be cited in support of these assertions.

These handicaps are becoming increasingly serious with the growing realization that propaganda is a purchasable commodity, and that the interests with most money for the purpose can generally dominate the settlement of the questions to which propaganda is directed. It is significant in this connection that the influence of social-work agencies dealing with fundamental social and economic questions has declined since 1914, the period during which the régime of propaganda has been firmly established, and propaganda itself brought under the law of supply and demand, like any other marketable commodity.

These considerations do not apply to the many social problems, some of them important ones, that are not particularly affected by powerful special interests, or that make a sufficiently wide popular appeal to permit successful opposition to such interests, when affected thereby. Numerous health, leisure-

time and child welfare problems, for instance, come under this category. We may anticipate that in the future social-work agencies will score their chief successes in dealing with problems of this class.

Problems of the other sort must be largely treated, under present conditions, by different methods. The main line of attack will be education of a fundamental character, designed to develop the citizen's interest in and understanding of public questions, especially those affected by powerful special interests and at the same time not characterized by a sentimental appeal. This education must for the most part rest on procedures different from those employed by the social worker. Serious, continuous, progressive study of public questions, largely by means of expertly directed discussion groups, is the prime essential. If and when such study shall have become general, and created a different sort of public from the present one, the social-work approach to the more basic social and economic questions will become feasible, provided it does not thereby become unnecessary. Adequate citizenship institutions, if they can be established, will probably obviate much of the need for social work as we know it. For under such institutions citizens will govern themselves, and will not need external agencies to govern for them. But institutions approximating this ideal will not be established for a long time to come, if ever; and, even if or when they are, they will require professional experts to

direct them who have much the same qualifications as the better type of social worker today. Meanwhile, in proportion as the public develops an interest in and understanding of its important problems, social workers can successfully appeal for a wider support of their efforts to deal with such problems; and the public will be qualified properly to discount the propaganda focused on those problems, whether by social workers or by their opponents. More and more, as this development continues, social-work programs will win when they deserve to do so.

We may say, by way of recapitulation, that social work is making invaluable contributions to the treatment of social problems; that, however, it labors under severe handicaps in dealing with problems not making a popular appeal, especially those affected by powerful special interests; and that these handicaps will be removed in proportion as the interest and intelligence of the public respecting such questions is developed through educational efforts not now undertaken, save in isolated instances, by social-work or other agencies.

CHAPTER VII

COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION AND SELF-GOVERNMENT

THE rubric "community organization" is applied to a great variety of efforts designed to promote community welfare, but having little in common except their claim to a common term and a common purpose. The underlying theories, administrative arrangements and other features of these undertakings present endless diversities that defy logical classification. This means, among other things, that the practitioners of community organization are not agreed as to the nature of this process, or of the community welfare it is supposed to achieve. Most often, perhaps, the term is applied to the organized efforts of professional social workers and their supporters *for* the community at large or for certain "underprivileged" elements thereof. It may mean, in addition, the more or less systematic coordination of their efforts. Many assume, however, that community organization means the organized effort of the community itself in its own behalf, including the efforts of social-work agencies that may be fitted into this more democratic type of activity.

Apparently a few would reject the offerings of such agencies altogether.

Community organizations may be classified in various ways, but for our purposes a basis of classification offered by Steiner seems most serviceable.¹ This is found in the various theories of community organization he distinguishes. These are designated, respectively, as the theories of (1) individualism, (2) supervision, (3) federation, (4) democratic participation, (5) paternalism, and (6) amalgamation. It will be found, by consulting Steiner's analysis, that *social workers or social-work agencies* have dominated the practical applications of all these theories except the fourth one, and have been influential in many applications of that theory. We may cite as single illustrations of these several theories in their practical applications (1) the charity organization society, (2) the American Association for Organizing Family Social Work, (3) the council of social agencies, (4) the community club or improvement association, (5) the financial federation dominated by the larger contributors, and (6) the county department of public welfare. These illustrations do not of course suggest the different varieties of organization comprehended by the major types indicated. Nor do they suggest the various kinds of control to which social workers themselves are subjected in their direction of activities thus classifiable. But the classification as thus illustrated

¹ *Community Organization*, Chap. XXI.

will serve the purpose in hand, that, namely, of indicating the nature of the relationships between community organization and the body of citizens that actually constitute the community.

Reserving for special consideration the more democratic types of community organization, we may comment on the significance of the other types for fundamental problems of citizenship. This will not be distinct from that of social work agencies so far as these are the constituent units of such organizations. The possible contributions of social work to constructive citizenship have been treated in the previous chapter. It was observed there that social-work agencies furnish a medium of expression and activity to socially-minded citizens who find the political party or other established institutions unadapted to this purpose. The substantial and, in some instances, far-reaching contributions of these agencies to the solution of the citizen's problems were also emphasized. And the opinion was expressed that agencies of this type may assume greatly increased importance in the future, and, indeed, that after their possibilities are fully revealed they may be adjudged as significant a feature of our historical development as that of the political party during the last century.

But serious limitations on their usefulness were pointed out. These relate particularly to their treatment of the more fundamental political and economic problems, especially those affected by pow-

erful special interests. Two limitations are of particular importance: (1) Agencies proposing to treat such problems by the social-work technique are usually unable to secure adequate funds for the purpose, except where, as is rarely the case, the object in view makes a popular, more or less sentimental appeal. This is because people of large means, who contribute the bulk of the funds for the maintenance of social-work agencies, are not as a rule interested in problems of that class and are indeed generally opposed to attempts at thoroughgoing solutions of them. (2) So far as social-work agencies attempt genuine solutions of such problems, their efforts can be largely neutralized by antagonistic special interests, which can generally command superior political and financial resources for this purpose. Both undertake to enlist public opinion in their support, by the use of propagandist methods, but social work agencies are usually out-distanced, in such a contest, by their opponents.

Coordination of social-work agencies under one or another form of community organization is capable of mitigating but not of abolishing these limitations. Effective organization eliminates duplication of effort, working at cross purposes and sheer neglect of needed services. It may also strengthen the appeal for financial support, and focus more effectively the pressure of the organized agencies for social legislation, adequate local appropriations for welfare purposes, or other measures of common

interest. But, so far as I can see, it does not greatly enhance the effectiveness of those agencies in working for such measures as a child labor amendment, adoption of a social insurance program, expansion of the merit system, or extension of public ownership, since the federative or other coordinative organization of agencies brought to bear on such objectives can be and is normally countered by similar organization in opposition to their efforts. We have our manufacturers' associations, our industrial councils, our chambers of commerce, our interlocking political machines, as well as our councils of social agencies and our conferences of social work. Community organization, however, may and does enhance the effectiveness of the coordinated agencies in promoting the "rehabilitation" of dependent families, the extension of public health services, the "constructive" use of leisure time, and other undertakings not encountering such powerful opposition from vested interests.

The more democratic forms of community organization include various sorts of community councils, welfare clubs and neighborhood associations. Included also and perhaps of greater significance for our inquiry are the community center and the social unit organization, the latter experimentally tested in the Mohawk-Brighton District of Cincinnati a few years ago.

The community council is a type of organization extensively applied in rural areas, due in part to its

advocacy by certain influential leaders of the country life movement. It is a federation of existing agencies, and is considered the most suitable form of community organization where a number of agencies are already functioning. A council has a governing board composed of representatives from the member agencies, and various committees to consider and recommend measures for community development. The execution of such plans is usually delegated to the constituent organizations, or to new agencies that may be established for the purpose. The executive secretary of the council may or may not be remunerated for his services. Open meetings for the discussion of community problems are held, which all adult members of the community are invited to attend. The constituent organizations include such agencies as the farm bureau, grange, women's clubs, churches, schools and official boards or departments, but unaffiliated citizens may also be admitted to membership. Under this plan of organization, the degree of "democratic participation" will depend on the local conditions, including the initiative displayed by the memberships of the constituent organizations, and the degree to which they are representative of the community at large.

The community club or association is considered a more suitable form of rural organization in communities not already well supplied with agencies such as those mentioned. Its membership is individual not organizational, and open to all adult resi-

dents of the community. It carries out its programs through its own committees; but encourages the establishment of independent agencies felt to be needed, such as a farm bureau, cooperative marketing associations, and the like. Its work may be directed by volunteer committees or by paid executives. Public meetings for the discussion of community problems are usually arranged under its auspices. The degree of democracy characterizing such an organization will obviously depend on conditions affecting its activity.²

Somewhat similar to the rural community club are the civic improvement society of the small town and the neighborhood association of the larger center. These may be more or less democratic in character, and exhibit almost any degree of efficiency in the promotion of local improvements. The small town society has a more manageable problem, as a rule, than has the urban neighborhood association, because decisions on local problems in the large city are dominated by city-wide agencies, and local neighborhood associations find effective combination for the promotion of common interests quite difficult.

Undoubtedly many agencies of these types have made substantial contributions to community de-

² Convenient sources of information on these and other forms of rural organization are Burr, W., *Rural Organization*; McClenahan, B. A., *Organizing the Community*, Chaps. IV-VI; Steiner, J. F., *Community Organization*, Chap. X; and Sims, N. L. (editor), *The Rural Community*, Chap. XII.

velopment. This is naturally more likely to be the case where able leadership is available, or where the advice of community organization experts, such as is supplied by the extension divisions of many state educational institutions, can be utilized. Their effectiveness also depends, of course, on the intelligence, interest and energy of their memberships in the study of community problems and promotion of measures for their solution.

Just how much agencies of these types are accomplishing, however, appears not to have been determined. A number of states are developing vigorous rural organization movements; and a few agencies have been reported, such as that of the Porter neighborhood under the inspiration of Mrs. Marie Turner Harvey,³ which have accomplished about as much as, humanly speaking, isolated local effort could accomplish. But I know of no such agencies that have attempted a thorough study of the political, economic and other social institutions conditioning local efforts, or the formulation of practical programs for the control of these factors.

Nevertheless, these agencies represent types of association that could be utilized, were the requisite conditions provided, in the systematic study of community problems by the community itself, and the initiation of measures for their treatment. Even now they are making significant contributions in this

³ Kimball, A. M., *The Country Gentlemen*, January 19 and 26, 1918.

direction by fostering habits of cooperation and stimulating interest in community undertakings.

Community councils, clubs or associations may maintain or be associated with centers of community life, though the latter are conducted under other auspices as well. I am discussing them separately, not because they are necessarily independent in practice, but because their functions are to some extent differentiated.

These centers are designated by a variety of terms, of which civic center, social center, community center and neighborhood center are the more common. A movement for the establishment of such centers began in 1907 with the initiation of the Rochester experiment in school community centers under the leadership of Edward J. Ward. The movement has steadily grown since that time and community centers may now be found in all parts of the country and in all sorts of communities. I have been unable to find any estimate of their number, but it certainly runs into the thousands.

Centers are conducted under all sorts of auspices, including public schools, churches, women's clubs, granges and community councils or associations, as well as organizations established for this particular purpose. A large percentage of them are located in public school buildings, but many of these are not directed or controlled by the educational authorities, though the consent of the latter is necessary to such use of school properties. School buildings are

thus utilized because it is believed to be a highly appropriate use of public property that would otherwise be idle at the hours when community centers are in session. Moreover, they are conveniently located, being in the centers of residential districts; and the school system furnishes a handy if not altogether suitable district organization for civic undertakings growing out of community center activities. Moreover, use of school buildings obviates the expense—an important consideration—of constructing special buildings for the centers, which would often be necessary otherwise.

Disadvantages of the school buildings include lack of architectural adaptation to center uses (which, however, can be gradually overcome as old buildings are displaced by new ones); traditional prejudices against the use of school buildings for any except school purposes; and the not infrequent opposition of special interests to certain community center activities in public buildings of any sort. The use of school properties for center purposes, however, has been extended, despite these difficulties.

An obstacle to community center development in heterogeneous neighborhoods, especially of the large cities, is the strong tendency of the residents to associate together on the basis of race, religion, economic status or intellectual interests, rather than of common membership in the community. Centers with selected memberships have developed in response to this tendency. The most important of these, nu-

merically, are centers maintained by the churches which are thereby catering more and more to the social and intellectual interests of their constituencies.

The activities of community centers are broad in scope, and tend to become more so. Public forums, civic clubs, local improvement societies, parent-teacher associations, branch libraries, evening classes, study groups, concerts, choruses, recitals, plays, pageants, celebrations, movies, dances, clinics and many other activities are included in the list, though these are rarely all found in one center. Generally speaking, centers tend to become genuine focal points in the civic, recreational and cultural activities of their neighborhoods. Some have seen in them the promise of a basic social unit linking up the family and the neighborhood with the city (or county), the state, the nation and organized society in general. Edward J. Ward conceives the center as, *in potentia*, an inclusive organization of all the citizens of the neighborhood, which when appropriately integrated into larger units, can serve in a truly representative fashion all the functions now devolving on political parties, thus render the latter unnecessary, and eventually bring government under popular control.⁴ Similarly, Henry E. Jackson pictures the community center as being at one and the same time the people's university, the community capitol, the community forum, the neighborhood club, the home

⁴ *The Social Center*, Chaps. I-VI.

and school league, the community bank, the cooperative exchange, and the child's right of way.⁵

There is evidence of enthusiasm here; yet many able thinkers have affirmed a belief in the pregnant possibilities of the community center as an agency for the civic and cultural development of the masses. So far, however, progress toward the realization of any such possibilities has been quite limited. It is true that the community center has afforded opportunities for wholesome recreation to many thousands of people; that intellectual and æsthetic interests have been fostered by its activities; that many local improvements have been carried out under the auspices of subsidiary or allied agencies; that it has stimulated the development of community spirit and the serious study of community problems. But none of the centers known to me have developed the type of civic education or of civic activity that, as I think, is requisite to the mastery, intellectual and practical, of the citizen's deeper problems.

This is no doubt partly due to the fact that it will take time—more time than community centers have had—to induct citizens into the intensive, continuous, scientifically grounded study of their problems, and into the exacting programmatic activities based thereon, that are connoted by a citizenship adapted to present-day needs. But it is also largely because leaders in the movement have failed to real-

⁵ The captions under which he answers the question, what is a community center? *A Community Center*, Part I.

ize that competent citizenship involves efforts of such magnitude. While a few intellectual leaders, notably John Collier, Joseph K. Hart and Mary P. Follett, have sensed these implications of the new citizenship and the functions of the community center in giving them practical effect, the movement, for whatever reason, has scarcely followed their lead. One influential leader speaks as if he thought a "weekly assembling of citizens" at the social center would furnish sufficient opportunity for the citizen's study and discussion of his problems.⁶ His conception is a fairly representative one, if we may judge from the literature and from the activities of the community center. That it is a wholly erroneous conception must be clear to anyone who has contemplated the diversity and difficulty of the citizen's problems and the nature of the efforts that must be put forth by the citizen himself if they are to be treated in his interest.

Despite its limitations, the community center, like the community councils and associations, is fostering habits of cooperation and types of interest that will prove invaluable contributions to the development of a competent citizenship when well-conceived, resolute attempts in this direction are made. More significantly expressed, the community center movement is contributing to the development of a *primary-group* phase of the community and the state, which have languished hitherto because, for

⁶ Ward, E. J., *op. cit.*, p. 38.

one thing, they are so largely constituted of *secondary-group* relationships.⁷ With a primary-group phase developed, they can successfully appeal to the individual for a substantial share of their proper interest and devotion, along with the family, the vocation, the economic class and the church, all of which are primary groups or embrace such groups in their organization.

The most thorough test of democratic principles in community organization recently undertaken in this country, and indeed about the only test of decisive significance, is that represented by the Social Unit Experiment conducted in Cincinnati during the years 1917 to 1920. According to Mr. and Mrs. Wilbur Phillips, the authors of the Social Unit Plan, "the organization of a community, if it is to be democratic and effective, stimulating people most to meet their own needs, should be based upon the following three principles:

"1. The organization of the citizens of the community should be by sufficiently small primary units of population so that those living in each unit may have a general acquaintance with the problems, conditions, and personalities in that area, and so that the elected representative of each primary unit may become, in the best sense of the word, a neighbor, familiar with the conditions and needs and responsive and responsible to the wishes of the other residents. . . .

⁷ A primary group is one in which communication among the members is predominantly of a direct or face-to-face type; a secondary group one in which, by contrast, communication is predominantly of an indirect, long-distance type.

"2. The organization of those who are serving the community because of especial knowledge or skill, in a direct or an advisory capacity, should be with reference to units of population served, so that they may be more closely in touch with the representatives of the citizens and with the citizens themselves.

"3. There should be an organic and coordinate working relationship between the representatives of groups having special knowledge or skill for service to the community and the representatives of the residents." ⁸

In accordance with these principles, the Mohawk-Brighton Social Unit Organization was composed of:

"A Citizens' Council, consisting of 31 block representatives (or 'block workers') each chosen by the 'Block Council' of one of the thirty-one blocks, or primary units of the District. Every person over eighteen was eligible to vote for the Council of the block in which he lived.

"An Occupational Council, consisting of the elected representatives of the physicians, the nurses, the social workers, the clergymen, the teachers, a representative of the business men of the District, and also a local representative of the Central Labor Council of the city (and later a representative of the recreational workers of the District).

⁸ Dinwiddie, Courtenay, *Community Responsibility*, p. 2. This monograph, published by the New York School of Social Work, is a review of the Cincinnati experiment by one closely associated with it.

"According to the Unit theory such occupational organization, and the election of representatives of the occupational groups, would lead to a dual representation of every citizen—*first*, in a geographical and, *second*, in an occupational group. This was far from being realized in the Unit experiment." *Ibid.*, p. 2, footnote.

"*A General Council*, consisting of the Citizens' and Occupational Councils, together, which was the governing body in the affairs of the neighboring organization."⁹

The services undertaken by the organization were practically all in the field of public health, and included, in the order of their development, an infant welfare service, pre-natal supervision of mothers, general bedside nursing service, health service for pre-school children, nursing supervision of tuberculous and pre-tuberculous patients, and medical examination of adults. Nursing supervision of school children and of patients with venereal diseases was also developed, but more gradually and informally than other phases of the work. Services included clinic examinations, home care, and hospitalization as needed, besides the cooperation of social workers in handling problems within their province. The nature of the services undertaken accounts for the prominence of physicians, nurses and social workers on the Occupational Council. Other vocational groups in the district, while sympathetic for the most part with the work of the organization, took little active part therein.

Some details on organization and finance may be added. The plan favored by the initiators of the experiment called for single executives of the various councils, including the block councils, the several occupational councils, the Citizens' Council (composed of the executives of the block councils), the Occu-

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4.

pational Council (composed of executives of the specific occupational councils), and the General Council (composed of the Citizens' and the Occupational Councils). This arrangement proved satisfactory, but its merits compared with possible alternatives were not tested. The block workers, besides constituting the membership of the Citizens' Council, served as intermediaries between residents of the neighborhood and specialists engaged in the health services. They received a moderate compensation for their work. The physicians, nurses, Council executives and necessary assistants were also remunerated for their services. Mr. and Mrs. Phillips served as joint executives of the General Council for the greater part of the experiment, as well as of the National Social Unit Organization, and the Cincinnati Social Unit Organization. The latter was formed to promote the application of the Unit Plan in the city at large, but accomplished little in this direction owing largely to a bitter political attack on the experiment by Mayor Galvin. This incident occurred during the second year of the experiment and seriously interfered with its development. The experiment was well financed, the National Social Unit Organization contributing \$90,000 and the city of Cincinnati half that amount for its support.

All competent observers of the experiment agree that it demonstrated the soundness of the principles upon which it was based. The Citizens' Council proved highly successful as a policy-forming body.

It gave intelligent consideration to plans submitted by the Occupational Council, brought these plans before the residents of the neighborhood for suggestions and criticisms, offered modifications in the light of opinions thus elicited, and made decisions on the basis of this procedure, shown by subsequent experience to be, in the main, sound ones. The procedure involved a cooperative education of and by the block workers, residents of the neighborhood, physicians, nurses and executives that proved most effective. As a result, the health services sponsored by the Unit were of an exceptionally high standard, the interest in and understanding of health problems on the part of the neighborhood almost unprecedented, and health conditions improved in a most remarkable manner. The education of block workers as a result of their experience in the organization was specially striking.

The educational value of the experiment to the specialists participating therein was also remarkable. The cooperative consideration of problems by physicians, nurses and social workers fundamentally modified their viewpoints on many of these problems, and led to revision of methods applied in the treatment of the latter. For example, the somewhat divergent views of nurses and social workers on their common problems gradually merged, and as a result their work was more closely integrated. Again, the experiment demonstrated the desirability of a shift from specialized to generalized

nursing in the public health services of the district, but, on the other hand, the advantages of greater specialization in the work of the physicians. The organization of medical and nursing services was modified accordingly.

Even more significant was the marked development of neighborly relations between the specialized workers and the residents of the district. Each of these groups developed greater understanding of and sympathy for the other, so that at the end a fine working relationship between them existed. This was largely the result of the *liaison* services performed by the block workers.

Summing up, the experiment demonstrated that, under such conditions at least, self-government by the citizen is feasible; that cooperative relationships between the specialist and the public can be established; and that efficient service under democratic citizenship organization is quite practicable. Perhaps the most significant factor in the demonstration was the direct, purposeful contacts among the participants, and especially between the residents and their elected representatives. These were predominantly of an individual character, as group meetings, though a number were held, played little part in the experiment. Mr. Dinwiddie regards this, and especially the infrequency of neighborhood forum meetings, as one of its weaknesses.¹⁰

¹⁰ The exceptional significance of this celebrated experiment and the importance of evaluating its contribution to the elucidation

The applicability of the Unit Plan to larger areas and to problems of a different character could only be determined by further experiment. One cannot tell in advance whether a system of representative government based on the type of unit organization adapted to a small district would prove successful. Such a system would necessarily include representative assemblies and administrative officers who could not be in such close touch with, or under such direct control of, their constituencies as were the Citizens' Council and its executives. This, however, is a necessary feature of any representative system serving a large body of people. The dual form of citizenship contemplated by the Plan also raises questions which can hardly be solved in advance of more extensive experiments designed to test them. These questions are now debated, in a speculative fashion, by the proponents and opponents of such a system, notably by the guild socialists and their critics.

Although the Unit Plan should prove applicable to leisure-time, child welfare and other problems that, like public health problems, are relatively concrete and understandable ones, it seems doubtful whether it could be applied, in the form demonstrated, to fundamental political and economic problems. Real solutions of such problems could not be initiated without a preparatory study by citizens that would necessarily be a prolonged and intensive one,

of fundamental citizenship problems may be offered as a justification for this fresh and somewhat detailed exposition of it.

and the educational methods applied in the Cincinnati experiment would hardly be adapted to that object. Systematic group study and discussion would be indispensable. The health services in the Mohawk-Brighton District did not in themselves involve such institutional reconstructions as are implied by problems of that sort. It is significant, however, that the novel type of social organization applied on a small scale in that experiment incurred the hostility of Mayor Galvin and the covert or open opposition of other conservative leaders, with the result that the experiment was seriously jeopardized, and its extension to the city at large forestalled.

The directors of the experiment are themselves modest in their claims as to its practical significance. A recognition of its limitations, however, in nowise detracts from its value. Any such experiment, if it is to be thorough, must be of limited scope. Perhaps our greatest need is for active, extensive, ably planned experimentation of this character. Certainly that is a prime essential in the development of citizenship organization adapted to present-day conditions.

We may say, by way of summarizing the foregoing survey of community organization, that at present this type of effort is largely dominated by and applied to social-work agencies, and that, *pro tanto*, it shares the limitations characterizing their activities, though serving to mitigate these in greater or

lesser degree. The more democratic types of community organization, as illustrated by community councils, clubs and associations, represent an advance on the social-work types in their greater independence of the wealthy contributor, in eliciting a more democratic participation in movements for community welfare, and in fostering habits of cooperation and types of interest that will prove invaluable contributions to the development of competent citizenship. The community center, in turn, offers contributions similar to those of other democratic types of community organization, besides representing specially significant beginnings in the development of a primary-group organization of the community and the state. None of these various undertakings, however, supplies a model for the type of intellectual and practical activity involved in the adequate organization of citizenship. Finally, the Social Unit Experiment is a noteworthy contribution to the thorough testing of democratic principles in community organization, and of special significance both for the light thrown on problems of citizenship and as an illustration of the intensive experimentation essential to the definitive solution of those problems.

CHAPTER VIII

THE MOVEMENT FOR ADULT EDUCATION

“**A**DULT education” is by way of becoming a popular slogan. There is a growing realization that adults need education as well as children, and that the education of children, at least of the prevailing type, will not in itself assure adult education. More and more, adults are recognizing that knowledge relative to their vital interests is soon out of date, unless by continuous, methodical study it is kept up to date. Fewer but still a considerable number realize that education is the gateway to the highest interests of any sort, that, indeed, participation in those interests *is* a process of education as well as of action or appreciation. And some at least have learned that the inadequacy both of adult and of child education excludes the masses of people from any real part in the higher interests of our civilization.

Included in our higher interests are the civic ones, and these are closed to the masses just as effectually as are intellectual and æsthetic interests. This fact is serious in a special sense, for civic interests not

only enrich and ennoble life in themselves, but on them participation in other interests is peculiarly dependent, representing, as they do, the means of achieving an opportunity for sharing in those interests.

Although adult education is old, and there is now a vast amount of it in the United States, a movement for its further development is under way. This movement is aiming both at its extension, because the present amount of it, though large, is all too small; and at the improvement of its quality, because the present quality, like the amount, leaves much to be desired. The concern with quality is expressed in part by consideration of the objectives to be attempted, and in part by efforts to improve the technique of adult study.

What contributions does—and can—adult education make to the new citizenship? What forms must it take if it is to develop citizens intelligent and skilled in the discharge of their functions? How will this phase of adult education be connected with the institutional organization of citizenship in general?

Adult education enterprises of interest to our inquiry include forums, institutes, public lecture courses, lyceums, chautauquas, correspondence schools, extension classes, part-time public schools, study clubs, independent schools, “workers’ education” and libraries. A comprehensive list would include the newspaper, the magazine, the church, the

community center, the theater and the radio, but these are considered elsewhere in the discussion.

Mr. Peffer estimates that there are 300 open forums in this country,¹ 195 of which are members of the Open Forum National Council organized a few years ago by Mr. George W. Coleman, an enthusiastic advocate of the forum idea. Of these member forums over half are located in Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey and New York. All but nine have been established since 1917, and two-thirds since 1920. They are conducted under various auspices, the majority under churches of certain denominations, but some of them independently.

A forum discussion consists usually of an address on a stated topic by an invited speaker, followed by questions or comments from the audience. Ordinarily, an hour is given to the formal discourse and the same amount of time to the subsequent discussion. Participation of the audience may consist only of questions addressed to the speaker, or it may include in addition short speeches from members of the audience. The former plan seems preferable, as speeches from the floor are apt to be more or less pointless and futile. Many forums begin their programs with short musical numbers, and some arrange "social" occasions for the membership at regular intervals. As a rule, the forum meetings themselves are held weekly; and 130 forums in reply to

¹ The discussion of this topic is based on Chapter II of Peffer, N., *New Schools for Older Students*.

a questionnaire reported an average of 17 meetings a year.

A wide range of topics may be discussed, but social, economic and political questions occupy a large place on the programs of most forums. Audiences are apt to be quite heterogeneous as regards race, religion, politics, social and economic viewpoints, a condition that stimulates discussion and fosters tolerance, especially under skilled leadership.

Some forums, notably Cooper Union of New York and Ford Hall of Boston, have been remarkably successful. Discussions have been on a high level, and many of the attendants inspired to pursue systematic studies on their own initiative. All told, a considerable number of persons have become better citizens from attending and participating in forum discussions.

Their contribution to civic education, however, is limited, though invaluable as far as it goes. The reasons for this are not far to seek. A year's program usually embraces a number of subjects that are not very closely related; and, even where this is not the case, participation of the attendant in the discussion is too limited for it to have any very profound influence on him. Real mastery of a difficult question can come only through its study day after day, or at least week after week, with the indispensable help of books and other publications. Mastery also depends, for most people, on active participation—much of it—in discussions under skilled di-

rection. Forums do not provide these conditions. Their office is rather the stimulation of interest leading to serious study, provision of opportunities to hear the views of capable thinkers, and maintenance of media for the formation of intelligent public opinion on questions of current interest. These functions will be acceptably performed in proportion as citizens are equipped by serious study under other auspices to participate intelligently in forum discussions and to grasp the import of what they have to offer.

Mr. Pepper characterizes the institute as "an organized lecture platform, bringing for the enlightenment of the public the men of the professional lecture platform."² The institute thus defined differs from the forum in that there are no questions, no active responses of any sort, from the audience, save in isolated cases. The institute program itself is characterized by Mr. Pepper as "the haphazard, unsequential, unrelated succession of lectures—Ibsen Tuesday, diet Thursday and psycho-analysis Saturday, with resultant vagueness Sunday as to Nora's part in the discovery of vitamins and Freud's contribution to the Scandinavian drama."³ Lecturers range in ability from the professional popularizers, who prepare their repertoires of lectures season after season, in accordance with prevailing intellectual fads, to the most eminent scholars

² *Op. cit.*, p. 42.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 43.

who turn aside but occasionally for the lecture platform. Civic subjects are not specially featured on the programs.

Typical institutes of this character are the Brooklyn Institute of Arts and Sciences (which, however, does not confine itself to lecture programs alone), the Peabody Institute of Baltimore, and the Goodwyn Institute of Memphis, Tennessee. The educational activities of the Lowell Institute of Boston and the Educational Alliance of New York are of a higher order, being adapted to constituencies with serious intellectual interests.

The activities of the institute represent only a very limited contribution to the development of citizenship, as will be clear from the foregoing characterizations. Series of lectures such as it offers doubtless do something to stimulate the intellectual interests of their auditors, but little or nothing to give those interests a positive, progressive character. The auditors derive from them only what their equipment will allow, and we know that relatively few of them are equipped to derive very much. In an educated society, the platform lecturer would perhaps serve a useful purpose as a purveyor of information on topics of current interest; and certainly as a stimulating variation from the more impersonal media of communication on which chief dependence would necessarily be placed.

What has been said about the institute applies in the main to public lectures under the auspices of

churches, women's clubs, boards of education and other agencies. Where serious study is encouraged in connection therewith, and particularly where lectures are followed by discussion, real education results in some measure, whether on civic or other questions. Lecture courses frequently include these features. But so far, they have made no noteworthy contribution to civic education, and they give little promise of doing so in the future. This is due, in part, to the fact that their sponsors do not fully realize the difficulty of genuine adult education, and, in part, to inherent limitations of the lecture itself as a method of instruction.

Lyceums and chautauquas are somewhat similar to the institute and the public lecture course as regards their educational offerings. The chautauqua presents a rather concentrated program of "attractions" covering a short period in the summer season, while the lyceum offers occasional, though regular, programs extending through the fall, winter and spring months. "In 1922, 35,000,000 chautauqua tickets were sold to 10,000,000 persons in 10,000 towns in the United States,"⁴ and some years ago approximately 16,000 communities supported lyceum courses, with the number of attractions in a course ranging from five to twelve. Both the chautauqua and the lyceum flourish mainly in the smaller centers of population, primarily because similar (and

⁴ *Adult Education and the Library*, Vol. 1, No. 2, p. 24.

better) opportunities are provided in larger centers by other agencies.

Lyceums and chautauquas cater to the diverse tastes of their constituencies, musical, literary, dramatic, scientific and civic. Study and discussion are fostered in many cases, but the dominant feature of the programs is entertainment and instruction of a popular sort by professionals who make a business of it.

These activities thus approximate, in type, the lecture courses of the institute, for which admission fees are charged, and the public lecture courses, to which admission is free. Their contribution to civic and other phases of adult education must therefore be of much the same nature. Civic, intellectual and æsthetic interests are stimulated in some degree, and serious study on the part of many thus motivated. It is obvious, however, that adult education cannot be developed very far by the methods of the chautauqua and the lyceum. They have had plenty of time to demonstrate their possibilities, having flourished for more than half a century in this country, but their achievements show that genuine education of the adult must come mainly through agencies of a different sort. In a really educated society, however, their contributions might assume considerable importance, like the institute programs and the public lecture courses of the larger centers.

The commercial correspondence schools, of which there are about 350 in the United States, enroll ap-

proximately 1,500,000 new students every year, besides another million that have taken courses previously. From 95 to 97 per cent of their courses are on vocational subjects. The mortality of the students (the proportion not completing their courses) is said to be approximately 95 per cent.⁵ The typical correspondence school student is a young man who has not completed the high-school course, and is engaged in some business or industrial pursuit of a semi-skilled nature. His motive is to increase his earning power by equipping himself for a more lucrative occupation.

These facts indicate that the commercial correspondence school has at present practically no significance for civic education. It could become significant only if, through educational enterprises of a different type, strong civic interests were developed among the masses. But enterprises that accomplished this object would themselves render the correspondence school unnecessary as a possible instrument of civic education. Its contribution would necessarily be limited in any case, because of inherent defects in the method to which it is restricted.

Public evening, continuation and other part-time schools enroll more than a million students a year. The great majority of this number are young men and women in the late teens or early twenties, nei-

⁵ *Digest of Proceedings of National Conference on Adult Education*, 1925, p. 29; published by Carnegie Corporation of New York.

ther sex having a marked preponderance. Courses are given on a great variety of subjects, comparable in range with those offered by the public day schools, of which these part-time schools are extensions. Vocational subjects are emphasized, however, owing to the more highly developed occupational interests of the students, and their greater freedom to choose courses for themselves. In communities with considerable foreign-born populations, courses in English and civics are popular, the latter specializing on the requirements for naturalization. Apart from that, the contribution of these schools to civic education is not of special significance. A strong demand for this phase of adult education does not exist, and part-time public schools would labor under serious limitations in supplying such a demand, if it should develop. Nevertheless, under a thorough institutional organization of citizenship, including the civic education of the adult, the contribution of part-time public schools to the training of the citizen might become important.

University extension, including correspondence courses and classes on or off the campus, reaches 150,000 students a year. Most of these are teachers, and a great majority of them work for "credit." Dr. Hall-Quest's composite portrait of an extension student describes *her* as a "teacher, approximately thirty years of age, interested especially in studying English, romance languages, education, mathematics, history, etc. . . . Her correspondence course will

continue as a rule through twenty-six assignments and in extension class meetings she will spend from thirty-five to fifty-seven hours. . . . In correspondence the instructor sends carefully prepared syllabi and directions for study and her papers containing her answers are painstakingly read and valuable suggestions offered. In extension classes she will listen to lectures, participate in discussions, read texts and other material, if available.”⁶ A considerable percentage of such students are enrolled in correspondence courses, and the mortality of this group, like that of commercial correspondence school students, is very high. Extension classes, on the other hand, offer an opportunity for education of the best type, considering the relative maturity of the student, his (or her) background of experience and the possibilities of group discussion. Much, of course, depends on the teacher.

The interests of extension students are largely vocational in character, since most of them are teachers seeking advancement by this route; but included are the varied interests, such as they are, that find gratification in the achievement of a college degree. The significance of university extension is thus quite similar to that of intra-mural education through the same institutions. Both represent substantial, though as yet quite limited, contributions to the civic education of the adult. Their future contributions will de-

⁶ *Digest of Proceedings of National Conference on Adult Education*, 1925, p. 30.

pend on the valuation of civic education by their constituencies, the place of the social sciences in university curricula, the responsibilities for developing civic leadership assumed by institutions of higher learning, and the efficiency of the methods employed in this phase of their work. The civic education of the masses, however, must obviously be intrusted to other agencies.

University extension includes, in addition to classes and correspondence courses, lecture services, radio programs, municipal reference bureaus, promotion of community institutes and the like. These, so far as germane to our inquiry, are discussed elsewhere.

Various independent schools recently established are making invaluable contributions, by way of experiment and demonstration, to the adult education movement. The People's Institute of New York, the New School of Social Research, the Bryn Mawr Summer School for Women in Industry, and Pocono People's College are perhaps the most significant of these schools.⁷

The People's Institute, founded in 1897, was at first a combination of lyceum and public forum, together with various social service activities not now featured in its program. The Institute forum, popularly known as Cooper Union, soon attained a national, even an international, reputation, and stimu-

⁷ Schools of this type are discussed by Pepper, N., *op. cit.*, Chap. IV. Our discussion is largely based on Mr. Pepper's work.

lated the organization of similar forums in other parts of the country. Recently, under the leadership of Everett Dean Martin, one of the pioneers in the adult education movement, a demand arose for more systematic instruction under the auspices of the Institute. This demand was particularly stimulated by Mr. Martin's Friday evening lecture courses, running through the season, and treating systematically some important theme of current interest, such as "Democracy in the Light of Psychology," "Dreams of a Social Redemption," "The Great Mass Movements of History," and the like. Small classes have been established in response to this demand. These meet in a public school building near Cooper Union and undertake intensive studies in history, philosophy, biology, psychology, logic and other subjects. The work is of high standard, and the demand for it appears to be growing. It is of special significance as showing that many adults in the lower income groups, from which the Institute draws its constituency, will respond to opportunities for serious and exacting intellectual work, if its import is made clear to them.

The students of the New School for Social Research come from a more prosperous and better educated class. The great majority of them are graduates of a college or training school of some sort, and engaged in business or professional pursuits. Classes are held in the late afternoon and evening, since most of their members are occupied during the

day. Courses are given in history, philosophy, religion, art, literature, biology, psychology, social science and other subjects. The dominant interest, however, is in the social sciences. The faculty is of exceptionally high caliber, and includes many distinguished specialists in the various subjects of the curriculum. Approximately one-third of the students currently enrolled have previously taken courses in the school, which indicates that many students at least feel repaid for the time and effort involved in the work. The school is opposed, on principle, to compulsory requirements that students attend class sessions regularly or do the reading recommended by the instructors. Examinations are not given and degrees are not offered. Students are expected to decide for themselves how much work they shall put in a course, and to make this decision on the basis of the course's own intrinsic value.

The Bryn Mawr Summer School for Women in Industry describes its purpose as follows:

To offer young women in industry opportunities to study liberal subjects and to train themselves in clear thinking; to stimulate an active and continued interest in the problems of our economic order; to develop a desire for study as a means of understanding and enjoyment of life. The school is not committed to any theory. The teaching is carried on by instructors who have an understanding of the student's practical experience in industry and of the labor movement. It is conducted in a spirit of impartial inquiry with freedom of discussion and teaching. It is expected that thus the stu-

dents will gain a truer insight into the problems of industry and feel a more vital responsibility for their solution.

The school has approximately one hundred students a session, deliberately selected from all parts of the country, but from the larger centers of population only, in order that nuclei of an educational movement for working women may thus be created. Students must be factory workers, waitresses or telephone operators, and equipped with a common school education or its equivalent, including ability to read and write English. They may or may not be trade unionists. Courses are given in economics, composition, hygiene, literature, psychology and science, the first three of these compulsory, the last three electives, one of which must be chosen by each student. There are also history lectures, attendance at which is voluntary, besides occasional concerts and lectures on the appreciation of music.

The work includes regular class sessions besides tutorial periods attended by small groups of students and offering particular opportunities for questions and discussions. A supervised study hour each evening assists the student in her reading.

The methods of instruction, the diverse experiences of the students and the highly selected character of the student body as a whole have combined to make this experiment in adult education a notably successful one. The students are interested from the start, preconceived opinions (varying from the most radical to the most conservative) are challenged,

horizons broadened, stimulus and direction given to intellectual aspirations by the gifted teachers of the faculty. A large percentage of the students continue their education by means of evening classes following their attendance at the summer school. One special difficulty faced by the school is in finding sufficient women workers who can withdraw for two or three months from wage earning, and from particular jobs, to avail themselves of the opportunities offered.

Our last example of independent adult schools is Pocono People's College, located at Henryville, Pennsylvania, in the Pocono Mountains. It is not really a college in the accepted sense of the term, but an adaptation to American conditions of the Danish folk high school, an institution that has played a dominating rôle in the progressive developments so characteristic of modern Denmark. Pocono offers a succession of three months' courses to ordinary folk who have not enjoyed many educational advantages, and most of whom are not eligible for admission to standard educational institutions. It is a resident school charging a tuition fee of \$200. Most of the students come on scholarships provided by friends in their communities or by supporters of the school. The majority of them are between 20 and 25 years of age.

The curriculum is divided into five departments: History, Literature, Community Life, Science, and Recreation. Minor courses in various other subjects

and occasional lectures by visitors are also offered. The discussion method is emphasized in the instruction, which, in application to the diverse opinions and life experiences of the students, proves most fruitful. Recreational activities are featured, in order to enhance the attractiveness of the school, stimulate emotional development and provide training in group leadership. Extension work in educational and recreational activities is undertaken in the neighboring communities.

The enrollment of the school has always been quite small, owing to the difficulty of finding students who can withdraw from their work for three months and pay \$200 besides, or find others to pay it for them.

It is perhaps too early to appraise independent schools of these types, as instruments of civic and other phases of adult education. The notable success of the Danish folk high schools indicates the possibility of an American adaptation that might show comparable achievements. This possibility should not of course be judged on the basis of one or a few attempts to transplant that institution to American soil. It would seem wise, however, to regard independent schools in general as offering only a relatively small part of the solution for our problems of adult education, and particularly of civic education. Any *school* serves a constantly changing personnel, and schools for adults partake of this trait much more than do schools for the young. It

cannot be too strongly emphasized that citizenship is a process of continuous education, or study, as well as a program of continuous activity. Moreover, it seems very likely that, in this country at least, the educational side of citizenship must be organically related to the practical side, if it is to accomplish its purposes. Even if that is not the case, the citizen who attends an adult school must thereafter be inducted into the permanent educational organization of citizenship, if he is to practice citizenship intelligently. An American adaptation of the folk high school might make an invaluable contribution to the preparatory civic education of farmers, in particular, since they could manage better than could city workers to attend a school of this sort. But the American farmer will, I think, need a more continuous, intensive education following any such preparatory training than does the Danish farmer, owing to the greater complexity and difficulty of his problems.

An enormous number of associations, reading circles and study clubs are contributing to adult education in this country. Included in this category are numerous women's clubs, parent-teacher associations, teachers' reading circles, young people's Christian associations, leagues of women voters, and the like.⁸

A survey of their multifarious contributions to civic education cannot be attempted here, and it

⁸ Many of the Christian associations in the larger centers conduct regularly organized classes for their members and might therefore have been considered under independent schools.

would perhaps be invidious to single out particular instances for special consideration. But I cannot forbear commenting at least on the admirable work of the National League of Women Voters,⁹ though the General Federation of Women's Clubs, the National Congress of Parents and Teachers, and the Young Women's Christian Association would also claim our consideration, did space permit, but more for their future possibilities than for their actual achievements as agencies of civic education.

The League of Women Voters is a national organization, with the congressional district as basic unit of organization, but with local and state branches as well. In 1924 it included leagues in 44 states and three-fourths of the congressional districts. Twenty-six state and fifteen municipal leagues had paid staffs in that year.

The League concentrates on political education and the promotion of political action, especially legislation and law enforcement in behalf of women and children. Its primary purpose is to promote active and intelligent citizenship on the part of the woman voter. Its "methods of operation," to quote Mr. Pepper, "are through instruction and discussion, public meetings on special subjects, candidates' meetings, ballot-marking classes, study groups and round tables, citizenship schools and institutes; through observation by fact-finding groups and visits to legislative bodies, administrative boards, etc.; through

⁹ See Pepper, N., *op cit.*, pp. 134-144.

conferences with public officials on special problems and with experts on technical subjects; through training of speakers and discussion leaders; through publication of bulletins of information and analysis, and through encouraging the participation of the electorate in all affairs of government." ¹⁰ Policies are determined by the national board, but these are submitted to the state leagues for approval, while both local and state leagues may initiate policies in consonance with their special needs and submit these, if desired, for consideration of the national organization. The attempt is to focus the activities of the League throughout the country on definite objectives whose attainment may be desired.

Promotion of legislative and other forms of political action is based on serious study of the questions at issue by the League membership. This preparatory study seems as thorough and systematic as it well could be under the circumstances. The educational activities of the League in 1924 included institutes in Ann Arbor and San Francisco organized by the national board; 84 institutes and citizenship schools sponsored by state leagues; 26 schools and several thousand study meetings under the auspices of local leagues. The so-called schools and institutes are usually of a week's duration or less, while local study groups are fairly permanent organizations holding more or less regular meetings throughout the year. Discussion by the members is featured in

¹⁰ *Op cit.*, pp. 141-142.

the meetings, but the services of specialists are utilized in the presentation of questions, and suitable literature as an aid to study is provided. Subjects emphasized in the discussion are of a "practical" nature, international relations, social legislation, law enforcement, tariff policies, educational problems, the merit system and the short ballot being illustrations.

It is easy to point out limitations in any human undertaking, of course, but doing so in this case does not imply adverse criticism of the League as an agency of civic education. The intermittent, even though systematic, character of its educational work is one limitation. Insufficient grounding in the social sciences as a preparation for the study of practical questions is another. Restriction of its educational activities to women, for the most part, is still another. True, such limitations are virtually imposed on any agency seriously venturing under present conditions into the field of adult civic education. Yet, eventually, civic education of the adult must transcend limitations of this kind, if it is fully to accomplish its purpose. Meanwhile, however, the League must be given credit for its exceptionally vigorous and intelligent efforts to deal with extraordinarily difficult problems, and, incidentally, for the light it is throwing on them. Especially worthy of commendation is its combination of political education with political action in a manner that strengthens both these phases of civic activity.

Perhaps one is not justified in drawing conclusions, on the basis of available evidence, regarding the civic contributions of associations, study clubs and reading circles in general, of which the League's activities are an exceptional instance. I would say, however, that they are usually characterized by limitations similar to those affecting the work of the League itself, only more so. Their activities are not, as a rule, so systematic, so thorough, so well-grounded scientifically, so organically related to practical affairs, so effectively focused on definite objectives as are the activities of the League. If this be true, they scarcely supply a counterpoise to the propaganda, the prejudice, the traditional attitudes, the special interests that now dominate public affairs, but, on the contrary, often if not commonly accentuate influences of this nature.

So-called workers' education is conceived as a distinct phase of adult education adapted to the needs of a special class. Sporadic developments in this field have occurred in England for the past fifty years, but workers' education assumed the character of a national movement in that country about the time (1899) Ruskin College was organized as a resident school for students of the working class. Extensive activities are now conducted in this field under the auspices of the Workers' Educational Association and the Plebs League, with the cooperation of the universities, local educational authorities and private agencies. Some observers attribute no small share of

the British Labor Party's success to the influence of this movement.

Workers' education in the United States has been inspired by and to some extent patterned after the British movement. Its development began during the War, and it is still largely in the experimental stage. But it was soon endorsed by the American Federation of Labor, and the Workers' Education Bureau (organized in 1921) made an integral part of the Federation in 1924. Unions representing a great majority of the Federation's membership are now affiliated with the Bureau, and contribute to its support. The affiliated organizations include "50 national and international unions, 11 state federations of labor, 36 city central labor bodies, 60 local unions, 20 trade union colleges and study groups and 6 co-operative and student associations"; and "its directory shows 107 labor educational committees, 53 classes and 35 labor colleges and summer schools."¹¹

A labor college is a number of classes—usually a small number—organized with some reference to one another, and under unified administrative control. Workers' classes, as distinct from labor colleges, are individual groups of students scattered here and there, but usually sponsored by some labor organization. The auspices under which colleges and classes are conducted include international unions, state federations of labor, central labor unions, and joint committees representing labor organizations and co-

¹¹ Peffer, N., *op. cit.*, p. 215.

operating educational institutions. Brookwood Workers College, a residential school for the training of labor leaders, is independently organized, but it is administered in the interest of the labor movement. The Workers' Education Bureau serves as a coordinating agency for activities in this field, conducts conferences on problems of workers' education, and employs field agents to promote and assist in the organization of workers' classes. It also publishes text-books (in cooperation with a commercial publisher), pamphlets, syllabi and reading lists for use by these classes.

Except for Brookwood, which offers to prospective labor leaders two years' training of a thorough and systematic nature, workers' colleges and classes are much like other classes for adults as regards their external characteristics. The discussion method is emphasized and reading encouraged, while the interest stimulated and results achieved are comparable. The social sciences, especially the economics of the labor movement, are featured, though English, public speaking, psychology and other subjects are not infrequently offered. The instructor is almost always sympathetically inclined to the labor and even the union "point of view," and social and economic problems are treated more or less from that viewpoint. Observers of workers' education assert, however, that it is not typically of a propagandist character—no more so, for instance, than instruction in economics offered by accredited institutions of higher learn-

ing. It is estimated that 30,000 adults are reached by workers' education in this country.¹²

Like so many of the recent developments in adult education, the possibilities of workers' education are not now susceptible of definite appraisal. But we are perhaps justified in assuming that the American movement will eventually exhibit a development comparable in scope and significance with that of the British movement, which has not itself fully revealed its possibilities. If this assumption is correct, it will in time constitute an important contribution to adult education in general and to civic education in particular. Its special significance lies in the fact that it undertakes to impress upon wage earners as a distinct economic class the nature and difficulties of their problems, and to assist them in the formulation of programs for coping with those problems. This fact partially indicates its limitations, for there are many vital public interests in which all citizens are concerned, but which cannot be properly conceived and promoted in terms of class or other special group interests. Workers' education also commonly suffers from limitations characteristic of many other phases

¹² Keppel, F. P., "Education for Adults," *The Yale Review*, April, 1926, p. 4. Hodgen, Margaret T., *Workers' Education in the United States and England* may be recommended for those desiring to acquaint themselves with the history of this movement. Workers' education is growing rapidly, and discussions of current developments are soon out of date. But reliable information may always be procured through the Workers' Education Bureau of America, 476 West 24th Street, New York.

of adult education. These may be recapitulated as lack of organic connection with practical affairs, inadequate grounding in the underlying scientific disciplines, the impermanence of the student personnel, and the intermittent, unintensive character of the educational work itself.

The last agency of adult education to be treated here is the library. It is perhaps the most important of all, and certainly one upon which all other agencies are dependent. The libraries are beginning to fit themselves into the new movement for adult education, and beyond question they have an important part to play therein. Mr. Carl H. Milam, Secretary of the American Library Association, indicates the place of the library in this movement as follows: ¹³

We have looked into the opportunities for adult education which are offered, many of which have been described briefly this morning. We think we see a good many hundreds of people who are not being touched. We think we have evidence that a good many of these people will not like even the little formality that goes with some of the agencies described. We think there may be a good many people who will want to study independently of any class or organization or teacher. A good many of them are studying in this way at the present time.

Among the methods advocated or actually applied in serving students of this class are the engagement of reference assistants specializing on certain sub-

¹³ Speaking before the National Conference on Adult Education at Cleveland, October 16-17, 1925.

jects; departmentalization of the library service with specialists in charge of the various divisions; co-operation of college and university teachers in maintaining a consultation service at stated hours of the week; and the publication of reading indexes prepared by specialists on the topics presented. Libraries are also working out methods of cooperating more effectively with other agencies of adult education, particularly of supplying them with adequate library materials for their work.

These illustrations will suggest the importance of the library as an agency of adult education. Its limitations as such are recognized by library leaders themselves, and are perhaps sufficiently obvious without explicit mention. Its peculiar limitations lie in the absence of discussion and the lack of consecutiveness that usually characterize the studies of isolated individuals preferring the library to the group method. Nevertheless, there are and will continue to be many such individuals, and for them the library is a prime necessity. It is of course a necessity, in a different way, for other adult students as well. The primary function of the library, needless to say, is to make adequate provision of books and journals on all sorts of subjects for all sorts of readers, and to facilitate their use in every way feasible. Relatively few communities in the United States have library facilities coming up to this standard, and a large percentage of our population is without access to library facilities of any sort.

I have attempted tentative estimates of possible contributions by various adult education agencies to the development of citizenship, and a detailed recapitulation of these appraisals by way of conclusion is perhaps unnecessary. One might characterize the types of adult education so far developed as, in general, less systematic, less intensive, less grounded scientifically, less focused on definite objectives, less connected with practical affairs than the citizen's study of his problems must be if he is to cope with them intelligently. While some projects in adult education, such as those of the People's Institute, Pocono People's College and the National League of Women Voters, could not be characterized in all these ways, none of them furnishes a model of what the citizen's education must eventually be, if the possibilities of citizenship are to be realized. Yet all intelligently conceived and competently executed projects in adult civic education are to be welcomed as contributions to the more inclusive, continuous, intensive education of the citizen that is essential, even though those contributions, judged by the standards of that larger effort, are only of a preparatory or auxiliary character.

CHAPTER IX

THE ORGANIZATION OF CITIZENSHIP

CITIZENSHIP in the broad sense affects and is affected by every phase of social life. As conceived here it is the procedure whereby the individual, particularly the adult, controls his social relationships in cooperation with other parties to the same relationships. So conceived, citizenship has its locus not only in the community and the state, but the family, the play group, the school, the church, the press, the theater, the vocation, the economic class, the racial group, the political party and other human associations. It resides in the community and the state in a special sense, however, since they comprehend all the other associations and assume the principal burden of regulating or coordinating them.

The quality of citizenship is affected by the influences centering in these various groups. Even if citizenship be defined with exclusive reference to the community and the state, all these influences still affect its quality, because, together, they mainly make the individual what he is, whether as a citizen or as anything else (his own hereditary endowments apart) ; and, besides, the state and the community are

largely identical in substance with all these, its constituent, associations.

This being true, any program for the reconstruction of citizenship must include proposals for contributory changes in such associations as well as such reconstitutions of the state and the community themselves as may be deemed requisite. In offering here such a program, however, chief emphasis will be given to proposed modifications of the community and the state, because these will provide the most effective instruments for such amendments of the other associations as are demanded by the exigencies of modern citizenship. The most significant change will be the development of a *primary-group* organization of the community and the state, embracing the rank and file of citizens, but including leaders and experts as well. The functions of this group organization will be the systematic study of public questions, and the application of measures for their solution.

Postponing for the present the elaboration of specification for this phase of citizenship organization, we may survey briefly the possible functions of other agencies in the development of the new régime. Probably no particular novelty can be attributed to my observations under this head. They are introduced in order to present a picture of the problem as a whole, of the difficulties that must be faced and of the resources that may be utilized in coping with it.

The family and the home embrace many difficult

problems, some of which will tax all our resources in years to come, if adjustments are to be worked out. The problems peculiar to the family itself will not, however, be treated here, as we are considering it primarily as an agency in the development of a citizenship responsive to all the problems of the citizen, not alone those of the family group.

The family functions in civic matters at present mainly as a transmitter of conventional opinions, traditional attitudes and partisan loyalties. There are of course many exceptions to this rule, and these are encouraging as an indication that family groups generally need not always play the conservative rôle in politics they now do. Nevertheless, the family seems likely to continue in the main as one of the more conventionalizing factors in the civic life of the country, owing largely to the inevitable process of habituation in family attitudes and viewpoints to which the young are normally subjected.

The parent is naturally the dominant factor in these influences. Anything that makes him a more constructive influence will therefore improve the family as an agency in the civic development of the young. His own home, play, school, church, vocational and other associations will have made him what he is in this regard, however acceptable or unacceptable it may be. These influences are partially controllable, and can therefore be reshaped, in some measure, with a view to training parents better as educators of the young in civic and other matters.

The training offered by the public schools in home-making might include instruction of prospective parents in their responsibilities for the civic development of their children. Insofar as the schools may be free to do so, they can impress on their pupils, especially those in high school and college, the importance of training children in cooperativeness, in open-mindedness, and in the suspension of judgments on questions, including political ones, beyond their capacities. It is equally important to teach prospective parents the necessity of encouraging children to assume responsibilities and make decisions not too difficult for them, of stimulating their interest in the welfare of associates beyond the family circle, and of gradually impressing upon them the interdependence of their lives with the lives of other people. This training will of course have reference to civic problems centering in other types of associations as well as in the home itself. It is scarcely necessary to say that boys require it as well as girls, though there will naturally be some differentiation in the training of the two sexes. Obviously, the more thoroughly such instruction is grounded in psychology, sociology, economics, political science and other pertinent intellectual disciplines, the more effective it will be.

The church, the press, the theater and other agencies can of course contribute to the development of parents as civic educators so far as they may be interested in doing so. Perhaps the women's clubs and the parent-teacher associations will eventually

turn their energies in this direction. The field is an open one, and almost anybody may cultivate it who cares to do so.

The school will teach its pupils on their own account as citizens much the same lessons taught them as prospective parents of citizens. Its civic training will of course be broader than its instruction in the civic aspects of child development. It aspires, no doubt, to train the pupil as best it may for the practice of citizenship after the school period is over. In common with many others, including a growing number of teachers, I think this training properly includes *experience* in self-government, especially through extra-curricular activities; the development of the student's interest and initiative by means of his studies; and, particularly, the cultivation of his capacities to solve problems for himself. These features should not perhaps characterize the social studies more than any others.

But serious teaching difficulties arise in connection with these subjects. The consideration of many contemporary social problems necessarily challenges established institutions and conventional opinions accepted by the general public as valid. Experience shows that any real discussion of such questions is apt to provoke opposition in the community, especially on the part of its more influential elements. The schools cannot withstand such opposition, save in limited measure, for they are commonly under the control of just those elements. The issue is really not

raised very often, as teachers themselves usually believe strongly in things as they are, owing to the circumstances of their training and development. But a questioning attitude toward the established order is a prime requisite to successful instruction in the social studies, and might well be weighted as a qualification of candidates for this work.

In any case the question arises as to how the school may, in view of the circumstances, teach those subjects most effectively. The answer, I think, is to be sought in various directions. First, the school might largely confine itself to bringing the student into first-hand contact with the social problems, or types of social problems, he will face as a citizen; developing the meaning of these problems in terms of his own experiences, needs and aspirations; but omitting the contentious aspects of such problems as liable to occasion difficulty. The student's social environment might in this way be made real, interesting and meaningful to him. So far as the maturity of the student permitted, grounding in the principles of sociology, economics and political science could be added. He would thus be prepared in a measure for the realistic study of his problems as a citizen, when he was inducted into adult groups for the purpose. Under competent teachers, this sort of instruction might be quite effective, and should not provoke outside opposition.

Progress beyond that point would be more problematical. If the community generally could be

brought to realize the meaning of free discussion, particularly freedom of teaching, real study of social problems in school would become feasible. This of course would not sanction partisan teaching of controversial views on social problems, but rather their exposition *as* problems, including the impartial presentation of relevant evidence and opinion. This would be the best possible sort of teaching, provided problems were linked up in a meaningful way with life experiences and interests. Needless to say, teachers themselves will need the training requisite to this type of instruction.

It will doubtless take a long time to bring such a development to pass; and in the meanwhile the procedure first indicated would seem to be the more promising one. The more constructive method can of course be followed as community sentiment permits. The group study of civic questions by adults, when it becomes general and systematic, should result in a transformation of community attitudes on this issue, and make unhampered study of social problems in the schools feasible.

Teachers themselves might by organized action do much to uphold professional standards in this as in other matters. That will obviously require autonomous professional associations utilized in the formulation of standards and protection of the teacher's freedom to observe them.

Only general observations on the play group will be offered. Scientific students of child nature agree

that it is a most effective and indeed indispensable agency in the development of initiative, cooperation, loyalty and other character traits, not to mention physical traits quite as important. While there may be little "transfer" of such traits from play to later civic activities, only young people endowed with these traits can develop into competent citizens. We shall doubtless learn more about the civic values of play, as the subject is brought under experimental investigation, and be better able to utilize it in our programs of civic education. The schools are making marked progress in the utilization of play interests and activities for educational purposes, and not least for the "socialization" of the pupil, a prime condition of good citizenship. Since parents direct or influence much of the child's play life, they require training in the proper guidance of play that it may contribute a maximum to the child's development. Finally, the child's spontaneous interest in play might be utilized by both teachers and parents to arouse interest in social problems—of which there are many—that have a bearing on play activities.

A complete inventory of the resources available for purposes of the new citizenship would list the various "social" and fraternal organizations, including a great variety of lodges, orders, clubs and the like. Some of these at least, particularly the women's clubs and men's luncheon clubs, do contribute to the civic development of their members and to the promotion of more or less worthy community enter-

prises. All together, organizations of this class are quite a factor in the civic life of the community. Their main concerns, however, lie in other directions, social, fraternal and cultural interests in the conventional sense receiving the major emphasis in their programs.

I am not prepared to offer any particular specifications for a greater utilization of these agencies in civic undertakings, assuming that such a development would be feasible. Perhaps the civic implications of their major interests could be impressed on their memberships, and their civic activities thus stimulated. The initiative in such a move must obviously rest with members of these organizations who might be interested in this possibility. It appears on the whole, however, that agencies of this class will reflect civic interests already current in the community rather than contribute substantially to their development.

The theater, including both the legitimate stage and the motion picture, is *potentially* a very important instrumentality of civic development. Both are dominated at the present time, however, by commercial interests not concerned, as such, in civic purposes. Nevertheless, they supply about as much drama on social themes as the box office will warrant, though its quality, with honorable exceptions, leaves much to be desired. Their stimulation of demand takes other directions in the main, again because of box-office considerations. There appears to be no

very conclusive evidence that their offerings on social themes are given any strong partisan bias through the pressure of special interests.

Improvement of the theater as a civic agency might be sought in two directions. One is development of the little theater, already flourishing in many communities, as an interpreter of human interests, and incidentally as a competitor of the commercial stage, including the movie. While the little theater could not go much beyond the public taste in its presentation of social themes, it can experiment more freely in this and other directions than can the commercial theater with its much larger investments.

Second, and more important, is cultivation of public taste demanding dramatic interpretations of life's deeper interests and problems, including the social and civic ones. The responsibility for this largely rests on other agencies than the theater itself, especially the school, the press and the church. The little theater, however, may contribute materially to the same object by keeping up with, if not somewhat ahead of, public tastes in this direction. A growing demand of this sort is already making itself felt as regards the motion picture, and many films of a high standard on serious themes are now available. Unfortunately, the problem of their distribution has not yet been worked out.

The movie is being increasingly utilized for educational purposes by various agencies, notably schools and social-work organizations. Its possibilities in the

dramatization or pictorial representation of social and industrial conditions are very great, and these will doubtless be increasingly utilized in the social studies of both children and adults. As civic education develops, the establishment of non-commercial or even commercial concerns for the production of sufficient films suited to this purpose should prove feasible.

The next agency to claim our attention is the church. I am not sure but that at present it would be adjudged, on an impartial appraisal, a civic liability rather than a civic asset. More than any other factor in American life, with the possible exception of race and class, it divides the community into mutually exclusive groups, and in so far blocks the development of community solidarity. This is balanced, in a sense, by its services as an agency of moral instruction, though even here its contribution is limited by its close adherence to the conventional code. It is balanced, too, by its ministration to its members' social interests, in the conventional sense of the term. On the same side of the scale must be put the religious consolations it affords, however little this phase of its service may appeal to the unorthodox. Its stand on science, while divided, would seem to belong on the debit side of the ledger.

Barring many honorable exceptions, its contributions to the civic life of the community—even if we do not balance its group particularism against them—are not very far-reaching. Support of safe and

sane reforms, frequently a strong stand on the popular side of contentious questions, and much rather vague preaching about civic righteousness are typical. A courageous advocacy of unpopular causes, real discussion of unsettling questions, or genuine civic education of the churchgoer is comparatively rare. Tendencies toward a more positive social policy are seen in the fine work of the Federal Council of Churches, the organization of social service commissions in various denominations, the establishment of genuine community churches here and there, the activities of minor denominations with a secular outlook, and perhaps in the progress, such as it is, toward church federation.

On such a balancing of activities and tendencies it would appear that the civic contributions of the church are rather unsubstantial, if not negative, in character. Nor can one see much prospect of its becoming a dynamic force for civic progress in the future. The indications are that it will continue, on the whole, to reflect conventional opinions on moral, political and economic questions. It does that now because its membership is composed, in the main, of conventional people and also because, like the social-work agency, it is dependent on well-to-do people for the major share of its financial support. The influence of these two elements combined prevents the church from grappling with issues that strike at the root of the *status quo*. And, together, they set up a selective process that tends to extrude

from the fellowship of the church both ministers and laymen who would wish the church to adopt a vigorous policy respecting such issues.

There seems to be little likelihood that these basic conditions will change, though of course the particular opinions and attitudes voiced by the church will not remain the same. Whether that be so or not, liberalization of the church's position on social and economic questions could not go very far without a corresponding modification of its views on religious questions; and its liberalization on religious questions would destroy the denominational basis of its existence, and assimilate its functions to those of the community in a secular sense. Such a development would tend to do away with the church as a divisive factor in community life.

If this analysis, here presented schematically, is sound, people with a secular outlook might pursue one of two policies with respect to the church as a civic and social agency: (1) work from the inside to liberalize the church's policy and hence prepare the way for its eventual absorption into the general organization of the community; or (2) concentrate on the development of community organization apart from the church, and thus indirectly promote the same result. The choice between these alternatives is perhaps a matter of taste.

In offering these suggestions, I am not overlooking the possibility that the church has functions to subserve other than those considered so far. It seems

very probable that there will always be many people requiring comforting beliefs on life's deeper problems, assurances that their more idealistic aspirations will eventually be realized, a faith that the injustices and miseries of this world will not be without their compensation. If so, something similar to our present church will have a permanent place in human life. But such a church will contribute relatively little to social progress in a secular sense, and figure but little in community undertakings. This does not mean, of course, that its members will not participate in such undertakings.

Possibilities of the press as a civic agency may next claim our attention. Taking for granted the organization of the press as it now functions, we may proceed at once to a discussion of reforms therein that might be introduced in the interest of the new citizenship. We may exclude from consideration, as impracticable in any immediate future, the "socialization" of the press, that is, its transfer from private to collective ownership and operation.

The dominant section of the press is obviously a phase of commercial enterprise. It thrives as such on large circulations and voluminous advertising. Circulation is promoted by "giving readers what they want" or at least what they like after they try it. They largely want news, real or alleged, of divorce scandals, atrocious crimes, sports events and other "sensational" occurrences, besides comic strips, advice to the lovelorn and other special features. Many,

perhaps most, readers also want a modicum of news on important developments in business, industry, politics and public affairs. But readers with an abnormal appetite for such news are served by newspapers that make a speciality of it. Newspapers in general do not present a balanced, comprehensive account of really important happenings in the world, because it would not be good business to do so. Some of course come much nearer to this than others. The news and editorial articles of almost all are "colored," "selected" or biased, in various degrees, and as a consequence do not supply altogether reliable information on the events they are supposed to report or interpret.

These conditions are determined, roughly speaking, by the interests and abilities of the reader, the pressure of both special-interest and public-interest groups for publicity on their projects, the bias of newspaper owners and writers, and the space demands of the advertiser. Two of these factors are susceptible of partial control: (1) reader's interests and abilities; (2) the bias of newspaper owners and writers.

The first factor must be controlled, if at all, through a more adequate training of the reading public. The school can contribute substantially to this training, but I think chief reliance must be placed on study and discussion groups of adults yet to be established, for only they will be capable of raising the interests and abilities of the masses to the requisite level.

The second factor—the bias of newspaper owners and writers—is partially controllable through the professional training of journalists, through their own self-criticism, and through the criticism of the reading public. The latter will become effective in proportion as the citizen learns, by means of discussion groups or otherwise, to read the newspaper critically, to condemn bias or inaccuracy or triviality therein, and to patronize newspapers that offend least in these respects.

The control of these two factors would effect at least a partial control of the other dominant factors in the newspaper, the pressure of special interests for publicity, and of advertisers for space. By the means suggested, therefore, the newspaper might eventually be made a reasonably satisfactory purveyor of news on events of social significance.

Even now an enterprising newspaper could do much more than is customary to instruct its readers regarding social, economic and political conditions. These conditions can all be interpreted in terms of the reader's interests; and they often lend themselves to dramatic treatment that would be most effective. A wage scale, a tariff schedule, a farmers' co-operative, a program of preventive medicine are all intensely human interests that need only imaginative, dramatic exposition to be as thrilling as a murder story or a victory of the White Sox over the Red Sox. Such a treatment could be made not only interesting but educational in the best sense of the term.

It is scarcely necessary to observe that so long as the newspaper selects and interprets its news as it does now, an opposition press, illustrated by labor and socialist organs, is needed. It is needed because, in effect, the dominant press lends itself to propaganda uses by intrenched interests, which can be counteracted only by propaganda activities on the other side.

Periodical and book publications call for only brief consideration in the present connection. The analysis of the newspaper, with certain qualifications, applies to these sections of the press also. What was said about the education of the reader, the training of the writers, the better exposition of social, economic and political conditions, applies to all alike, though with some differences in emphasis.

There is, it will be agreed, more of a place for the journal or book of opinion than for the newspaper thus characterized. The more vigorously, intelligently and comprehensively divergent opinions on public questions are expounded in books and periodicals, the better. But it is desirable that in all such expositions fact be distinguished from opinion, and opposed opinions adequately stated. Thorough training of readers and establishment of high professional standards for editors and writers are obviously the means to this end.

Laws, traditions and interests controlling the uses of the radio are now in process of rapid evolution, which makes any but general observations on the

radio as a civic agency somewhat hazardous. Not counting the amateur stations, the broadcasting concerns may be roughly divided into the commercial companies, and organizations operating for non-commercial purposes. Commercial concerns derive their revenues from rents and advertising, and recruit their circulation (or audience) through their programs of "attractions." The non-commercial concerns are controlled by various interests, of which, for our purposes, the political and educational are the more significant. The radio listener has of course a greater freedom of choice in bestowing his patronage than has the newspaper reader.

It is desirable that commercial broadcasting stations admitting to their programs matter on controversial public questions should restrict it to news entirely, or, if partisan pronouncements are accepted, that all sides be given a fair hearing. It is also important that the various partisan interests should share equitably in the allocation of wave lengths reserved for this group of interests. These are only partially recognized principles in the use of the radio at the present time, and believers in freedom of discussion have a task of no little difficulty in bringing about their general adoption.

Potentially the most influential factor in the control of broadcasting is the radio listener. He will listen to the sorts of things he now likes to read in his newspaper, so long as his tastes remain the same. No one can compel him to follow a recital of impor-

tant developments in public affairs, or the pros and cons of a debate on some controversial question. Moreover, he cannot discount for the prejudices, inaccuracies or omissions of a radio speaker unless he is trained to do so. The citizen thus needs much the same sort of preparation for radio listening as for newspaper reading. Given such preparation, he would be able, through the pressure of his criticism and his patronage, to correct the abuses of the radio and make it, within its inherent limitations, a consistently serviceable agency of communication. This is the surest, even if the slowest, method of preventing the autocratic control of the radio in behalf of special interests or its less overt manipulation for illegitimate propaganda purposes.

I have now considered the more significant contributions to citizenship of which the home, the school, the play group, the club, the theater, the church, the press and the radio seem capable. There remain to be considered the potential civic functions of the vocation, the economic class, the political party, the social-work agency, the adult education group and certain types of community organization. These would best be treated, however, in connection with the new institutions of citizenship which, as we shall see, are essential to the performance of the citizen's functions. The following chapter will be devoted to this phase of our inquiry.

CHAPTER X

THE ORGANIZATION OF CITIZENSHIP (Continued)

THE *sine qua non* of competent citizenship is continuous, intensive, systematic study of the citizen's problems by the citizen himself. Existing agencies are fulfilling, and are capable of fulfilling, but a small part of this need. The home, school, church, newspaper, radio, vocation, economic class, political party, social-work agency, adult education group and community organization are either concerned with other objects, largely, or they have not at any rate developed an adequate program for the realization of this object.

Theoretically, the political party might have become an agency for civic education but, because citizens were not prepared to operate or control it, it does not now serve this function. The social-work agency engages in educational activities of a special sort, but it does not offer the training in public questions upon which competent citizenship for the masses must be based. Again, adult education includes some training in public affairs, but only a few are equipped by it for the intelligent practice of citizenship. Finally, the community council, neighbor-

hood association, social center and other democratic forms of community organization are contributing to civic education as well as to the practical solution of civic questions, but none of them has yet furnished a model for the larger educational effort that is needed.

I have classified the citizen's problems under three heads: (1) social and economic problems affecting his own personal welfare as a member of the general public; (2) problems of special concern to him as a member of a family, a vocation, an economic class, a church, a race and other social groups; (3) problems of justice or welfare primarily affecting other groups than his own.¹ As I have shown, the citizen must grapple with these problems himself, if they are to be treated in his interest. Moreover, they are so numerous and complex that a great deal of time must be devoted to their study if he is to deal intelligently with them. I have estimated that the requisite study and treatment of these problems will demand two hours of the citizen's time each day on the average. This of course is little more than a rough guess, but it seems as likely to be too low as too high. I have also ventured the opinion that the adult, in order to share fully in our cultural heritage, needs two free hours a day for the study and enjoyment of art, literature, science or anything else that might appeal to him. I mention this suggestion here, because the civic activities of the adult will be more or less closely related

¹ See pp. 124-130 for the elaboration of these distinctions.

in practice to his scientific, æsthetic, and other leisure-time interests. The time demanded by these various interests must obviously be released from vocational and other activities.

How will the two hours devoted to citizenship be utilized? And what type of organization will be essential to its effective utilization? A consideration of the latter question first should give perspective to the discussion of the problem as a whole.

I am persuaded that a *primary-group* organization of citizenship is absolutely necessary if the citizen is to discharge his proper functions in social control. The state and the community are almost wholly *secondary* groups at the present time. The associations or relationships which constitute them are mediated, with relatively unimportant exceptions, by *long-distance* communications—through the newspaper, the postal service, the telephone, the telegraph and the radio—not by face-to-face contacts. It is true that adults have many direct contacts as members of the same neighborhoods, vocations, clubs, audiences and other groups, but they have relatively few as *citizens*.

Exceptions are found in political rallies, conferences of politicians or public officials, meetings of local civic associations, and the like. But the direct contacts of private citizens as citizens are few; and for the most part they are *unorganized*. Contacts among the members of a church or a vocation are far more numerous and much better organized. The

community centers and neighborhood associations are seeking to multiply and organize face-to-face contacts among citizens, but so far they have made little more than a beginning in the requisite primary-group organization of citizenship.

All this means that the citizen as a citizen is isolated, and hence indifferent and ineffective. It largely accounts for the fact that social control has escaped from his hands.

The primary group of citizens is necessary for three reasons: (1) The rank and file of citizens can be stimulated to the requisite activity in public affairs only by means of group meetings and discussions. (2) Only through face-to-face contacts established by this and other means can the *esprit de corps*, the group solidarity, necessary to resolute, concerted action in public affairs be developed. (3) The practical work of competent citizenship includes much co-operative action by groups of citizens, in much the same way as does the work of a trade or an industry.

Assuming the validity of the general proposition, we may proceed to specify the characteristics of citizens' primary groups adapted to the discharge of their functions.

These groups will have definite headquarters or meeting places, just as do churches or other primary groups. In order that they may be properly integrated into larger units, each will function in a definite neighborhood. Available experimental evidence does not warrant any final conclusion on the

question of how the boundaries of such neighborhoods shall be defined; or on the question of the extent to which school buildings will furnish suitable meeting places for primary groups of citizens.

We may next specify the sort of study our groups will need to undertake in order to fulfill their functions. If it be true, as I have contended, that few social problems, especially the difficult ones, can be understood without a fair knowledge of social organization as a whole, the study of that subject will be a necessary foundation for all the other studies. An orientation course in the social sciences will fulfill this requirement. Probably in view of other demands on the citizen, this course should be extended over a period of two years. In addition, a general survey course in the major problems of the citizen—local, national and international—will be needed. Perhaps, for the requisite degree of thoroughness, this too should be extended over a period of two years. Either of these courses might be taken before the other, and both could be taken concurrently by citizens who desired to do so. Both together should give the citizen a fair grasp of his more important problems, and equip him for the more specialized studies he will need to undertake subsequently.

To provide opportunities for the latter, courses on more restricted subjects will be required. Certain significant groups of problems, such as those pertaining to conservation of natural resources, size, distribution and quality of population, agricultural

economics, labor conditions, organization of business and industry, prevention and treatment of disease, use of leisure time, public education, politics and government, and international affairs, might be treated in the more specialized courses. These courses might continue through a year or half-year, depending on the ground to be covered and type of treatment undertaken. Only a limited number of such courses would be given in any one year, but it should be possible through carefully arranged sequences covering a number of years to supply the need for this type of training. Still more specialized studies could be undertaken in response to local demands. Rural and urban groups, for instance, would pursue somewhat differentiated series of special studies. Indeed, all the studies would be planned with special reference to local conditions.

The individual members of a primary group would not necessarily take all the specialized courses offered. The latter would be in the nature of electives, from which choice could be made on the basis of personal interest. The individual would doubtless, as a rule, correlate his special studies with his practical activities in civic affairs.

There will also be a place for general meetings of the group—say once a week—to discuss problems of current interest. These might be open forums led on occasion by outside speakers but perhaps drawing mainly on the group and its director for leadership. Such meetings would serve to keep the entire mem-

bership posted on important developments in public affairs, and give them a better perspective on the special problems in which they were severally interested.

A tentative suggestion might be offered as to the amount of time that could be profitably devoted to group study and discussion of this sort. Perhaps the study groups—those taking systematic courses—might meet once a week for a two-hour period. Each member might be enrolled in one of these groups. The forum meetings would be held once a week for two hours, and, according to our specifications, attended by the entire membership. This would make two meetings a week of two hours each for every member. The other eight hours devoted weekly to civic activities might perhaps be about equally divided between reading, some of it in preparation for the study meetings, and practical work of various sorts, such as will be discussed presently.

Except for centers with large memberships, one person should be able to direct all the educational activities. He or she would give the general courses in social organization and social problems; direct forum meetings; and devote, say, two evenings a week to courses in special subjects. This would be enough work for one individual, in view of the preparation required and the exacting nature of the work itself. If less time were devoted to the educational activities, the leader in charge could take part in the practical committee work, while if more edu-

cational service were needed, assistance could be provided.

The specific character of these suggestions does not imply rigid uniformity in the organization and activity of different primary groups. Their work should in fact be adapted to local circumstances, and the needs of their members. The general courses would not, for instance, be needed by members who had taken the equivalent thereof in high school or college, and likewise as regards specialized courses. Again, group meetings would be scheduled for afternoon hours, where housewives or others could not attend evening meetings. Also, the educational leaders could specialize in their work by each serving two or more groups in particular subjects, which would of course mean that the educational work of such a group would be in charge of two or more leaders. Variations in such matters would be the normal thing.

I have suggested that the practical activities of the citizen under the proposed régime include (1) the formulation of his judgments on public questions and communication thereof to officials responsible for the treatment of these questions; (2) selection of agents (officials) for execution of the citizen's policies on public questions, involving the investigation of candidates' qualifications, and evaluation of the records of those already intrusted with public responsibilities; (3) performance of certain types of public service in the local community, such as check-

ing up on law enforcement, cooperation in investigating conditions needing attention, acting in an advisory capacity to government departments, and the like; (4) participation in the work of agencies promoting special programs, such, for example, as social-work organizations interested in housing, public health or leisure-time problems.

Activities of this character must of course be organized, if they are to be effective. They will be conducted largely by special or standing committees charged with particular functions, but under the control of the local primary groups and the larger units into which they are integrated. The weekly meetings of the local group would furnish suitable occasions for the appointment of committees, presentation of reports, deliberation on committee recommendations, further delegation of committee responsibilities, and adoption of resolutions on public questions upon which the group wished to express itself. A constitution and by-laws controlling the selection of committees, election of officers, and general procedures employed in the work would obviously be necessary. A director or secretary to facilitate committee work, conduct correspondence, and take charge of other administrative details would be required. Perhaps the average group would have sufficient work of this character to occupy the full time of an executive officer.

Little need be said regarding types of federative

organization required for action on public questions affecting political units embracing a number of primary groups. Such organization would clearly be necessary for action on state and national problems, as well as on problems of local communities with considerable populations. The federations for these various units would of course be controlled by committees representative of the local groups, and selected by the latter. Whether the officers and committees of the larger federations should be directly selected by the individual members, or by delegates chosen for this and other functions, is a question upon which it is not now necessary to pronounce. Conventions of the federative units could be arranged as desired.

There should of course be provision for unified action by the constituent units of these federations, on questions of common concern. This would involve, among other things, a discussion of common problems and action on proposed policies respecting them. The initiative could be utilized in the selection of questions for discussion and in the submission of policies thereon for decisions by the membership. Questions delegated to officials for decision could be reviewed by the members through use of the referendum. Coordination of the committee work undertaken by local groups, especially that dealing with problems of wide scope, could be worked out through the federative organizations. Each of the various

units would so plan its activities that all the citizen's problems coming within its purview received the necessary attention.

The proposal that citizens thus organized select agents—legislative and executive—to carry out their mandates raises the question of the rôle to be played by political parties under the new régime. This question might be waived as not of immediate importance, but as it would probably arise rather early in local communities developing citizenship organizations, some speculations on it may be offered.

Citizens' organizations of the type described would be quite well adapted to the selection of candidates for public office, as their local meetings, delegate conventions and balloting procedures could be readily utilized for this purpose. They could not of course make formal choices unless they secured official recognition as a political party or as the organized electorate. Prior to such recognition the citizens' groups could function by participating in the primaries of the established parties and in the ensuing general elections, thus promoting the selection and election of acceptable candidates.

The effectiveness of these methods would depend on a number of factors. The most important perhaps would be the numerical strength of the citizens' organizations compared with the active electorate not enrolled therein. Another would be the initiative and energy exercised by the citizens' organizations in the choice of candidates and promotion of their

election. Still another would be the influence exerted by professional politicians on the choice of candidates by the citizens.

Should citizens' organizations of the type described enroll a preponderant number of the active voters and serve as their medium for political action, parties as we know them would probably disappear. Citizens who formulated their mandates on public questions and chose representatives for the execution thereof, in the ways indicated, would have no use for party organizations of the prevailing type. Public policies would be formulated by the citizens themselves, not party committees chosen by politicians; and candidates would be chosen by citizens also, not primaries or conventions controlled by politicians. And if the citizens' organizations controlled a majority of the voters, they would elect their own candidates to carry out their policies.

There would naturally be differences of opinion on public policies, but, under the régime depicted, these would hardly occasion political cleavages of the sort represented by party organizations. The differences would be on specific questions, and citizens could not be marshalled into distinct political camps on such a basis, since they would divide differently on different questions. Practical decisions on such questions would be effected through the initiative and referendum, or left to the discretion of elected representatives, subject to review by the citizens. And unless considerations of patronage should dominate, and give rise

to political machines, officials would be chosen by the citizens' organizations themselves without the intervention of political parties. The citizen would be concerned primarily with the qualifications of the candidate for the particular office, including his attitude on the policies involved therein, his ability as an executive, his skill in drafting legislation, and the like, and this in itself would not encourage the development of party organizations.

Citizens thus functioning would naturally be interested in such matters as the democratization of procedures for constitutional amendment, the allocation of powers to federal, state and local governments, the coordination of legislative, executive and judicial functions, the initiative, referendum and recall, proportional representation, the short ballot and extension of the merit system in the civil service. It is unnecessary to attempt here a forecast of their action on these matters. Such problems are of distinctly secondary importance, because citizens functioning in the way described would be able to dispose of them in their own interest. The unused political power already accessible to the citizen is sufficient to keep him employed, and at important tasks, indefinitely. And if he develops the initiative and ability to perform these tasks acceptably he will have little difficulty in enlarging his powers as needed through the requisite reconstruction of his political institutions.

The citizen's problems, according to our definition,

include not only those coming under the jurisdiction of the state, but also those dealt with primarily by the family, the vocation, the economic class and other special-interest groups of which he is a member. To simplify the discussion these problems were not explicitly treated in our formulation of specifications for the organization of citizenship. Procedures for dealing with this class of problems may now be considered.

Problems of the family will detain us only a moment. They would be a proper subject of study by the citizens' organizations already described, and problems requiring attention by legislative or other public agencies would be handled according to the regular procedures of those organizations. Special machinery for the treatment of family problems need not be considered here. It may be added, however, that family interests would not occasion deep cleavages among the membership of the citizens' organization any more than would, for instance, public health or recreational interests.

It would be very different with problems arising out of vocational, class and racial interests. These interests are often very divisive in their influences, and especially in communities where different vocations, races and classes are found in considerable numbers. This condition will be of vital concern to the citizens' organizations for two reasons: (1) Where attitudes of different races, classes and vocations toward one another are markedly antagonistic or uncooperative,

the development of inclusive or representative primary groups will be difficult. (2) The citizens' organizations will have difficulty dealing with the questions at issue between antagonistic groups, even though vital public interests are at stake.

No one method will be generally applicable in coping with the first difficulty. In some parts of the country Negroes will necessarily be excluded from groups including white persons; in other parts groups including members of both races could be formed by restricting them to those willing thus to associate together; in still other parts no difficulty would arise from this source. Feeling between employers and employees or members of other distinct classes is rarely so strong, though their direct contacts in primary groups of citizens would often be uncongenial to them. There is little antagonistic feeling between members of different vocations, normally, but personal association of those widely separated in education, wealth or social position would not, I suppose, be particularly inviting, as a rule. Clearly, tact and a careful weighing of many ticklish questions will be necessary to the development of harmonious citizens' groups composed of such heterogeneous elements. Yet those to whom the purposes of such groups appealed would probably be less affected than others by these differences. And it should be possible, despite these conditions, gradually to include in their fellowship the great majority of serious-minded people in the community.

The policy of the citizens' organizations toward issues between employers and employees, farm owners and tenants, whites and blacks, and other more or less antagonistic groups should, I think, be a judicious mixture of neutrality and active interest. The primary group might well study such issues, but citizens' organizations generally would best confine their action to questions properly coming within the jurisdiction of the state. The dividing line between issues properly subject to and exempt from such control is of course not clear, and I shall not attempt to make it clearer here. But to illustrate the point by some clear-cut examples, the citizens' organization could appropriately make recommendations regarding an eight-hour law for women workers or a system of unemployment insurance, but could hardly do so regarding the issues involved in an industrial dispute. Nevertheless, group discussion of the more contentious issues would contribute to the formation of public opinion thereon, and thus indirectly affect their settlement. In the long run this would probably be the most effective policy for these questions.

But the citizens' organization would be specially interested in the proper delimitation of state authority respecting questions of this order. It would be quite as important to deny the state jurisdiction over questions it could not deal with successfully, on account of the pressure of special interests, as to urge upon it the assumption of jurisdiction over questions

it could handle more competently than could other agencies.

The organization of employers, wage earners, farmers and other economic groups for the promotion of their special interests, whether through political action or otherwise, might be expected under the new régime. And such organizations would doubtless study their problems on their own initiative, apart from the educational activities of the citizens' groups.

It is perhaps not of great consequence whether these organizations should have their headquarters in the same buildings as the citizens' groups, though there would be some advantages in such an arrangement. It would enhance the importance of the civic center, encourage friendly intercourse between citizens divided by their interests, and thus contribute to community solidarity. We might expect, in any case, that the educational influences of the primary groups would in large measure socialize the attitudes of different vocations, classes and races toward one another, and thus foster more amicable adjustments of issues upon which they might divide.

We may now consider briefly the relation of citizens' organizations to prevailing types of social work, community organization and adult education. Their interrelationships will be the outcome of gradual processes of accommodation and, so to speak, the survival of the agencies best adapted to the conditions.

Social-work agencies will continue to function

much as they do now until the influence of the citizens' organizations, and especially of their educational activities, becomes a dominant factor in public affairs. Then the public, or an influential part of it, will have developed an understanding and appreciation of the more constructive social-work programs, and thus be prepared to support them, both by the contribution of funds for their promotion, and by their indorsement as against antagonistic special interests. The influence of the citizens' organizations at any given time will of course depend on the extent to which the public has been educated through their efforts, the influence they may exert on the purposes and methods of special interests themselves, and the skill and energy with which social-work agencies promote their programs.

One could hardly tell in advance whether social-work agencies will be supplanted in greater or lesser measure by the citizens' organizations, or, if they shall continue to flourish, what sort of organic connection between the two forms of organization will be developed. It will depend on the successes achieved by the two in the treatment of social problems. Each may demonstrate superiorities over the other in specific directions. For example, the specialized, decentralized type of effort characteristic of the social-work agency might prove better adapted to the promotion of practical programs than the more closely coordinated efforts of the citizens' organizations, while the latter would be likely to prove themselves

superior as agencies of civic education, besides having a free field as regards the selection and control of public officials, so far as any competition from the social-work agency was concerned. All such questions would of course be settled by actual experience. We might expect that, in any case, the social-work agency under the new régime would become a more democratic and effective instrument of public service than it is at present.

A similar analysis applies to types of community organization applied to the activities of social-work agencies. The more democratic types, illustrated by community councils or clubs, neighborhood associations, community centers and federations of women's clubs, would be related in various ways to the citizens' organizations. Primary groups of citizens as here depicted would represent a systematic, intensive development of community centers and neighborhood associations, and, so far as successful, would tend to supplant or absorb the latter. The same statement applies to the more democratic community councils and clubs. The less democratic ones would often resist absorption into the citizens' organizations, and only experience would show what functions, if any, they could perform better than the latter. Federations of churches, women's clubs and other specialized associations would doubtless continue to thrive, since they would serve functions not undertaken by the citizens' organizations. Their civic work, however, would be coordinated, as

seemed expedient, with the activities of those organizations. Their support of the latter would be important, of course, and should be readily secured in view of the fact that their respective memberships would be largely identical.

Much of the same general analysis applies also to independent adult education enterprises. In so far as the citizens' organizations supplied the need for adult civic education, independent contributions thereto would not be demanded. Again, only experience can tell what the relationships between the citizens' organizations and independent agencies in this field will be. Our primary groups are expressly designed to supply the major share of the adult civic education needed, but it is quite likely that other agencies, such as libraries, independent schools and university extension departments, will contribute a substantial share of it. But their efforts should be closely coordinated with the activities of the citizens' organizations, especially since the latter will provide the connecting link between civic education and civic action. It may be suggested also that, so far as feasible, there would be advantages in housing the citizens' organizations and independent adult education enterprises in the same buildings. This would facilitate contacts, enhance the popularity of the civic centers and reduce overhead expenses.

As the citizens' groups increased in number, certain auxiliary services would be desirable, if not indispensable. One of these is a well-organized in-

formation service on public affairs.² The primary groups and their various federations would require, for their best functioning, intelligible, up-to-date information on the problems coming within their purview. Such information, to be most serviceable, would have to be compiled for this specific purpose.

The service could be rendered most acceptably by agencies established for this special function. Their work would be to collate information from the thousand and one sources thereof, and organize it systematically in the form best adapted to the citizen's needs. Probably this service should be unified for the several political units under which public functions are organized; that is, there would be separate information services for the nation at large, the several states, and the various local communities. The service would not be confined, however, to subjects coming under the jurisdiction of the different political units as such, but would embrace all the problems of citizens within their territories. Coordination of the various services would of course be desirable.

Where adequate information for the citizen's purposes was not available, it would be the function of the information service to arrange for the investigations necessary to secure it, either by other agencies or by its own staff. The chief burden of such investigations would necessarily be shifted to

² Cf. Lippmann, W., *Public Opinion*, Chaps. XXVI, XXVII.

other agencies, since the information service itself could assume only a small share of it.

Needless to say, this work would have to be done in a painstaking, objective manner for it to accomplish its purpose. The materials prepared for the citizen's use would be presented in various forms as required. Comprehensive compendiums of information, systematic discussions of specific problems, and announcements of current developments in public affairs would be among them. The style and format of such publications should be designed with great care, as a means of stimulating the citizen's interest in his problems.

The development of an adequate information service would necessarily be a gradual process, as only fragmentary beginnings in that direction have been made so far. The responsibility for this enterprise would probably have to be assumed in the beginning by the citizens' organizations themselves, as it would require time to arrange with governmental agencies to undertake it. But great caution should be exercised in turning it over to the latter, in order that its essential standards might not be compromised. When governmental agencies were prepared to maintain those standards, however, they could render the service better than could the citizens' organizations, because of their superior resources.

The citizens' study groups will also require, for

the best work, a type of textbook different from those now on the market. A demand for more suitable texts has already been expressed by workers' classes and other adult groups engaged in serious study. Writers and publishers are now beginning to supply this demand. Fortunately, the publishing business may be relied on to supply suitable texts for adult groups as fast as their publication becomes profitable. Some publishers are now experimenting with cheap editions of texts suited to adult study groups.

Citizens devoted to the serious study of public questions will doubtless demand something different in the way of newspapers, journals of opinion and periodical reviews of current events. This demand will not call so much for entirely new types of publications as for a more extensive patronage of types already adapted to it. Nevertheless, publications best suited to the needs of the new citizen may not closely approximate any of the better types now produced, as these are adapted to highly selected constituencies that may not be representative of the much larger body of citizens seriously devoted to public affairs under the new régime. It seems likely, however, that publications of new types that may be demanded could be supported by the citizen's patronage, together with the advertising business based thereon.

The radio would be a very serviceable agency in the work of the citizens' organizations, both for the prompt communication of events of special in-

terest to them, and for the expeditious transmission of dispatches from the federations to their constituent organizations. Prompt, concerted action by the various organizations—for which there would be many occasions—should be possible through such a use of the radio.

Except for a tentative suggestion that suffrage be limited to those qualified for the functions it involves—a suggestion developed in the following chapter—the elaboration of my proposals for the establishment of new citizenship institutions has now been completed. The chief innovation proposed is the development of a primary-group organization of the community and state, the groups contemplated to be open to all persons qualified for the suffrage, and perhaps to interested young people who have not reached voting age.

The development of such organization would convert the state and community from secondary to intermediate groups.³ An intermediate group, it may be explained, is one wherein communication is not predominantly of the direct, face-to-face type, as in primary groups, nor of the indirect, long-distance type, as in secondary groups, but of both types combined, each serving indispensable functions in the activities of the group. By the development of a

³The concept of intermediate groups was, I understand, first clearly formulated by Smith, W. R., *An Introduction to Educational Sociology*, Chap. III. The concept has been further elaborated by Good, Alvin, *Sociology and Education*, pp. 73-78.

primary-group organization, the state and community would become intermediate groups similar, in this respect, to the school, the church, the vocation and the economic class.

The basic function of the primary group will be the study and discussion of civic questions. But this function, while valuable in itself, will be instrumental to more practical ones, namely, the formulation of policies on those questions, and execution thereof through machinery established for the purpose, the latter function involving the selection by the citizen himself, through his organizations, of the officials responsible for the elaboration and application of public policies. Moreover, according to our specifications, the private citizen would cooperate in the execution of his mandates by assisting in inspections, investigations and other public services in his local community.

For the performance of these functions, federative organizations of the primary groups by local communities, states, the nation at large, and perhaps intermediate units will be required. These federative organizations, while coordinating as may be requisite the study activities of the primary groups, will be chiefly concerned in the organization of the citizen's more practical activities, including the formulation of public policies, and the selection of public officials.

Certain auxiliary services will be valuable if not

indispensable to these organizations. The chief one is an information service to supply the citizen the requisite information on his problems. Another is a radio service to facilitate the transmission of intelligence, and prompt, concerted action on the part of the various organizations. Other auxiliary services, including the provision of suitable textbooks, periodicals and newspapers, could probably be supplied through established channels in response to citizen demand.

The potential contributions of existing agencies to the new citizenship, and possible relations between them and the proposed institutions have been discussed. The home, the school, the play group, the club, the theater, the church, the press, the vocation, the economic class, the social-work agency, the community organization and the independent adult education agency were all considered in this connection. That discussion need not be recapitulated here, but much of it has an important bearing on the main proposals.

Now, the régime of citizenship here pictured may be pure utopia, as I have already admitted. But, also, it may not. It is probably neither a pure utopia nor altogether a potential reality. A substantial part of it is, I think, practical. Put in logical terms, the proposition that such a régime might be established is a hypothetical one that cannot be conclusively verified or refuted at present, but is partially sup-

ported and partially contradicted by the available evidence. A decisive test can be applied only through experimentation.

Experimentation for this purpose I now propose. The stakes of success are so great that every responsible citizen, whether social scientist or layman, might well be eager to give it such a test. One of the issues at stake is whether democracy—not its form—is possible. It would seem patent to anyone who has contemplated our own alleged democracy, and the democracies of other peoples, that only through some such effort as has been proposed is real democracy possible. And there are all the other issues that hinge on this one—a decent standard of living for the masses, a more general participation in the higher interests of life, the alleviation of class, racial and international conflicts, and many others.

I am going to offer some tentative specifications for experiments designed to test the most crucial of the proposals, that contemplating the development of primary groups of citizens. The program as a whole will stand or fall with this proposal, and for that reason it merits the most searching and painstaking investigation. In presenting suggestions for such an investigation, I shall consider certain practical questions pertaining to this part of the program that have received only incidental treatment thus far.

I would propose carefully planned, adequately financed attempts to develop primary groups of citi-

zens in a number of typical American communities. These should include at least a large-city neighborhood, a village or small-town community, and an open-country community. Experiments in selected communities representing distinct varieties of these main types would also be very desirable. I would suggest that communities be selected for experiment that already have more or less developed community centers and civic agencies, because the conditions there would be more favorable, and the experiments, if successful, would open up a growing field for the extension of the new type of organization. It would be very desirable, however, to test the program in communities where such developments have not occurred. I think a considerable period of time—say from five to ten years—would be required for experiments yielding decisive results.

In these experiments major emphasis should perhaps be given to group study and discussion of public questions, though the more practical functions of citizenship organization should also be tested, so far as feasible, especially since that would add interest and meaning to the educational efforts. But the exercise of electoral functions might at first be hazardous, and should in any case be planned with great care.

Included in the experimental program should be a variety of social, recreational and educational activities not civic in character, which, besides being valuable in themselves, would assist in attracting

people to the center. These might well include concerts, recitals, community sings, plays, moving pictures, pageants, festivals, dances, banquets, library services and classes or study groups in various subjects likely to be of interest. Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts, Camp Fire Girls, labor unions, business men's associations, professional groups, lodges, women's clubs and other organizations might be encouraged to meet at the center. Musical, dramatic and other kinds of entertainment offered would be supplied in part by groups of amateurs encouraged to affiliate themselves with the center, though professional talent should be utilized so far as might be deemed necessary to enhance the attractiveness of the center. However, it would be unwise to set a standard for the activities of the experimental centers that would not be generally practicable, as this would cast doubt on the validity of the experimental results, if these should be of a positive nature.⁴

The directors of these experiments should of course be most carefully chosen. The staff of an experimental center should probably include a leader for the group studies and discussions, a director of the more practical activities, including the non-civic activities requiring supervision, and an office secretary. Qualifications for the first two positions should

⁴The non-civic features of the experimental centers are to be patterned, according to the specifications, after the corresponding features of the more attractive community centers already developed.

be formulated with care before candidates are considered. The undeniably difficult pedagogical problems involved in the contemplated activities of the primary groups ⁵ should weigh heavily in the formulation of qualifications and the consideration of candidates. Both the educational leader and the director of practical work should be endowed with appealing traits of personality, thoroughly grounded in the practical side of social psychology, well versed in expedients for stimulating interest in civic questions, resourceful in grappling with unforeseen problems, interested in the outcome of the experiments, and equipped with the requisite executive ability to discharge the responsibilities of their positions. These are, of course, exacting qualifications, but primary groups of citizens cannot be successfully developed and maintained without leaders so endowed. Yet it would be unwise to set a standard of leadership for the experimental centers that would not be generally applicable, eventually, as that would cast doubt on the value of the experimental results.

The meeting places of the experimental groups should also be selected with care. No one can tell in advance whether public school buildings will be both suitable and available for the activities of such groups. We do not know whether the type of study and activity contemplated for these groups will be

⁵ See pp. 146-152.

likely to commend itself sufficiently to the educational authorities and the general public for them to approve such a use of school property. Obviously, this question is more likely to be decided in the negative while the primary groups are being established than after they shall have become a dominant or influential element in community affairs. There is also the question whether school buildings, even those designed with these uses in view, can, so to speak, have the "atmosphere" congenial to this type of effort.

Clearly, however, it is most desirable that school buildings be utilized for the activities of primary groups, if feasible; and thorough attempts should be made to test this possibility. The question cannot be settled for the country generally by experimental centers in a few school buildings, but must necessarily be decided by practical experience in a great many communities. Yet experimental centers could throw some light on it and, in addition, test the suitability of school architecture for primary-group activities of the kind contemplated. For this purpose various types of school buildings presumably adapted to such activities should be selected for the experimental centers. It would be well, in addition, to house some of the experimental centers in buildings constructed for the purpose, and expressly designed to throw light on the architectural problems involved in the general program.

The experience of the Danish folk high schools

suggests that younger citizens are more likely than older ones to be interested in the opportunities offered by the proposed primary groups of citizens. Those schools have discovered that it is wise to admit as students only young people between eighteen and twenty-five years of age. While this precedent could not be followed in the organization of citizens' primary groups in the United States, it may carry a valuable lesson for us, as the objectives of these groups would have much in common with those of the Danish schools. It would seem at least to suggest the advisability of giving special attention to young people of the same age-group. Their interests are not crystallized, their idealistic aspirations are running at high tide, and many of them have developed an enthusiasm for public service, all of which should make them specially susceptible to the appeal of the citizens' primary group. These groups would certainly furnish a goodly number of them a very welcome civic home, if one may thus express it. Moreover, recent high-school and college experiences should have enhanced these considerations, in the case of many young people, and prepared them to participate with some skill and intelligence in the activities of such groups.

I would suggest, therefore, that the leaders of the experimental groups give particular attention to young people of this age, though at the same time inviting and even urging the participation of the older people. Not unlikely the primary groups will

be recruited mainly by attracting young people of this age and of course making their membership therein permanent.

The problem of finance should not be a difficult one, so far as experimental centers are concerned. Perhaps the most likely source of funds will be certain large foundations whose purposes could be interpreted to embrace such a project. But these experiments would be amply justified as projects in pure research, and should indeed have that character, under whatever auspices conducted. They would therefore properly come within the scope of research interests promoted by social science departments of colleges or universities. One or more of the special research organizations in this field, such as the Social Science Research Council, might well arrange for such experiments. Financial provision might even be made by lay citizens interested in having experimental centers located in their communities. Initiative in any such direction will naturally rest with individuals interested in the possibilities of this proposal.

The experimental centers might throw some light on the question of how the activities of citizens' primary groups generally could be financed, should the feasibility of such groups otherwise be demonstrated by those centers. They could do more or less experimenting with this question after the centers had been firmly established with the aid of funds provided for the experimental period. The possibilities of mem-

bership dues and larger donations from well-to-do persons could be more or less thoroughly tested in the experimental communities which, we have assumed, will be representative of American communities generally.

The financial experience of churches and social-work agencies suggests that adequate funds might generally be secured from the sources indicated; for, although different in vital respects from the proposed citizens' organizations, they are nevertheless sufficiently comparable in aims and methods to make their experience very suggestive. It is suggestive not only of sources that might be drawn upon for financial support, but of dangers and limitations that should be avoided in the handling of this problem. The further the experimental centers could go in exploring such questions the better.

They could hardly arrive at conclusive answers to these questions, however, as a long time will be required for the primary groups to cultivate the interest and loyalty that would ultimately determine the effectiveness of their financial appeal to the public. Time would be required also for discovery of the pitfalls to be avoided in coping with the problem of finance.

The possibility that subventions from the public treasury might supply part of the funds required by the primary groups should not be excluded from consideration. The experience with adult education in Denmark and Great Britain seems to indicate that

this might be utilized as one source of income, but it indicates also that serious dangers and limitations inhere in such a plan. Perhaps it would be wise at first to accept government aid only in the form of use, by the primary groups, of public school buildings—but cautiously—and consider the expediency of subventions from the public treasury only after the citizens' organizations had become sufficiently strong to resist attempts at control which such aid would surely encourage. The experimental centers could throw little or no light on the latter question.

Finally, experimental centers should be located only in communities desirous of having them, and willing to accord them the practical cooperation requisite to the accomplishment of their purposes. A decisive test of these conditions would be willingness of any community considered as a location for a center to raise a reasonable share of the funds required for its maintenance. Moreover, the history of the Cincinnati Social Unit Experiment suggests that the centers should be carefully safeguarded against attack from political or other special interests liable to interfere with the achievement of their objectives.

CHAPTER XI

FUNCTIONAL LIMITATION OF THE SUFFRAGE

THE requirements of competent citizenship in modern society may well prove incompatible with universal adult suffrage, or anything approximating it. A voter cannot be much of a civic asset unless he has a fair grasp of the more important public questions and their implications for political action. Both intelligence and industry are essential to such an understanding, because of the number, complexity and changeability of these questions. Conservation of natural resources, adjustment of the vexed relationships between capital and labor, alleviation of racial and international conflict, to mention only a few of the citizen's many problems, will tax his capacities to the utmost, if he is to make any real contributions to these objectives. A comprehensive inventory of such questions and of the efforts involved in their solution would emphasize the difficulty of the citizen's responsibilities in our society.

I have offered specifications for the organization of the citizen designed to make him a real, not a nominal, factor in the treatment of these questions.

His questions they are, and historical experience offers no warrant for the supposition that they might be treated in his interest except through his own efforts. I have contended that the citizen as such is now a relatively unimportant factor in the disposition of public questions, and that unless some such program as I have proposed is carried out our ideal of political democracy and the hopes based on its realization might as well be abandoned.

The program alluded to calls for the continuous, systematic, intensive study of the citizen's problems, including relevant "scientific" principles, by the citizen himself. This study for psychological reasons must be largely by means of group discussion, if it is to accomplish its object. Local groups of citizens, functioning as a primary-group organization of the community and the state, have been proposed for this purpose. The program also calls for various practical activities by the citizen, including the formulation of policies on public questions, selection of agents—legislative and executive—for the application of those policies, and cooperation in certain types of services in the local community, such as study of law enforcement, inspection of conditions demanding legislative attention, service on committees dealing with community problems, and the like. According to the program, these practical activities will be undertaken by citizens' organizations adapted to the purpose, including the primary groups already mentioned, and federations thereof in local com-

munities, the several states and the nation at large.

I have ventured the opinion that these efforts, to accomplish their objectives, will require, on the average, two hours of the citizen's time every day. It is pretty obvious that, to be effective, they will also require considerable intelligence and a strong sense of civic responsibility on the part of the citizen. This type of interest, intelligence and activity is requisite to competent citizenship in modern society, whatever the nature of the institutions under which it is organized.

In all probability a considerable percentage of adults—and not unlikely a very large percentage—cannot measure up to such a standard. They will fall short because of limited intelligence, insufficient interest or both together. With the most generous allowances for the development of civic interest and intelligence through the school and other educational agencies, we shall still have to assume that many adults will fall short of these requisites for competent citizenship. We do not know *how large* a percentage of the total they will be, because the specific requirements for competent citizenship have not been experimentally determined, and there is now no basis for estimating the percentage of adults that would be capable of meeting these requirements. Discussion of the problem at this time must therefore be of a tentative, speculative nature.

But if and when an intelligent attempt is made to develop a citizenship adapted to its functions,

the question of what policy to adopt regarding adults who do not meet its requirements will become a serious one. A similar question could be raised regarding citizenship as at present practiced, but it would be a much less important one, because citizenship is now relatively inconsequential, considered from the standpoint of its proper functions in social control. Few, very few, citizens would measure up to any acceptable criterion of the citizenship demanded by contemporary conditions.

To set the problem of the future before us in concrete form, let us ask whether, when a systematic, well-conceived effort to create competent citizenship is made, adults should be excluded from the suffrage who cannot meet its requirements. This question implicates a number of specific issues that may be stated at this point in order properly to elaborate the problem as a whole.

One question is that involved in the controversy over the respective influences of heredity and environment in the development of the individual. Applied in a significant form to our problem, the question is whether any considerable percentage of individuals are disqualified by hereditary limitations for the competent practice of citizenship under modern conditions. The environmentalists would hold that only a small percentage, if any, need be excluded by such limitations, because, they contend, such limitations are not very serious, if indeed they exist at all. The biological determinists would hold

the contrary, believing, as they do, that the individual's abilities and achievements are determined primarily by his hereditary endowment, and that a large percentage of individuals are disqualified by hereditary limitations for competent citizenship. There is a position or series of positions between these two, which weight both hereditary and environmental factors in the development of the individual, and which would imply, consequently, that many individuals are more or less disqualified by hereditary limitations for modern citizenship, but that under favorable environmental conditions the number thus disqualified would be far less than under unfavorable conditions. This question is of basic significance for problems of citizenship in general, and it has considerable bearing on the question of adopting functional tests for admission to the suffrage, should that policy be considered.

Another question is whether restriction of the suffrage by the application of such tests would not handicap certain groups in society by reducing their share in ultimate political power, namely, that exercisable by the electorate. Considerable evidence exists that there is an occupational scale of intelligence and other personality traits, and, if this is a fact, occupations would be unequally represented, proportionate to numbers, in an electorate selected by functional tests weighting much the same traits. If this is true of vocational groups, it may be true of economic classes, since the latter are correlated

with certain broad occupational groupings that may occupy definite positions on the occupational scale in question. Not unlikely, groups of other kinds would also be unequally represented in a selected electorate. That might be so, for instance, of different races, sects, parties (as defined by political preferences), and even of the two sexes. The general point of these illustrations is that functional selection of the electorate *might* mean seriously unequal political representation of various social groups, and, so far as they had divergent political aims, handicap the groups with relatively low representation, in their efforts for political action favorable to their interests.

A related question is whether functional selection of the electorate, if it resulted, as might be the case, in exclusion of a large percentage of adults from the suffrage, or even in a serious reduction in the proportionate representation of one or more large classes, might not lead to violent revolt against the system and the social order of which it was a part. If, for instance, farm tenants or wage earners should have only half, or less than half, the representation, proportionate to their numbers, that land-owning farmers or employers had, would that not incite them to revolt against an electoral system, which, according to the older traditions, was grossly unjust to them? This question seems a serious one when it is considered that political equality in the formal sense, though not of great practical

value under present conditions, would probably become an object of passionate devotion, if it should be set aside; and, further, that there would not be wanting leaders to persuade the partially disfranchised classes that the new system was unjust and oppressive to them, whether or no it really was so.

There is also the question whether administration of the system would not be liable to grave abuses, even though all possible safeguards against that contingency had been adopted. The amount of work involved in application of the requisite tests to a large number of candidates for the suffrage would be enormous, and if the machinery was not adapted and the personnel not adequate for this work, it could not be done with the necessary thoroughness. Superficial work would mean erroneous judgments, both affirmative and negative, in individual cases, with the consequent injustices. Moreover, those administering the tests would have their biases and prejudices, which might easily influence their appraisal of candidates whose group connections should arouse them, whether in an adverse or favorable sense. Negroes would hardly be treated with strict impartiality by white examiners, nor wage earners by examiners with middle-class connections. Were abuses of this sort serious, some groups would be materially disadvantaged thereby, and this would tend to arouse discontent with and open revolt against the system.

These various questions are all germane to the

general proposition, and must be examined in its further consideration. We may reserve them for the present, however, and present the more general considerations affecting the problem.

Apart from the objections implied by these questions, a strong case for a functionally selected electorate can be made out. Citizenship is a function or group of functions for which all adults are naturally no more qualified than for any other specific social function. Human beings are probably no more adapted by heredity to the functions of citizenship than to farming or business or professional work; or, changing the type of illustration, to the study of grammar or mathematics. If all human beings should strive strenuously for proficiency in any of these pursuits, and receive the most competent assistance in the attempt, it is certain that many of them would fail. We do not know how large the percentage would be, but all experience indicates that it would be considerable. They would fail because they did not have or could not develop the requisite intelligence or interest for success in the particular pursuit. Put differently, they would not have the complex of specific traits and capacities that alone could qualify them for success in that pursuit.

Exactly the same thing is true of citizenship. With all possible allowances for specialization in the functions of citizenship, and for different degrees of ability and interest requisite to the performance

of the various functions, it will still be true that some human beings—and perhaps a great many—will be unable to develop the qualifications essential to competent citizenship. Otherwise stated, it seems not unlikely that many human beings will be civic liabilities rather than civic assets, if they attempt to participate in citizenship functions, no matter how hard they try, or how much help they receive in trying, to qualify themselves for these functions. Citizenship of an acceptable standard is certainly as exacting as acceptable work in any one of a great many vocations, or as proficiency in any one of numerous studies; and the traits and capacities required for it are probably quite as specific, and *may not be more widely distributed*. The analogy argues that many human beings are disqualified for citizenship just as they are disqualified for specific vocations or studies, and for the *same general*, though for *different specific, reasons*. Directly or indirectly, vocations apply functional tests to candidates for admission thereto, and analogous but generally less rigorous tests are applied to candidates for marriage, for church membership, for admission to a variety of clubs, lodges and associations.

Should not selective tests for the suffrage, comparable in rigor to those applied for the more exacting vocations, be established? This question acquires new meaning when we consider that competent citizenship in modern society is probably as exacting as competent service on the higher voca-

tional levels. It would seem to be as exacting, for instance, as competent service in the skilled industrial or commercial occupations, if not in the professions. I do not of course imply that only the members of such vocations could qualify as citizens. All the capable people are not in those vocations, and, besides, the traits and capacities requisite to competent citizenship are not identical with those essential to any particular vocation, whether of high or low grade. Nevertheless, it would seem that a strong *prima facie* case could be made out for a proposal to establish a functional test for citizenship as rigorous in its way as the tests now applied for admission to various skilled occupations.

Relating the problem to our proposal for the establishment of primary groups of citizens, I would say that an adult who did not have the interest or the intelligence to become a useful participant in the activities of such a group, or in functionally equivalent activities under other auspices, could hardly qualify as a citizen according to any acceptable criterion of good citizenship. Those groups would indeed be effective selective agencies, if generally established, and their studies and practical activities maintained on the proper level. For, according to the specifications laid down for them, they would hardly attract and retain the membership of any except those endowed with considerable intelligence and interest in civic questions, or the capacities for developing such; and these are just

the characteristics that, under a selective system, would qualify a candidate for admission to the 'suffrage.

Intelligence of a relatively high order, at least as regards public questions, is a *sine qua non* of competent citizenship. We cannot yet say just what degrees or sorts of intelligence are requisite, but they are certainly such as a great many adults do not now possess, and, as I think, will not possess under any circumstances. A functional system would be designed to identify the individuals who possessed the requisite degrees and sorts, however great or small their percentage of the adult population might be.

It might be objected that capacity to develop a fair understanding of social, economic and political problems, such as would be systematically studied by primary groups of citizens, would not be a measure of the intellectual capacities requisite to useful citizenship. The claim might be made that a great many, perhaps a large majority, of the adults unable to qualify by this test could nevertheless be trusted to participate usefully in the selection of officials for the formulation and execution of public policies, or in decisions on policies submitted to the electorate through the initiative and referendum. Let us examine these claims.

A voter who could not acquire a fair understanding of tariff, taxation, labor, educational or public health problems would hardly be able to make an

intelligent selection of public agents responsible for the treatment of those problems. In our choice at the polls we wittingly or unwittingly, directly or indirectly, indorse more or less definite policies on just such questions. If we do not understand those questions, we cannot understand the merits and defects of different policies thereon, and cannot know, therefore, what policies to indorse by our votes. The claims of rival candidates and rival parties must necessarily be judged, to no small degree, in terms of their policies on these questions.

But other factors have a bearing on the same problem. One is the qualifications of the candidate for performance of the functions devolving on him with respect to public policies. His training, experience, specific abilities and disabilities are comprised in these qualifications. Appraisal of such qualifications would seem to require as much intelligence and knowledge as decisions on public policies themselves. Another factor is the capacities and limitations of the party as distinct from its candidates. The party's achievements and failures, its alliances with special groups or interests, the merits and demerits of its dominant leaders must all be intelligently weighed if a wise decision on its claim for support is to be made. A decision on this question would seem to be as difficult as judgments on public policies and on individual candidates. It is obvious, of course, that wise decisions on initiative and referendum questions require just the same qualifica-

tions as such decisions on public questions under other circumstances. Understanding of the given questions and policies is essential in each case.

The general conclusion is that competent exercise of any of these major electoral functions requires considerable intelligence, and that this is consequently an indispensable condition of good citizenship. We may assume, without discussion, that the same thing is true of cooperation in the formation of public opinion or in any other civic function involving judgments on difficult questions.

The only possible rebuttal of this argument, so far as I can see, would be one drawn from a consideration of the possibly unequal electoral strength, proportionate to numbers, of economic classes or other groups with divergent political interests. To illustrate it by a hypothetical case (which, however, might be a real one), it could be argued that wage earners who could not vote intelligently at the polls might align themselves with their class anyway, as a result of irrational influences brought to bear on them by their class organizations, and that their support would be essential to needed political action in behalf of their class interests; but that, if the wage-earning class should have a much smaller representation, proportionate to its numbers, than did the opposed class or classes, under a selective electoral system, then this system would correspondingly diminish the political strength of the wage-earning class, and thus perhaps permanently

defeat its legitimate claims to public action in its behalf. Parallel arguments would apply generally to the political relationships between vocations, economic classes, political parties, religious sects and racial groups, so far as proportionately unequal electoral representation thereof might be entailed by a selective system.

This argument raises one of the special questions previously stated, and as we are now ready to consider those questions, we may take up this one first. The question is whether a selective suffrage system would not unjustly handicap various groups in society by reducing their electoral representation and hence their share in ultimate political power. This question implicates another of the special questions, that respecting the relative influence of hereditary and environmental factors in the development of the individual, including his civic development. If the environmentalists are right on that question, then the problem of unequal electoral representation of social groups as entailed by a selective system is not a serious one, since that contingency could be obviated through the requisite control of educational and other environmental factors in the civic development of the individual. But if the biological determinists are right, then this problem is a serious one, for, according to their assumptions, unequal electoral representation of various social groups would surely be entailed by a selective system. Since

this problem is a really serious one, therefore, only if the biological determinists are right in their assumptions, we may base our consideration of it on the supposition (for purposes of the argument) that they *are* right.

A remarkable book by N. J. Lennes¹ will assist us in considering the problem, thus formulated, in relation to vocational groups, and, indirectly, economic classes also.

Lennes argues, with the citation of much supporting evidence, that there is an occupational scale of intelligence; in other words, that different occupations require and in large measure secure workers with different degrees of intelligence, and that the various occupations may be arranged in a continuous scale with reference to the degrees of intelligence requisite to acceptable service therein. This selective sifting of workers according to intelligence has become a fairly general, unobstructed process with the breaking down of caste barriers and equalization of educational opportunity. As a result, superior talent in lower occupational groups, or among the children of workers in those groups, tends to find its way upwards to the place in the occupational scale for which it may be fitted. The children of workers in the upper groups, on the other hand, are generally demoted to lower places in the scale when their talents do not fit them for positions of

¹ *Whither Democracy?*

the grade occupied by their parents (particularly their fathers.) ² Lennes asserts that this selective process is becoming more and more effective with the increasing attention given to the search for talented children and to suitable provision for their training, irrespective of their parents' economic status. The process is far from having developed to its ultimate limits, but Lennes argues with much force that this development is likely to be approximately complete within a comparatively short period of time.

Lennes assumes that intelligence or at least the capacities underlying its development are in large measure hereditary; and he argues on the basis of this assumption that the children of workers in a given vocation are more likely than other children to be endowed with the intellectual capacities and other traits adapting them to that vocation or one near it in the occupational scale of intelligence. He argues, further, that there is a relatively close correlation between occupational groupings, on the one hand, and social classes with their various gradations, on the other hand; and that intermarriage between members of different social classes or

² P. Sorokin's *Social Mobility*, especially Chaps. VI, XVII and XVIII, presents considerable evidence bearing on these assumptions, but it in nowise either substantiates or refutes them. I am not here concerned to test any of Lennes' assumptions, but only to utilize them in the consideration of our special problem.

specific gradations thereof, and hence the mixture of diverse hereditary capacities represented by different occupational groupings, are relatively infrequent. Lennes concludes on these grounds that hereditary occupational and social classes are developing in this and other democratic countries, and that we shall eventually have a sort of caste system, with its different ranks divided by barriers that, unlike those of past systems, cannot be broken down, because based on hereditary (biological) differentiations stabilized by the selective process of vocational placement and the endogamic system of marriage correlated with occupational stratifications. A significant corollary of the theory is that after the occupational castes shall have been completely developed, the lower ones will have virtually no material for leadership within their own ranks, since the stock capable of producing leaders will have found its way into the upper castes. In this respect the system will be quite unlike caste systems of the past, since these were based, not on biological, but on social differences resulting from conquest and other historical circumstances.

In the statistical elaboration of his thesis, Lennes utilizes various occupational classifications already formulated, one of which is that prepared by F. W. Taussig. He attempts a tentative correlation between Taussig's divisions and the occupational scale of intelligence as he elaborates it, and offers an estimate, also tentative in character, of the percent-

ages of workers eligible to, and for the most part destined to reach, the several divisions.

Taussig's classification of occupations recognizes five great divisions which, in order of ability, are (1) the professional, (2) the semi-professional and business, (3) the skilled labor, (4) the semi-skilled to slightly skilled labor, and (5) the common labor. The percentages of all workers which, according to Lennes' estimates, belong to these several classes are 7, 20, 24, 24 and 25, respectively. Data in support of these estimates are prescribed.

He concludes, after an examination of relevant evidence, that the *permanent* memberships of these several classes will have IQ ratings (given in inverse order of ability) of 92 or lower, 92 to 98, 98 to 107, 107 to 117, and 117 or above. It is important to note that these estimates refer to the state of society toward which we are moving, as a result of the selective process of vocational placement, and which, according to Lennes, we are destined to reach in a comparatively short period of time. This development has already gone far, but is by no means complete.

Lennes gives the equivalents of these IQ ratings in terms of school abilities. Of the common labor group, containing 25 per cent of all workers, scarcely any would be able to graduate from a modern high school; of the semi-skilled to slightly skilled group, containing 24 per cent of all workers, about two-thirds, or 16 per cent of the total, would be able

to graduate from high school, though the majority of these would be very poor students; of the skilled labor group, also containing 24 per cent of all workers, one-third would make fair college students, the remainder poor ones. We may omit the characterizations of the other groups in terms of school abilities.

Let us consider these figures in relation to functional tests for the suffrage, and the possibility that such tests would entail unequal electoral representation of vocational and other social groups.

Opinions will differ as to the minimum degree of intelligence that, so far as this factor is concerned, would qualify a person, given the requisite interest and training, for useful citizenship in modern society. It is perhaps fair to say that one who could not, because of limited intelligence, graduate from a high school would hardly be capable of understanding, as a competent citizen must understand, the questions that are passed on, directly or indirectly, at the polls as well as on other occasions. Many of the problems studied by primary groups of citizens, for example, would tax the intellectual abilities of high-school seniors, certainly the poorer ones.

If we may assume, then, that a selective test for admission to the suffrage would exclude practically all who could not graduate from high school, it would exclude virtually all the common labor class and one-third of the semi-skilled to slightly skilled

labor class, or 33 per cent of all workers.³ If that assumption, together with the other assumptions on which the discussion at this point is based, is correct, a selective system of suffrage would thus disfranchise virtually all the members of vocational groups coming within the common labor class, and one-third the members of groups coming within the semi-skilled to slightly skilled labor class. This of course raises the question whether the interests of these groups that depend for recognition on political action would not be seriously, perhaps fatally, prejudiced by a selective suffrage system. That question hinges on the further question whether the political action of these particular vocational groups would in the future tend to favor their own distinctive vocational interests. This latter question is a debatable one, for it is by no means certain that it could be answered either in the affirmative or in the negative. It is significant, however, that the upper vocational groups *within the wage-earning class*—roughly the skilled and semi-skilled groups—have hitherto borne the brunt of the struggle for recognition of the rights of “labor,” whether concerned with class or with specific vocational interests. But there is now no way of settling this question, or the

³ It must be remembered throughout this part of the discussion that we are proceeding on the basis of Lennes' assumptions, and, in particular, that his IQ ratings of the various occupational classes refer to the memberships of these classes after the selective distribution of workers shall have been practically complete.

related question as to the possible effect of a selected suffrage on the interests of vocational groups whose electoral representation was eliminated or greatly reduced by the system.

Economic classes and vocational groups are of course intimately interrelated, and even partially identical. Yet they may be distinguished from each other, economic classes being largely defined with reference to the ownership or non-ownership of capital, and vocational groups with reference to specialized labor functions. So far as they may be legitimately distinguished, the interests of economic classes would appear to be of more fundamental importance in politics than are distinctive vocational interests, especially since the latter are everywhere basically conditioned by the relations existing between economic classes. It is important, therefore, to consider the bearing of a selective suffrage on the interests of economic classes as such, particularly those whose electoral representation might be reduced by that system.

Lenne's estimates may also serve this purpose. While Taussig's occupational classification (as utilized by Lenne) is not strictly correlated with economic-class divisions, it is highly significant for our problem that practically all wage earners fall in the lower three divisions, and the great bulk of the farmers in the third and fourth divisions. One might conjecture on the basis of Lenne's allocation of specific vocational groups to the divisions of the

Taussig scale ⁴—and assuming as before that his IQ ratings for the Taussig divisions are correct and that ability to graduate from high school would be a rough index of the abilities selected by a suffrage test—that not far from one-half of all wage earners would be disfranchised by a selective system. Probably a considerably smaller percentage of farmers would be disfranchised by the system, though it might be quite as high among farm tenants. Consideration of this aspect of the general proposition may be limited to the case of the wage earners, the class whose political interests would be most seriously affected by the system.

Assuming that as many as fifty per cent of all wage earners might be disfranchised by a selective system, how would that affect the interests of the wage-earning class as a whole?

Various considerations not indicated thus far have a bearing on this question. It may be noted, first, that male workers preponderate among the gainfully employed, yet that fact would hardly affect the implications of Lennes' analysis for our problem, as the partisan preferences of men and women are distributed in about the same way, so far as we know, and are probably correlated in much the same way with economic-class divisions and their IQ ratings.

Pertinent to our problem, also, is the fact that political organizations of the wage-earning class

⁴ *Op. cit.*, pp. 54-57.

(roughly the labor and socialist parties) have been unable in any country to attract the support of all or even almost all the members of this class. Though wage earners (and their women folks) preponderate among the adult populations of several countries, as a class they have never attained anywhere a stable and workable political majority. More generally, the correlations between economic-class memberships and political affiliations are everywhere incomplete. Many wage earners support essentially middle-class parties, and many, though a much smaller percentage of, middle-class people support labor or socialist parties. Farmers, whether wisely or unwisely, pretty consistently affiliate themselves with middle-class parties.

We should note, finally, that the distribution of workers among the various occupational classes is not fixed, but constantly changes with the evolution of the industrial arts and the economic system.

All these are variable factors the influence of which cannot be predicted with any degree of reliability. Yet one significant probability stands out very clearly, assuming that some such correlation between occupation and intelligence exists as has been indicated, and that the degree of intelligence requisite to citizenship, under a selective system, would not be less than that specified. This probability is that the proportion of the wage-earning class eligible to the suffrage would be only one-half what it is now, while the eligible proportions

of other classes (with the possible exception of farm tenants) would probably suffer relatively small, if any, reductions. It may readily be inferred that such a reduction would seriously impair the strength of wage earners' political organizations and virtually doom their hopes of ever attaining working majorities. This inference, however, is based on the assumption that the political organizations of labor receive relatively more support from wage earners in the low IQ groups than do middle-class political organizations, and that such would be the case in the future. This assumption is clearly an important one, and deserving of investigation.

Against the assumed reduction in the voting strength of the wage-earning class might be set some compensating advantages. The level of politics *in general* would likely be raised by excluding from any share therein those too unintelligent to act with reference to the real issues involved, rather than irrelevant ones. The treatment of public questions, even those at issue between capital and labor, would probably be more intelligent and efficient, even if the handling of those particular issues were biased in favor of middle-class interests. It is possible that these advantages would outweigh the disadvantages of a selected suffrage, from the standpoint of the wage-earning class itself.

One's position on this question of a selected suffrage in relation to the interests of wage earners

and other economic classes will naturally be determined by the weight given these various considerations, and by one's attitudes toward the several economic classes.

The bearing of such a suffrage on the interests of economic classes would obviously change with basic changes in the economic system. It would be very different, for instance, under private capitalism from what it would under a system in which the collective ownership and control of industrial enterprises was the dominant feature. We can speculate to little purpose on this aspect of the question, but it may at least be pointed out that, should economic classes as such disappear or be greatly reduced in importance, objection to a selected suffrage on the ground of its discrimination against subordinate economic classes would lose all or much of its force. Cleavages on a vocational basis would still remain, however, and a selective system would tend to favor the higher vocational groupings at the expense of the lower ones, so far as contentious issues between them were concerned, while probably conducive to efficiency in the public service generally.

Brief statements relative to other group interests must suffice for our purpose. Partisan political interests are of course correlated to some degree with the interests of economic classes. So far as they are distinct, the influence of a selected suffrage thereon would be salutary. If relatively more Republicans than Democrats, for instance, were excluded from

the suffrage, that would presumably be because more Republicans were not qualified to be members of any party. The Republican machine would be the loser, but the public would stand to gain. Much more significant than the influence of a selected suffrage on the fortunes of rival parties such as we now have would be its adverse effect on machine politics generally. The exclusion of all except qualified adults from the suffrage should give citizens' organizations such as I have proposed a distinct advantage in their competition with partisan political machines and increase their chances of displacing the latter as agencies for the formulation of public policies and for the selection and control of public officials.

According to the more competent opinions on the question of hereditary racial differences, a selected suffrage would not entail seriously unequal electoral representation of different racial groups as such, proportionate to their numbers, provided there was no discrimination in the administration of the functional tests, and provided, further, each racial group had sufficient educational opportunities to prepare for the tests. These provisos, however, could not be taken for granted as regards a large percentage of the Negro population in the United States. Yet the political discriminations against Negroes under a selective system would probably not be more serious than the discriminations under present conditions.

Bearing of the system on religious interests would doubtless be of minor importance, except under unusual circumstances. It would likely conduce to a more rational treatment of religious questions that became involved in politics. Such issues, for instance, as that raised by the fundamentalists regarding the teaching of evolution in public educational institutions, or that by the Ku Klux Klan regarding office-holding by Roman Catholics, would less likely be dominated by prejudice and ignorance than under an unrestricted system of suffrage.

The question whether violent revolution might be encouraged by the formal political inequalities entailed by a selective system of suffrage is closely related to the questions just considered. Dissatisfied racial, religious or partisan groups would not, I think, seriously entertain such a project, because the effect on their interests would scarcely be grave enough for that. Partisan political groups might be an exception, but these could not, I think, make out a plausible *casus belli*, even to their own members.

The case of vocational and class interests is much more serious. Radical leaders of the wage-earning class could plausibly represent the system as another, and an intolerable, instrument of oppression forged by the capitalists to keep the workers in subjection. And, as we have seen, there might be much evidence in support of such a claim. Actual developments would be strongly influenced by alignments

of the electorate on the questions at issue between capitalist and wage-earning classes. Under such an organization of citizenship as I have proposed, undertaking, as it would, the thorough education of the voter in civic questions, the sympathies of an electoral majority *might be* mobilized on the side of the wage earners, so far as their claims were just ones, particularly since only a relatively small minority of the voters would themselves be employers of wage labor. Even those not in sympathy with the claims of labor might regard liberal concessions to them as expedient from the standpoint of their own interests. We cannot of course tell in advance what would be possible in these directions, since no such program of civic education as I have proposed has ever been tested.

Of crucial significance would be the attitude of wage earners *not* disqualified by limited intelligence for the suffrage. Their concern, however great or small, for the interests of the common and slightly skilled labor groups excluded from the suffrage, and the effect this exclusion was deemed to have on their own vocational and class interests, would largely control their attitude. Factors at present indeterminate enter into the problem, so that there is no way of arriving at a reliable conclusion on it. We are pretty safe in saying, however, as regards the contingency of violent revolution, that the criterion for the expediency of a selected suffrage would lie in the attitude toward it of the upper ranks of the

wage-earning class. Their support would be necessary to its adoption in the first place, on account of their numbers; and, for a different reason, to its maintenance afterwards, without incurring the danger of violent revolution. All this on the supposition that a selective suffrage would entail a greatly reduced electoral representation, proportionate to numbers, of the wage-earning class.

The question of assuring an honest and efficient administration of selective tests for admission to the suffrage seems, on the whole, to be one of subordinate importance. Our experience with examinations of candidates for the civil service as well as for admission to the professions and various other skilled occupations furnishes grounds for the belief that suitable tests for the suffrage and fairly impartial administration thereof would be feasible. It would seem possible, for instance, to make their administration sufficiently impersonal to obviate serious discriminations against the members of particular economic, political, religious or racial groups. While administrative machinery alone would not assure strict impartiality, it should be possible to develop traditions and attitudes that would make gross violations of that principle infrequent. The case of Negroes would doubtless be an exception in many parts of the country, unless real tolerance toward them should develop. But political discrimination against them is inevitable in any case, until the white man's attitude undergoes a radical change.

It is tempting to offer specifications for tests that might be applied in the examination of candidates for the suffrage, but only some general observations on the subject will be presented. I should say that such tests should seek rather to determine the candidate's grasp of the more significant public questions, and his ability to think independently about them, than his information on such questions or on the externals of our political institutions. And emphasis would properly be given to the questions or aspects of questions with which he would have to deal as a citizen. Moreover, it would be desirable, if feasible, to evaluate the civic *activities* of the candidate as a part of his examination for the suffrage. Activities depending on exercise of the suffrage itself could not of course be included in this part of the test, but genuine contributions to the public service might nevertheless be made a condition of admission to the suffrage, somewhat after the manner of the Russian Communist Party in imposing a similar condition for admission to its membership.

If not impracticable, re-examinations of those already admitted to the suffrage might be provided in order to test their qualifications for the continued exercise of electoral rights. Failure to keep informed on public affairs, chronic abstention from voting or neglect of other civic responsibilities might, under this plan, be reasons for debarring from the suffrage those already admitted thereto. Such features of a selective system would of course entail an enormous

amount of difficult work, so much so that they might not be feasible; but, if not impracticable for this reason, and if at the same time countenanced by public opinion, they should provide a powerful stimulus to consistently serious participation by the citizen in his responsibilities.

The questions at issue between biological and environmental determinists have a vital bearing, as we saw, on one aspect of a selective suffrage system. This of course concerns the possible effects of such a system on the interests of social groups, particularly subordinate vocational groups and economic classes. A serious problem is not involved here if the environmentalists are right in their assumptions; but such a problem is involved if their opponents are right. Since, as I think, the feasibility of a selective suffrage turns on just this problem, it is perhaps wise to assume the validity of the position taken by the biological determinists, so far as *this* problem is implicated. This has been done in our treatment of the problem, the conclusions of the study by Lennes (a biological determinist) having been utilized for the purpose. Further than this it is unnecessary to go in taking up a position on the issues between environmentalists and biological determinists.

Apart from the bearing of vocational and economic-class interests on the feasibility of a selective suffrage, those issues have no particular significance for that proposition. Should such a system be

adopted, selective tests for the suffrage would not, even if they could, be designed to evaluate hereditary capacities of the candidate nor environmental factors in his development, but rather his abilities and disabilities as a possible citizen, irrespective of the influence therein of hereditary and environmental factors respectively. It would not be necessary to raise or settle any question as to the comparative responsibility of these factors for the candidate's qualifications or disqualifications.

Educational and all other environmental influences should of course be made as conducive as possible to the development of qualifications for the suffrage. It would be specially important that they should be such as not to entail discriminations against the members of particular economic, racial or other groups. But on these principles both environmentalists and biological determinists should be able to agree. And if a really enlightened system of civic education were established, and resulted in a demonstration that hereditary limitations are less serious and general than Lennes, for instance, has represented, or, on the contrary, that they are more so, such a demonstration would be calmly accepted by both camps, so far as their interests were scientific ones.

We are perhaps justified in assuming that a selected suffrage would greatly intensify interest in civic education, and stimulate more adequate provision therefor. It would almost certainly lead to

greater emphasis on the social studies in schools, colleges and universities. It would also, I believe, greatly enhance the appeal of primary groups of citizens, assuming their establishment, and especially of their educational activities. Moreover, it might well stimulate economic classes and perhaps other social groups to cooperate in promoting the civic education and activity of their members, in order that their electoral representation might be a maximum.

It will be seen that in this chapter I have presented a problem and developed some of its implications, but that the problem does not now permit of a definitive solution. Theoretically at least, it is a most important problem, for either the adoption or the rejection of a functional suffrage system will have far-reaching consequences on our social organization, and perhaps on the interests of various social groups. If that be true, exhaustive examination of the system in all its bearings is greatly to be desired.

CHAPTER XII

CONCLUSIONS AND CRITICISMS

ON its critical side our discussion has attempted to account for the impotence of the citizen as a factor in American politics. It has shown that the prevailing traditions, attitudes and interests under which he develops, which he assimilates and which, in fact, become the very substance of his life produce civic incompetency as an inevitable consequence; and because these conditions are overwhelmingly non-civic in character. Obversely, the influences making for civic interest and intelligence are so weak by comparison that competent citizenship is at present impossible, save for the few favored by exceptional endowment or circumstance.

The crucial factor in this situation is primary-group interests and relationships. It is crucial, both in creating the average man's non-civic outlook, and in offering a point of attack for processes of control designed to achieve the opposite result. This is so because, for the masses of people at least, the things with respect to which they become most interested, active and intelligent are those that enter, palpably, into their daily lives, that are discussed with their

companions, that are handled in direct cooperation with their fellows. Our historical development has been such that these are predominantly, almost exclusively, the concerns of the family, the vocation, the economic class, the church, the lodge, the club, the social clique, set or circle, not the concerns of the community, the state, the great society, in which citizenship so largely resides. Why this is so has been set forth summarily, and no doubt partially, in preceding chapters.

Many of the interests now under primary-group control were similarly controlled—or rather their historical counterparts were—before the transformation of society wrought by the industrial revolution had begun. Other interests of the same category, notably vocational and economic ones, developed primary-group organization in response to the direct contacts, the vital needs, the recurrent exigencies in which their participants shared.

That was not so of the community and the state. The pioneering settlement of the country, the expansion of the market, the improvement of communication, the unprecedented specialization of interests transpired to kill off the village community and the local neighborhood as primary control groups; and even where such groups persisted, as the New England town and the Mormon village community, they have been concerned almost exclusively, *as* groups, with local affairs, and scarcely equipped themselves to handle even local problems

quite competently. Elsewhere primary-group organization of the community and state has not developed to take the place of the earlier groups that fell into decay.

This is so because the detailed, day-by-day work of community and state can and must be delegated to special agents; because the consequences of their action are largely indirect, remote, impalpable; because public needs, problems and crises can be handled, after a fashion, by the aforesaid agents, without forcing the rank and file of citizens to "get together" and organize for this purpose.

The state and community differ radically, in these respects, from the family, the vocation and the economic class. Organized effort is literally forced on the memberships of these groups, under penalty of unmistakable want, privation or failure. That is not so of the community and state. Significant in this connection is the fact that the community and the state themselves have come under the control of a special vocation—professional politics—that has developed and flourished so luxuriantly because, under the conditions, the rank and file of citizens could not exercise the control themselves.

Though a primary-group phase of the community and the state has not developed, it is my contention that they are, actually or potentially, as vital a factor in the life of the individual as any of the primary groups to which he now belongs; and that the rôle they inevitably play in his life will not at

the same time be played more or less consistently in his interest unless he himself acts to make it so. I have contended, further, that he cannot develop the interest and intelligence requisite to such action unless he organizes himself into primary groups, together with federative units thereof, for this specific purpose. The family, school, church, vocation and other groups will be largely directed in the future as in the past to different objectives. Efficient citizenship will not come as a by-product of their activities, though they might contribute much to its development.

If these things are so, the proposed experiments with primary groups of citizens, and the requisite federation thereof in larger units, offer a crucial test of the possibility of political democracy. In view of what has been said in previous chapters as to reforms of political machinery, the extension of collective ownership, the development of social work, the experiments in community organization, the movement for adult education and other contributions to civic progress, I believe the results of that test, when made, will give the final answer to the question whether democracy is possible, at least in the present age. If that be so, too much time and effort cannot be spent in making the test a conclusive one.

But this claim is subject to certain qualifications. We may take it for granted that though government might possibly be *of* and *for*, it can never be

by, all the people. Limitations on the number who may really share in government have perhaps been sufficiently suggested in the exacting specifications for a new citizenship as I have formulated them, and particularly in the discussion of a selective suffrage system, in which these limitations were explicitly considered. I think it safe to say, on the other hand, that a more or less considerable percentage of adults can and will achieve competent citizenship when well conceived, systematic efforts to *create* it, such as those proposed, are made. The real issue, then, is not whether democracy in the sense of government by *all* the people is possible; but how large and responsible and competent a ruling class can be developed. Otherwise stated, the issue is whether the "iron law of oligarchy," so impressively expounded by Robert Michels, can be broken, or so transformed that its sinister implications shall no longer obtain.

I have set forth grounds for the hypothesis that this question may be answered, on a crucial test, in an affirmative sense. Even if such an organization of citizenship as is herein proposed should attract to its membership only a comparatively small percentage of adults, it might be able, nevertheless, to revolutionize American politics and at least displace rule by the few *for* the few, with a rule by the few *for* the *many*. There is of course the contrary possibility that, if successful at all, it will itself achieve

oligarchical control no better than that represented by party machines such as we now have.

We may expect that, in any case, opinions will differ widely as to the possibilities of the experimental program here offered. Some perhaps will regard it as a plan likely to prove successful as a means of achieving some approximation to popular government. Others may concede that it offers a desperate last chance of such a consummation. Still others will regard it, in view of the heroic remedies offered, as only another proof that political democracy is impossible under any circumstances.

No one knows which of these positions is the correct one. I have given reasons for my own belief that the plan has a fighting chance of success. These reasons need not be here recapitulated. But I would add to them others not emphasized in the discussion hitherto. The Greek city-state, cooperative Denmark and the Communist Party of Russia would seem to show, in their several ways, that such an organization of citizenship as is here proposed should prove not altogether impracticable. The results of the Cincinnati Social Unit experiment and the less celebrated successes of many rural councils and associations point in the same direction.

The history of the church furnishes still more impressive evidence of a similar import. The goods, the values, the benefits offered by the church have certainly not been more direct and tangible than

those to be achieved through the organization of citizenship. And yet the church has in the past aroused the interest, won the loyalty and elicited the cooperation of the masses to an all but unprecedented degree. Is it a groundless hypothesis that citizenship institutions might achieve a comparable success? The contemplated organization of citizens might indeed be conceived as a sort of modern, secular analogue of the church, and even as its possible successor. Could not the vital secular interests of such an organization become as appealing and compulsive?

As already conceded, however, the answers to these questions are not known. The purpose of this study has indeed been not to answer them, for that is now impossible; but rather to state the questions themselves in a significant form, frame verifiable hypotheses about them, and elaborate an experimental program for testing these hypotheses. All will agree, I suppose, that both in a practical and in a scientific sense these questions are of transcendent importance, and that much is to be gained, and nothing lost, except some illusions, in finding the answers to them. That is the essence of my proposals.

THE END

APPENDIX

THE CITIZEN'S INTEREST IN PUBLIC QUESTIONS

SIGNIFICANT evidence as to the citizen's competency may be found in a consideration of the extent to which political, economic and other social problems are being solved in the practical sense of the term. Obviously, only problems which have been solved in a scientific or intellectual sense could serve this purpose, since problems not solved in that sense could hardly be solved in a practical sense, by applying legislative or other public measures to them. However, it is fair to utilize in this connection problems no solutions of which are as yet *demonstrably* correct, but which have been sufficiently investigated and are of sufficient import to the citizen properly to come within the scope of his interests. Many questions in this category are such that solutions of them can be found only through experiment. That is true, for instance, of the problem of preventing war, and of the problem whether to substitute for private capitalism in industry some one or more forms of collective ownership and operation. Interest in such questions may be quite as important, from the standpoint of public welfare, as interest in questions already solved in the scientific sense.

I propose to utilize the evidence thus afforded as to the citizen's competency in the discharge of his functions. In so doing, problems will be considered which do not come within the purview of political action (save to a limited extent), as well as problems which do come within this cate-

gory. This is because the two classes of problems are bound up together, and because also the education and organization of the citizen for dealing with them could hardly be divided up on the basis of this distinction. Indeed, the concept of citizenship herein assumed embraces the control, by members of the community, of their social relationships in general, not alone those that are subject to the authority of the state as such. We may proceed without further preliminaries to the tests indicated.

Conservation of Natural Resources. Perhaps the conservation of natural resources and the rational treatment of population problems are the phases of social control that strike closest to the foundations of public welfare, since they deal with the primary determinants of individual and social life. The movement for the conservation of natural resources is now of many years' standing. A fairly comprehensive program of conserving resources has been worked out, based on experience in this and other countries, and representing what may fairly be deemed scientific solutions of the problems involved. Numerous conservational problems have not been solved in this sense, but these do not concern us here.

Of the more vital resources, substantial progress has been made in conserving soil fertility and the timber supply. Interest and effort in soil conservation are probably growing, but such appears not to be the case as regards timber conservation. Although the movement for the latter is now about half a century old, it has not attracted sufficient support to protect the country against a severe shortage of timber at some future time, probably within the next twenty-five or fifty years.

Little progress has been made in conserving our power resources. The utilization of water power is now being developed at an encouraging rate, and this will materially lessen the drain on other power resources. There is controversy as to whether this development shall in the future be

under private or public auspices or some combination of the two. The public is moderately alert and interested as regards this particular issue.

Very little has been done, through public action, to conserve our coal supply, other than to administer reserves on the public domain, a small part of the total reserves, with this end in view. The public appears not to be interested in the problem.

Our oil resources have been and are being recklessly squandered, and the virtual exhaustion of these precious resources is only a matter of a few years, according to the most authoritative opinion on the subject. Oil shale seems the most likely source of substitutes for petroleum, after the supply of the latter has been exhausted, but the general public is scarcely aware of its existence or its possibilities, and practically nothing has been done to conserve the reserves of this mineral, though its exploitation has not yet begun.

Little has been done through public action to conserve the reserves of iron, lead, zinc and other metals. The same is true of phosphorus, a most essential ingredient in artificial fertilizers. The public is not interested in the conservation of these resources.

It may be concluded that, in general, the public is largely ignorant and indifferent as to the conservation of our natural resources. Conservation which is to the advantage of special-interest groups is progressing more or less, as in the case of soil fertility and water power. Public interest may be occasionally stimulated by struggles in Congress or elsewhere over the conservation of particular resources, and this is apt to have some practical results, as may be illustrated by the fight for timber conservation under the leadership of Gifford Pinchot, and recent controversies over the utilization of certain water-power resources.

Population Problems. Relatively few population problems have been settled in a scientific sense, and fewer still have

been settled long enough to have afforded the public an opportunity to develop an interest in them. Beyond question it is undesirable for feeble-minded persons to become parents, and this opinion has been established long enough for public opinion and public action to have developed with regard to the problem. Some progress has been made in instituting measures for prevention of propagation by persons of this class, but these measures are very far from adequate, though some states are much more backward than others in this regard. The general public appears not to be interested in the problem.

Most students of population problems are agreed that the practice of birth control is desirable, and that laws forbidding physicians or others to communicate information regarding contraceptives should be repealed. Virtually nothing has been accomplished in this direction, other than agitation by certain organizations aimed at these objectives. The public generally is ignorant or indifferent regarding the problem. A consensus of expert opinion on the subject has been established sufficiently long for public attitudes to have been modified, had other conditions not been unfavorable to this development.

So-called race and immigration problems are intimately related to, and in part identical with, population problems. There is fairly widespread interest in the subject, and much legislation dealing with it has been enacted. It is a fact, however, that public interest and action harmonize only in part with the best scientific opinion on these problems. Prejudice and misinformation are rife in this field.

Regarding many other population problems, the public is profoundly ignorant. The relations of population to natural resources, and of positive to preventive checks on the population, for instance, are beyond its ken, though these are of the most vital import to human beings everywhere.

The Organization of Business and Industry. Many of the problems under this head are highly controversial in char-

acter, and only a relatively few have been definitely settled in a scientific sense.

Only recently has it been conclusively shown that American business and industry are far from being as efficient as they might be. There has hardly been time for the public to inform itself regarding this fact. The possibilities of scientific management, in the sense of the term employed by F. W. Taylor, have long been demonstrated, however, and many business and industrial establishments have adopted that system in greater or lesser measure. Various factors have retarded the application of the system. The public generally is hardly aware that there is any such system, much less of the problems involved in its wider application.

Certain problems in this general field, however, have been rather definitely solved in practice. The Federal Reserve System represents the solution of a problem that had been very difficult and acute. The regulation of railways has become quite effective, within the limits prescribed for it. The regulation of other public utilities has been generally attempted, with widely varying degrees of success, in different states and municipalities. The problem of preventing or controlling monopolies has not been treated so successfully, though it could be argued that substantial progress has been made in this direction. The public is more or less interested in this group of problems, though its understanding of them is quite limited.

Mention may be made of the business cycle and the fluctuating price level as most serious problems which have been intensively investigated by economists for some years past, though the practical problems created thereby have scarcely been solved in a scientific sense. The public is largely ignorant of the nature and significance of these problems.

In the tariff problem we have an issue that has been investigated and discussed during the greater part of our history as a nation, and one, therefore, that furnishes a signif-

icant test of the citizen's competency in dealing with public questions. We could hardly say, perhaps, that it has been completely solved in a scientific sense, as economists differ regarding many of its features. Yet they agree on some important aspects of it, and it would be of interest if we could know to what extent popular opinion accords with the consensus established among that group. No exact study of the subject has been made,¹ but it seems very probable that only a relatively small number of people in this country have anything like a correct understanding of the tariff in relation to the price level, the wage earner's standard of living and, in general, the distribution of income among the various producing classes. I would venture the assertion that not more than one voter in ten—and this seems to me a liberal estimate—has much real understanding of these matters.

The issue of collective *versus* private ownership and control in industry is, of course, an unsettled one, and one that must be settled in the scientific sense, if settled at all, by experiment. The time is ripe for systematic experimentation with this end in view; and extensive experimentation has in fact been undertaken in various parts of the world, including the United States. The issue has been discussed long enough, and it is certainly of sufficient importance, for citizens generally to have developed a definite interest in it, had other conditions favored. Yet relatively few citizens have any genuine interest in it. Those who vote for the Socialistic parties may be presumed to have such an interest; many of those who supported the LaFollette movement in 1924 must also be interested; and, of course, many Republicans and Democrats are interested, too. All these put together might seem to be more than a "relatively few," and yet it is quite certain that only a small fraction of this number have more than a superficial acquaintance with the problem, while many have altogether distorted conceptions of it, due to propaganda against

¹ A limited study is in progress at the University of Kansas.

the "reds" and the "Bolsheviks." The implications, for the general issue, of our own extensive experience in state socialism are not grasped by many people, and the far-reaching significance of the Russian experiment is realized by an even smaller number.

Problems of the Wage Earner. The more important problems under this head pertain to a "living wage," economic security, safe and sanitary working conditions, reasonable hours of labor, special protection of women and minors, and "self-government" in industry. Many of these problems have been settled in a scientific sense, through experiment in this or other countries. Some important problems have not, however, been settled in this sense.

We could hardly say that the problem of a living wage has been thus settled. It has for a long time, however, been intensively investigated and widely discussed, and ample opportunity thus afforded the public to develop an interest in and some understanding of it. Wage earners from the very nature of the case are interested in the problem, and employers are naturally interested in it, too, though for different reasons. No one knows how large a percentage of these and other groups have a measurable *understanding* of the problem, and of the more promising measures whereby it might be solved in a practical sense. My own impression is that the number is relatively very small, even among wage earners themselves. Few people have anything approaching the insight into the problem that, for instance, economists specializing on the labor movement have, yet something like that is necessary for really intelligent action with reference to it, especially so far as the more basic factors therein are concerned.

The problem of eliminating the economic insecurity of the wage earner and his family, so far as this is due to unforeseeable stoppages of the wage income, has been largely solved in the scientific sense, the solutions having been worked out,

for the most part, in Great Britain, Germany and other European countries. These solutions have been available long enough to have been generally applied in practice, and, indeed, attempts have been made for many years past to bring this about.

Substantial progress has resulted from these efforts and other favoring conditions. The principle of "workmen's compensation" for industrial accidents is now generally accepted, and all but a very few states have enacted legislation in application of the principle. Many of these laws are seriously defective, but no doubt steady progress will be made in improving them. Considerable progress has been made, also, in providing for families left without means of support by death of the father, whether or no a member of the wage-earning class. Most states have enacted so-called widows' pension or mothers' aid laws designed to provide for this contingency. In the great majority of these states, however, progress has not gone much beyond the stage of enactment, as in those states few pensions are granted, and most of those granted are very inadequate, compared to the need. Some progress has been made, too, in providing for old age by means of pensions, as a few states have enacted old-age pension laws, and it seems not unlikely that other states will follow^a their example in the near future. It is too early to say how adequate this provision may be.

Insecurity of the wage earner due to sickness and unemployment has, as a problem, scarcely been touched, other than through savings, private insurance, company provisions and trade-union benefits, which are demonstrably quite inadequate to the need. The public appears not to be much concerned in the problem, and few wage earners have manifested any real understanding of it. The unions have generally opposed state insurance for these contingencies, although this is the only type of provision which, as experience elsewhere shows, would be at all adequate.

Substantial progress has been made recently in the establishment of safe and sanitary working conditions, owing largely to pressure upon legislative bodies by organized labor and by a small section of the general public. The United States, however, is far behind the advanced industrial countries of Europe in this regard. A great majority of the public are but little concerned in the matter.

Very great progress has been made in the reduction of the wage earner's working day to reasonable length, due primarily to efforts of the unions, in the case of men, and to organized agitation for legislation in behalf of working women. The public has been moderately interested in the movement, and more or less active in supporting it. Much, of course, still remains to be done in this field.

Less progress has been made in affording woman workers other special protection needed by them. The movement for minimum wage legislation in their behalf has been blocked by a Supreme Court decision, and there is still much to do in the way of prohibiting the employment of married women before and after childbirth, requiring the provision of seats and rest rooms for women workers, and the like. The general public is not much interested.

There has been widespread public interest in the restriction and regulation of child labor. Some states have fairly satisfactory laws on the subject, but many are very backward in regard to it. Experience with the proposed federal amendment illustrates or at least suggests the ease with which the public may be misled on a matter in which it has a genuine interest.

All the wage earner's problems hitherto considered, except that of the living wage, have been settled in the scientific sense, so far as the essential principles are concerned. That is hardly true of self-government in industry, regarded as a problem. The various programs contemplating the substitution of collective for private ownership of industry all

offer solutions of the problem, and other measures not involving so radical a change have been advocated. What was said earlier regarding the issue of collective *vs.* private ownership applies to this problem, so far as that phase of it is concerned. The interest of the public in other possible solutions is not extensive, only a few employers, economists and other students of labor conditions concerning themselves with it.

The labor union has made by far the most important contribution to the solution of the wage earner's problems taken as a whole, though experience has shown pretty conclusively that it cannot successfully cope with all these problems without the support of public opinion and the assistance of the state. Public sympathy with and understanding of labor unions, however, is very limited; nevertheless, it has been a potent factor in the history of the labor movement. But *lack* of sympathy and understanding has apparently had more influence. This is reflected in arbitrary and unfair laws, injunctions and court decisions operating to hamper labor organizations in the use of justifiable methods to improve the lot of their members. Not all action of the state, however, could be thus characterized. The fact that fewer than fifteen per cent of American wage earners are unionized must be put down, in part, to failure of wage earners themselves to understand the historic functions of labor organization. Moreover, it is probably true that relatively few trade unionists have anything like a "scientific conception" of the labor movement, such as social scientists specializing on the subject have developed.

Problems of the Farmer. Evidence indicates extensive public interest in the economic problems of the farmer. The support commanded by recent legislative measures designed to solve these problems, in part, shows a corresponding activity in the farmer's behalf. One gets the impression, however, that certain basic factors in the agricultural situation are not generally understood by the interested public, or even

by farm leaders themselves. These include the inflation of farm values, the injustice to farmers of the general property tax, in view of that inflation, and the inevitable movement of population to urban centers because of the increasing efficiency of agriculture. The phenomenal development of co-operative marketing in recent years and progress in the application of scientific methods to agriculture indicate that farmers themselves are developing an intelligent interest in their economic problems.

Housing Problems. It is pretty clearly established that thoroughgoing legal regulation of housing is necessary if dwellings coming up to acceptable standards of safety, sanitation and convenience are to be assured, especially dwellings purchased or constructed by investors for profit-making purposes. Various states and municipalities have enacted housing legislation aimed at this object. Progress in this direction has, however, been slow. There is controversy among housing experts over the question whether state aid in the form of loans for housing purposes at low interest rates and easy terms of payment is necessary in order to get sufficient houses of a standard type built, and at prices or rents which persons of small incomes can afford. Both these aspects of housing are of very great importance, as it has been estimated that one third of our population live under unsatisfactory housing conditions, and a large percentage of urban families live in rented houses because they are financially unable to acquire homes of their own. There appears to be little public interest in these problems and less understanding of the factors involved. There was of course a temporary wave of interest during and immediately after the War, due to rising rents and housing shortages.

Public Health Problems. Great progress has been made during the past quarter century in preventing disease and prolonging human life. This is due in large part to the growth of public interest in the problem of preventable dis-

ease, and of public willingness to cooperate financially and otherwise in abolishing this evil. Yet there is impressive evidence that public interest and cooperation are far from sufficient for a complete solution of this problem. On the assumption that scientific knowledge of the causes, preventives and cures of diseases and defects might be generally applied, it has been estimated that there are upwards of 500,000 preventable deaths in the country per annum, that more than one million persons are at any given time incapacitated for work by preventable illnesses or defects, and that the money waste due to these factors is well over a billion dollars a year. These figures measure the *relative* backwardness of public interest and intelligence with regard to the general problem.

Leisure Time. During the present century there has been a notable development of parks and playgrounds, community centers, little theaters, public libraries and other facilities for the wholesome use of leisure time, especially in cities. This development has been stimulated or supported by public interest in the matter, and the schools are contributing something at least to the development of "constructive" leisure-time interests. The great majority of people, however, think of leisure time as affording opportunity for relaxation, amusement, sport, pursuit of a hobby and the like, but scarcely conceive of it as also affording an opportunity—and the only one for most people—for the cultivation of intellectual, æsthetic and civic interests. The more difficult problems raised by this conception of leisure time have not been solved in a scientific sense, and indeed are recognized as problems only by a very few people in this country.

Crime and Juvenile Delinquency. The overwhelming majority of people have little more than a morbid or sentimental interest in crime and delinquency, except perhaps when these touch their private lives or their vocational interests. Very few indeed, relatively speaking, have anything

approaching a well-grounded conception of the causation of crime and delinquency, of the wider behavior problems of which they are symptomatic, or of the measures requisite to the solution of these various problems, so far as solution is possible. Many problems in this field are of course unsolved in the scientific sense, but enough is known about the subject to demonstrate that our criminal procedure and penal system are essentially archaic in character. The irrational attitudes of the general public account very largely for the slow rate of progress in the reconstruction of these systems along scientific lines.

The remainder of our survey of social problems will be concerned with the more significant processes of social control, or the procedures applied in the treatment of social problems themselves. The problems pertaining to these processes are perhaps the most important of all, furnishing as they do the key to the more satisfactory treatment of social problems generally. We may begin with problems created by group attitudes and relationships.

Group Attitudes and Relationships. The secular trend (to borrow a term from the economists) of the relationships between different groups is probably toward a larger measure of tolerance, sympathy and understanding. There is not now the fierce intolerance, contempt and antagonism that characterized inter-group relationships in more primitive societies. Nevertheless, group intolerance, antipathy and misunderstanding constitute one of the most serious obstacles to the rational adjustment of inter-group relationships, and indeed largely create the problems here involved. The attitudes of employers and employees, of whites and blacks, of fundamentalists and modernists, and of different national groups towards one another sufficiently illustrate this fact. So serious are the problems thus created that many competent students anticipate that in numerous cases at least overt conflict will occur before solutions shall have been worked out;

and a recent writer has declared that, in the nature of the case, there can be no solution for one of these problems, the so-called Negro problem. Nevertheless, it seems probable that, from the secular point of view, relationships between these fundamental group divisions are slowly improving. It is obvious that general ignorance of the factors involved in inter-group relationships largely, though by no means entirely, accounts for the difficult problems involved therein.

Research. The first step in successfully dealing with any "practical" human problem is its solution in the scientific sense. Such solution or the lack or degree of it will condition anything that may be done to solve the problem in the practical sense of the term: Science and nescience, knowledge and ignorance, are thus basic factors in every domain of human life. Human problems include, of course, not only social problems as the term is commonly understood, but the questions raised by perplexity, doubt, frustration, maladjustment, in every phase of human life. If it be assumed that applied science works better than applied nescience as a procedure for dealing with these problems, then every human being has the most vital interest in the scientific solution of human problems. This, of course, is the function of research in the inclusive sense of the term.

The "average citizen" doubtless has some not altogether mistaken notions as to the nature of research and its contributions, actual and potential, to human welfare. Many citizens have read more or less "popular" literature on scientific subjects. Everybody applies innumerable scientific discoveries, especially those that are demonstrably applicable to everyday concerns. But when so much has been said, the accomplishments of the average citizen in the field of science are about all told. An understanding of scientific method or of the deeper implications of science for human behavior is the accomplishment of the few, not of the many. The fact that in all probability 90 per cent of adults in this country,

if not a greater percentage, accept the Biblical accounts of creation, two-thirds of a century after Darwin definitely disproved those accounts, the fact that many outright superstitions are still widely accepted, and many similar evidences attest the correctness of this assertion.

It rather follows that the mass of citizens can have only a very inadequate conception of the social functions of research, and can therefore count for but little in the promotion of research. Many observers are inclined to believe that, on the contrary, public opposition to scientific teachings in conflict with popular prejudices is likely to interfere with the development of research in the future.

Education. Both science and nescience, together with the associated attitudes and sentiments, are given practical effect through educational influences of one sort or another. There is an all but universal belief in education conceived as schooling, in the United States as in many other countries, and the actual educational processes thus sanctioned have an incalculable influence on human life and welfare. In fact, education thus understood is one of the very few social interests in which the public is vitally concerned. The evidences of this fact may be seen everywhere, and need not, therefore, be indicated here.

On the other hand, there is a general failure to understand many of our deeper educational problems. The vital importance of fostering independence in thought and respect for scientific knowledge is not generally understood. The popular notion that education is schooling, and not a way of life universal in its application, indicates another serious misunderstanding. The types of personnel required for the most fruitful educational endeavor, and their implications for professional training and educational finance are also matters of vital educational import which do not come within the comprehension of the public at large.

Of educational agencies not engaged in schooling the public

is quite ignorant, so far as their deeper problems are concerned. The educational significance of the primary groups, the forces for good and evil centering in the newspaper, the social menace of propaganda as at present developed and applied, the educational functions of group discussion, the part which "adult education" generally might play in human life are only very superficially understood by the general public, when understood at all.

Political Problems. The public evidently cares or understands but little about the outstanding political problems of the time. It knows or cares but little, for instance, about the short ballot, the merit system in the civil service, or the initiative, referendum and recall. The first two of these "systems" at least are demonstrably superior to any alternative systems, but, save for commission forms of government in cities, progress in their adoption is quite slow, owing to public indifference and the opposition of professional politicians.

Quite as obviously, the public is generally ignorant and indifferent, profoundly so, regarding party machinery and party politics. For instance, primary elections and the forces that dominate them are not generally understood. One evidence of this is the relatively small vote cast at primaries, compared with general elections.

Needless to say, the grave problems raised by the demonstrated limitations of political democracy and the rise of avowedly anti-democratic movements in various parts of the world are beyond the ken of the common man. So also are the problems raised by the more undemocratic features of our own peculiar constitutional system. Much is said, of course, regarding the Constitution in high-school debates and political campaigns, but the tendency of such discussion, as a rule, is to promote anything but an understanding of our constitutional problems. There are, of course, many people

in the United States who do have some grasp of fundamental constitutional issues.

One traditional principle of our constitutional system is so significant in the present connection that explicit reference to it will not be out of place. This is freedom of speech, press and assembly. Lip homage is paid to this principle by almost everybody who has occasion to mention it. Yet when a crucial practical test of the principle is made, as in war time or in strike situations, it is often, very often, violated. This indicates, I think, that the practical implications of the principle are not generally realized. Indeed, the indications are that real understanding of the principle is a comparatively rare phenomenon. This, if true, is quite significant, for there has surely been ample time for people generally to learn what the principle means, had other factors not interfered.

Such a survey of the citizen's problems and the nature of his interest therein could be indefinitely extended and elaborated. One could show, for instance, that there is but little public interest in and understanding of problems centering in the home, the institution of marriage and the rôle of women in political, economic and social life—problems which affect all classes of persons in our society, whatever their sex, age or circumstance. Likewise, the problems that are created, for those who can see them, by the virtual exclusion of the masses from science, art and so-called higher interests in general are realized by very few. Again, the problem of preventing armed conflict between nations, so vital to the security and happiness of everybody, is really grasped by only a comparatively few people, though interest in the problem superficially conceived is perhaps quite general.

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MAR 3-	Hutchinson	MAR 5-
OCT 5-	C. C. Hutchinson	OCT
MAY 10	Pense <u>Clark</u>	

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ELDRIDGE, S.
New citizenship.

